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Summary 
 
In the universe of problems humans face every day there is subset characterized by a salient 
dynamic component. The FireChief task (Omodei & Wearing 1995) is a fire-fighting computer 
simulation that can be characterized as the acquisition of interactive skills involving fast-paced 
actions cued by external information. This research describes the process followed to create a 
cognitive model of this complex dynamic task where full experimental control is not available. 
The cognitive model provides a detailed description of how cognition and perception interplay 
to produce the interactive skill of fighting the fire. Several artefacts were produced by this 
effort including a dynamic task fully compatible with ACT-R, a tool for analysing the data, and a 
cognitive model whose features enable the replication of several aspects of the empirical data. 
A key finding is that good performance is linked to an effective combination of strategic 
control with attention to changing task demands, reflecting time and care taken in informing 
and effecting action. The contributions of this work towards our understanding of complex 
problem solving are the methodological approach to the creation of the model, the design 
patterns embedded in the model (which are a reflection of the cognitive demands imposed by 
the nature of the task) and mainly an explanation of how skill, described in terms of strategy 
use, is acquired in complex scenarios. This study also provides a deeper understanding of the 
interactions observed in the Cañas et al. (2005) dataset, including a computational realisation 
of how cognitive inflexibility occurs.  
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1. Introduction  
Given that solving problems is a pervasive aspect of everyone’s life, it seems reasonable to 
dedicate effort to understand more about the nature of these problems and, ideally, to learn 
how to solve them. Researchers have created several categories of problems such as well-
defined and ill-defined, static and dynamic, simple and complex problems, etc. (Newell & 
Simon, 1972). Considering these categories classic problem solving research has been focused 
on quite static problems such as the Tower of Hanoi (see section 2.3.1.1). In contrast, there are 
other tasks that are characterized by a salient dynamic component. The purpose of this 
research work is to conduct a detailed study of problem solving behaviour in a complex 
dynamic task, a fire-fighting computer simulation, in order to further understand strategy use 
in CPS. A methodology based on systematic data analysis of empirical data and mainly on a 
detailed modelling of problem solving behaviour is followed. 
1.1. Problem solving, microworlds and cognitive modelling 
Research in problem solving has provided useful constructs to explain how people solve 
problems such as the concept of problem space (Newell & Simon, 1972) which can be 
combined with the notion of purposeful behaviour to conceptualize a problem solver as an 
agent that produces a stream of behaviour when given a goal. This study is focused on a 
branch of problem solving named Complex Problem Solving (CPS). There is not a single 
definition of CPS available in literature. For example, Frensch & Funke (1995) consider CPS as 
an activity to overcome obstacles between current and goal states, whilst Anderson provides a 
quite operational definition: a “goal-directed sequence of cognitive operations” (1980, p. 257). 
For this research complexity is related the amount of variables involved in the problem solving 
situation, the number of decisions involved and perceptual-motor requirements. A paradigm 
to study CPS is taken from the work of Frensch & Funke (1995). In this paradigm a problem is 
not defined only by task features, but rather by “the interaction between task characteristics 
and person characteristics” (Frensch & Funke, 1995, p. 7).  
 
Different aspects of CPS can be studied following this conceptualization of CPS. By focusing on 
the task only it is possible to explore different factors related to the structure of the problem: 
task characteristics (section 2.3.2) and task configuration (sections 2.2.3.3 and 2.2.3.4). Also, 
by isolating the problem solver, cognitive and non-cognitive variables (section 2.2.3.2) can be 
analysed. Furthermore, when the study considers the interplay between the problem solver 
and the task a new set of areas related to the process of coping with the task can be studied 
(section 2.3.6) including mechanisms such as the use of strategies, a topic largely studied in 
this research. As participants interact with the task there is a learning effect that has different 
components including skill acquisition (section 2.2.3.1), strategy consolidation (section 6.1.2.2) 
and cognitive inflexibility (section 3.1).   
 
There are various approaches to the study of CPS. One of these approaches emphasizes the 
use of computerized simulations, also called microworlds. The work of Dörner (1996) is highly 
representative of this approach. Microworlds are computer simulations that represent a 
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middle point between naturalistic scenarios and laboratory tasks (Brehmer & Dörner, 1993). 
Although microworlds are relatively simple, they embody the essential characteristics of real-
world dynamic decision making environments (Gonzalez, Vanyukov & Martin, 2005). 
Microworlds have three characteristics (Gonzalez, Thomas & Vanyukov, 2004). The first 
characteristic is complexity, owing to the number of elements involved and the nature of their 
interrelationships (Frensch & Funke, 1995). The second one is the lack of transparency; the 
problem solver does not have access to all relevant task information, making interaction with 
the world necessary for knowledge requirements. And the third one is their dynamic nature: 
the problem state changes both independently and as a consequence of the participant’s 
actions.  
 
This research work is concerned with choice at the level of strategy selection, adaptation and 
implementation, and attempts to provide insights into interactions between these dimensions 
and performance under different conditions of task practice; therefore it is necessary to select 
a suitable dynamic task. This dynamic task is called FireChief (Omodei & Wearing, 1995). 
Imagine the following situation: you are in charge of fighting a fire spreading over a well-
delimited landscape composed of different terrain types. In order to accomplish the goal of 
fighting the fire you are required to use two kinds of resources, copters and trucks, which have 
different capabilities. You also have knowledge about the direction and the strength of the 
wind. FireChief performance is measured in terms of the amount of terrain that is not 
destroyed at the end of a four-minute trial (a detailed description is provided in the next 
chapter). The specific kind of problem participants confront when dealing with FireChief is a 
dynamic decision problem (Brehmer, 1987) where a series of interdependent decisions are 
required to reach the goal, the environment changes over time, and the decisions change the 
state of the world (Brehmer, 1987; Brehmer & Allard, 1991; Gonzalez et al., 2004). In general 
terms, a FireChief participant is engaged in a strategic situation where he or she has control 
over a limited number of truck and copter fire-fighting units and has to use them to accomplish 
one mission: fighting the fire.     
 
According to Schunn, McGregor & Saner (2006) a strategy is a coherent set of steps for solving 
a problem. For this research strategies are considered the basic construct to explain 
phenomena such as performance differences. When the problem solver is facing the situation 
imposed by the simulation, s/he must select actions that ultimately will lead to the 
achievement of a goal such as the successful control of the fire. It has been observed that 
everyone uses multiple strategies, and that different groups of people share many, if not most, 
strategies (Reder, 1987; Lemaire & Siegler, 1995). It has also been observed that participants 
vary in their distribution of use of strategies. These observations led to the creation of the 
strategy adaptivity approach (Schunn & Reder, 2001). In this approach while two individuals 
may have the same set of strategies, they may differ in their ability to select the best strategy 
for a given situation. Strategies are characterized by different levels of accuracy and required 
effort but, for Payne et al. (1993) an effortful decision process is identified by a high number of 
operators or more demanding operators. These topics of strategy use and implementation are 
explored in detail in this research.  
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Cognitive modelling has been used in dynamic environments such as air traffic control 
(Taatgen, 2005). As Frensch and Funke (1995) suggest, it is important to understand the 
process of complex problem solving rather than the product. For this research the problem 
solving product is comprised by a list of actions taken by the problem solver within a dynamic 
task. On the other hand, the problem solving process comprises a sequence of cognitive, 
perceptual and motor actions that should produce a sequence of FireChief commands. Insight 
into these cognitive processes can be gained through the construction of a cognitive model. 
How these actions are selected and executed by the model depends on the cognitive 
architecture that supports them.  
 
A cognitive architecture embodies structures and mechanisms in the form of a general theory 
of how the mind works (Newell, 1990) and is used for creating simulation models of human 
cognition (Taatgen & Anderson, 2008). Cognitive architectures define a set of operations 
provided by their processing structure, in the form of mechanisms to access encoded 
knowledge (in the form of rules for example) to appropriately select actions to attain goals. 
One such architecture is ACT-R (Adaptive Control of Thought-Rational, Anderson et al., 2004). 
The basic principle of ACT-R is that an agent executes actions according to rational analysis: it 
selects actions that attempt to achieve its goals. According to rational analysis “each 
component of the cognitive system is optimised with respect to demands from the 
environment, given its computational limitations.” (p. 29). A cognitive model developed in 
ACT-R makes use of the several modules of the architecture (for example, to perceive the 
environment or to remember things) and of its various mechanisms (for example, learning or 
action selection) to produce a stream of behaviour.   
 
There are several cognitive modelling paradigms (Taatgen et al., 2006). In one of these 
approaches several strategies are implemented in the cognitive architecture and then compete 
for use in solving a problem. This paradigm is leveraged and extended in this research. 
According to Taatgen et al. (2006) utility learning is a useful mechanism in tasks where there 
are multiple cognitive strategies, but where it is unclear which one is best. The model is 
designed around the exploitation of the temporal utility learning mechanism embedded in 
ACT-R in order to provide the required sensibility considering the highly dynamic task it is 
facing. The characteristics of the task used in this research provided a challenging scenario for 
modelling. As a result, various experiences relating to the development of large cognitive 
models were documented throughout the various stages of the model’s development. A 
cognitive model is implemented in the ACT-R cognitive architecture with the aim of gaining 
understanding about different aspects of problem solving described in the following 
section.The study of CPS behaviour 
Now that the focus of this research is clearly defined, namely the modelling of strategy use in a 
complex dynamic task, specific issues can be addressed. A first challenge this research must 
tackle refers to the identification of strategies, that is, the ability to discriminate among 
distinct models of strategic behaviour based on empirical data. The kind of behaviour required 
by FireChief can be described as interactive in terms of Fu & Anderson (2008): “learning action 
sequences in situations that depend critically on the utilization of external cues” (p. 4). It is 
known that interactive behaviour in complex tasks is constrained by cognitive, perceptual and 
manual processes (Anderson et al., 2004; Taatgen, 2005). A cognitive model of a complex 
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dynamic task can shed light on this topic by providing a detailed account of how behaviour is 
constrained by the various ACT-R modules controlled by the knowledge embedded in ACT-R. 
This research is focused on strategy use, including execution, adaptation and flexibility and is 
structured around specific research questions that are presented below.  
1.2.1. What characterizes strategies in complex dynamic tasks?  
The problem solver must achieve control over the situation by means of competent and time-
constrained decision making. The complexity of FireChief is considerable: the landscape is 
composed of 400 blocks of terrain, there are 4 fire-fighting units, multiple fires spreading at 
the same time, three different commands available and the influence of wind strength and 
direction to be taken into consideration. The problem solver also needs to deal with the 
dynamic nature of the microworld. In this context two kinds of control seems to be in 
continuous competition (Taatgen, 2005). In top-down control the decision flow starts in the 
head of the problem solver, in his or her representation of the problem, and ultimately results 
in selection of an action that has some impact in the environment. This kind of control can be 
characterized as a plan that is followed. As actions are executed in the environment the state 
of the world is updated, and eventually it is possible to determine whether the goal has been 
achieved. In bottom-up control the problem solver executes actions based on the effects that 
they produce in the environment. The problem solver needs to be aware of these effects at all 
times; there is no pre-defined course of action but an adaptive selection of operators. This 
characteristic raises several questions such as which kind of control (top-down or bottom-up) 
should be exerted and when, or how to make sense of environmental feedback. Considering 
the speed at which events occur in FireChief psychomotor ability is a good candidate for good 
performance: the problem solver must issue a considerable quantity of commands under 
severe time constraints. For some researchers (Ackerman 1988; Ackerman & Cianciolo, 2002) 
task content is a determining factor of skilled performance. Because FireChief is spatio-
temporal in nature (it requires the processing of spatial and temporal content), it is important 
to consider spatial ability. Spatial thinking requires the ability to encode, remember, transform 
and discriminate spatial stimuli.  
1.2.2. How strategy use is affected by task manipulations? 
The Experimental Psychology and Behaviour Physiology Department of the University of 
Granada kindly made available the data of 82 participants completing dynamic CPS trials using 
the FireChief simulation. This dataset was obtained using an experimental design that 
examined different aspects of strategy use, adaptation and strategy consolidation. The Cañas 
et al. (2005) study found interesting interactions using this data set. The results found by Cañas 
et al. are considered in this work but a brand new analysis was conducted. Because the 
ultimate goal was to create a cognitive model a new analysis at a finer level of detail than that 
carried out in the original study was required. Conducting this analysis also resulted in a 
detailed understanding of the FireChief task in which strategies are deployed. In the Cañas et 
al. (2005) study participants interacted with 24 FireChief scenarios. The first 16 scenarios were 
considered as the training phase and the last 8 scenarios as the testing phase. The various 
interactions found by the Cañas et al. (2005) study are re-examined here and more 
explanations are obtained through the new analysis and mainly by the explanations provided 
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by the cognitive model. An important consideration here is how much of these explanations 
can be generalized to other complex dynamic tasks.  
1.2.3. How do choices arise in complex and dynamic situations? 
This study is focused on the interactive, dynamic decision making aspects of complex tasks. Fu 
& Anderson (2006) consider that the ability to make quick, non-deliberative decisions that 
occurs through the exposure to the same or similar situations is a major component of 
performing complex skills. Because decisions in this kind of task must be made under 
considerable time-pressure, the problem solver needs to select appropriate actions quickly. 
Any benefit derived from making a decision decreases with the amount of time it takes to be 
executed (in the extreme case, the best decision will become completely useless). Adaptation 
makes sense when environmental conditions are not always the same (Schunn et al., 2001), 
and adaptivity is directly related to sensitivity to environmental change. The problem solver 
uses feedback for determining the effectiveness of his or her interventions. Gonzalez et al. 
(2004) affirmed that performance in dynamic tasks is highly determined by the ability of the 
problem solver to recognize that it is necessary to alter the decision processes. Problem 
solvers require continuous processing of feedback in order to select appropriate actions within 
an ever-changing situation (Brehmer & Dörner, 1993). The cognitive model prescribes a 
mechanism in which environmental feedback controls how actions are selected in a highly 
dynamic task. 
1.3. A challenging task  
One of the main difficulties associated to the use of microworlds for experimental research is 
how to deal with their inherent complexity. A data analysis tool was developed to aid in the 
data analysis process. This same tool is used to assess the Quality of Fit of the model with the 
empirical data. This tool was used to analyse and make sense of empirical data in order to 
identify and characterize participants’ strategies.  
 
An important aspect that needs to be considered when developing an ACT-R cognitive model is 
that the task must be available to the model. This is a technical requirement that is imposed on 
the modeller. If the task is simple enough this requirement may represent a dozen LISP 
functions. In the case of FireChief this requirement represented a rather challenging technical 
endeavour: a new version of FireChief was developed for this research in the LISP language. A 
particularly difficult aspect of this task was to handle all the possible events that could arise in 
FireChief while the model was executing commands and perceiving events. 
 
Cooper et al. (1996) stress the gap that exists between an informal psychological statement 
and the computer realisation of this statement in a computer language such a LISP using the 
ACT-R cognitive architecture. This research work shows how this gap is bridged by defining a 
cognitive modelling approach. The cognitive modelling literature provides a set of principles 
that were used during the development of the model, for example Taatgen (2005) advocates 
the most simple control structure. The cognitive modelling paradigm followed in this research 
shares several elements with the Strategy Behaviour Paradigm described in Taatgen et al. 
(2006). Nevertheless, there are many characteristics of the FireChief task, mainly its dynamic 
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component, which requires a new approach to its modelling. For example, there is a 
considerable amount of perceptual and motor processes that must be executed at a fast pace, 
so it is necessary to find a modelling approach that addresses these requirements.  
 
Another topic related to the modelling of complex tasks is how we can exploit the information 
given by the model. An ACT-R cognitive model provides a trace of all the actions that are being 
executed in the different modules and the content of all its memories, this information is 
essential for understanding the underlying process, but there is another potential source of 
information that is usually not considered by modellers. In a cognitive architecture such as 
ACT-R there is a formidable amount of computation happening at all times used during the 
conflict resolution phase to select a single action for the next cycle. An approach that uses the 
utility of productions to understand more about the underlying phenomenon is proposed and 
used in this research.  
 
As Anderson et al. (2004) put it: the external world provides much of the cognitive tissue that 
integrates cognition. One of the motivations for this study is to assess the capabilities of ACT-R 
for dealing with a complex problem such as FireChief. The authors of FireChief postulate that 
this microworld captures many of the properties of real world fire-fighting (Omodei & Wearing 
1995). The idea of investigating cognition in a complex task was compelling. In ACT-R 
coordination of behaviour depends on the central production system (which stores and uses 
production rules), but it is aware of a limited amount of information: just that which can be 
stored in registers that can hold only one piece of information at a time (Anderson et. al, 
2004). The FireChief microworld requires a considerable amount of processing by the visual 
and motor modules and its procedural memory is composed of several hundreds of rules. 
1.4. Overview 
The approach taken in this research is as follows. First, relevant knowledge about microworld 
characteristics is gathered from the literature. This literature survey is centred on complex, 
dynamic and non-transparent microworlds and the demands they impose on problems solvers. 
Second, a particular microworld, FireChief, is selected and a task analysis is conducted. This 
task analysis is detailed enough to allow a re-implementation of this task in a different 
programming language. Third, a large set of data is analysed and several behavioural patterns 
are extracted and organized into strategic categories, significant interactions are documented 
also. This analysis is assisted by the use of a software tool developed for this end. Fourth, a 
fine-grained cognitive model is developed with the aim of replicating the main interactions 
observed in the Cañas et al. (2005) study. The model should also provide a detailed 
explanation of these phenomena, including the considerable variability shown by participants.  
 
This research is interested in understanding more about how people deal with complex 
dynamic situations, particularly at the level of strategy use, so the different choices made by 
the problem solvers are the focus of attention. In the FireChief model there are different kinds 
of decisions. First, a strategy must be chosen. In the FireChief model a strategy is composed of 
a set of intentions. So the second kind of choices refers to the selection of the next intention to 
be executed. After an intention is selected there is a third level of choices: how to execute the 
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intention. An intention is executed by selecting FireChief commands. After a FireChief 
command is selected the model decides how to execute this command through a combination 
of cognitive, perceptual and motor actions. The ACT-R cognitive architecture allows the 
modelling of these different kinds of decisions. 
1.5. Plan of the thesis 
Chapter 2 reviews theory related to Complex Problem Solving (CPS). The first part discusses 
topics related to CPS such as its definition, determinants of CPS performance and different 
approaches to its study. This chapter also introduces a particular set of tasks called 
microworlds. Much of the literature discussed in this chapter is centred on the use of 
computer simulations for the study of CPS behaviour. Concrete examples of microworlds are 
provided with the aim of illustrating the concepts described in the chapter. In this section a 
comprehensive description of the FireChief microworld (Omodei & Wearing, 1995) is provided. 
The chapter continues with a discussion of the various cognitive demands associated with the 
use of microworlds before describing the advantages and difficulties associated with the use of 
these simulations. Because the methodological approach followed in this research is cognitive 
modelling, chapter 2 ends with a section related to cognitive architectures and cognitive 
modelling. A description of the ACT-R cognitive architecture is included in this chapter 
alongside the reasons behind its selection in this research.  
 
A focal point of this research work is how to overcome the complexity inherent to the use of 
microworlds for psychological research. Chapter 3 describes an approach based on task and 
data analysis. Chapter 3 starts describing in detail the Cañas et al. (2005) study, which is the 
source of the dataset used for cognitive modelling. To support the data analysis phase a 
software tool called the Protocol Analysis Tool (PAT) was designed and developed. The way 
this tool enables the analysis of FireChief data is discussed in this chapter. The main outcome 
of the analysis of the data is the definition of a set of strategies. These strategies are named, 
described and organized into a hierarchy. The second half of chapter 3 presents a series of 
statistics and metrics extracted from the data. Significant interactions discovered through this 
detailed analysis of the data are presented here. This section also presents a special set of 
metrics related to the use of FireChief commands which are particularly relevant in assessing 
the Quality of Fit (QOF) of the model.  
 
The potential benefit of any cognitive architecture is the opportunity to bring to bear multiple 
constraints in a single framework. The sources of constraints that impact the model’s 
behaviour are depicted in the CPS paradigm proposed by Frensch & Funke (1995): the problem 
solver, the task and the environment. Previous chapters describe different aspects of the 
FireChief task and the cognitive demands it poses to problem solvers. Chapter 4 is about how 
the complex problem solving process happens from the problem solver’s perspective. The ACT-
R cognitive architecture is an abstraction of the problem solver’s cognitive system, and the 
FireChief task is solved by making use of the various mechanisms built into the architecture. 
This chapter describes with more detail these mechanisms. The model’s behaviour is also 
determined by its knowledge; Chapter 4 therefore describes which knowledge is available to 
the model. This chapter explains that the general approach followed during the development 
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of the model was to enforce the free competition of small blocks of behaviour based on 
environmental rewards.  
 
Bearing in mind the research goal of increasing our understanding of strategy use in dynamic 
tasks, chapter 5 describes the results obtained with the model. This chapter starts with a 
description of the output of each model run and the analysis of the Quality of Fit (QOF) of the 
model using several measures. Interesting findings related to command use are presented in 
this section too. A particularly relevant section of this chapter describes how the procedural 
knowledge embedded in the model, governed by a set of utility values, was tuned to the task 
by the continuous interaction of the model with the simulation and, among other topics, how 
the different training programmes mediated this process. Knowledge about how to execute 
actions is given to the cognitive model at the outset, but the exact emergence of strategies is a 
product of the interaction between the problem solver (the model) and the environment. The 
last chapter, chapter 6, presents a general discussion of the contributions of the thesis which 
are organized around the explanations of CPS behaviour and performance provided by the 
cognitive model. This chapter also presents the conclusions of this research work. 
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2. Complex Problem Solving, 
Microworlds and Cognitive 
Architectures 
This chapter provides the context in which this research is conducted. The first two sections 
introduce concepts related to problem solving and Complex Problem Solving (CPS) respectively 
including a theoretical framework for the study of CPS. The third section describes computer 
simulations called microworlds and explains why they are suitable for studying CPS. This 
section also discusses the demands imposed by this kind of simulation bearing in mind the 
ultimate goal of laying the groundwork for the development of a cognitive model. Given that 
human rational behaviour is constrained by the structure of the task and computational 
capabilities of the problem solver (Simon, 1990) it is possible that the various demands that 
complex dynamic tasks impose on problem solvers, such as the fact that a high level of 
dynamics reduces the available time for making decisions dramatically, may exceed their 
cognitive abilities. This chapter ends with a description of cognitive architectures and cognitive 
modelling.  
2.1. Problem Solving 
Solving problems is a pervasive aspect of everyone’s life. From the many definitions of 
problem solving (cf. Frensch & Funke, 1995) it is possible to extract a set of commonalties. 
First, problem solving is goal-directed (Scheiter et al., 2000). This means that it is necessary to 
find the sequence of actions that will produce the desired outcome using whatever knowledge 
and techniques problem solvers have. By generating these actions the environment is affected 
and therefore the problem solver needs to evaluate the consequences of his or her actions and 
act accordingly. Second, problems are decomposable. For instance, the Tower of Hanoi (TOH) 
problem of moving several disks from one peg to another can be decomposed into sub-
problems related to moving single disks to different locations. Nevertheless goal 
decomposition requires the execution of processes for coordinating the execution and 
completion of sub-goals, placing extra cognitive demands on the problem solver. Third, the 
problem solver relies on abstractions. Some problems can be represented as problem spaces 
(Newell & Simon, 1972) comprised by problem states and operators. A key assumption of this 
approach is that a problem space should only include aspects of the task environment that are 
relevant for solving a particular problem. This means that the problem solver creates a useful 
representation of the task. This abstraction enables a searching process driven by two 
elements: which operators apply in the current situation and the probability for each of being 
on the correct path. Fourth, problems solvers make use of methods, or strategies. The 
available strategies are determined by the chosen representation. Methods are organizations 
of behaviour directed towards solving problems. There is a huge variety of strategies that can 
be leveraged for solving a problem. Some of them are simple: the answer to a problem may be 
evoked from memory or a problem may be solved by a “generate and test” approach. Others 
are a bit more elaborate such as means-ends analysis. The nature of certain tasks requires the 
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application of very specific strategies which can hardly be transferred to other scenarios. 
Because each strategy has a different probability of solving the problem at hand it is important 
to understand how strategies are selected and implemented. Fifth, problems can be classified. 
A common distinction is between well-defined problems, where the problem solver is provided 
with all the information needed in order to solve the problem; and ill-defined problems, where 
the problem solver needs to make an extra effort to define the problem. Another one is 
between simple and complex problems, a topic discussed in the next section.  
2.2. Complex Problem Solving 
In traditional problem solving, where research emphasized the process of moving between 
intermediate states until the final solution is reached, there was a preference for using tasks 
where these intermediate states are physical such as the Tower Of Hanoi (VanLehn, 1989). 
These tasks are novel to participants, have clearly defined optimal solutions, are solvable 
within a short time frame, and participants’ problem solving steps can be traced. In this 
respect Funke (1991) argued that it is hard to generalize results obtained from traditional 
problem solving studies to Complex Problem Solving (CPS) due to the low validity of simple 
laboratory tasks with respect to the complexity of real-life problems. Also Quesada, Kintsch & 
Gomez (2002), who were interested in defining CPS, consider that due to the unclear definition 
of CPS it is hard to say whether traditional problem solving findings can be extended to CPS. 
This kind of discrepancy spawned different approaches to the study of CPS. In one of them, the 
American approach, there was an interest in studying problem solving in domains that require 
extensive knowledge, such as reading, writing, arithmetic, social and natural sciences, and 
games (Sternberg & Frensch, 1991).  
An alternative approach, branded the European tradition, presents two variants: the first 
related to the work of Broadbent (Broadbent 1993; Berry & Broadbent, 1988) and the second 
represented by the work of Dörner (Dörner & Wearing, 1995). The Broadbent tradition 
emphasizes the distinction between cognitive processes that operate under awareness versus 
outside of awareness. Berry & Broadbent (1995) used a task environment called Sugar 
Production where an input variable (workforce) is manipulated in order to control the output 
of the system (sugar production) at a pre-specified level. It was observed that although people 
are capable of controlling the system (i.e. maintaining the targeted amount of sugar 
production) they are unable to verbalize the relation between the variables. On the other hand 
Dörner’s tradition emphasizes the use of computerized simulations. For example in the SINUS 
simulation there are three input variables that control three output variables and the relation 
among them is governed by three linear equations, and the task that the problem solver 
confronts is to understand the nature of these equations. Within this same tradition there are 
also microworlds that highlight the dynamic aspects of problem solving such as fire-fighting 
scenarios (Brehmer 1987, Dörner & Wearing 1995, Omodei & Wearing 1995, Rigas et al., 
2002), emergency dispatching (Joslyn & Hunt, 1998), and air traffic control (Taatgen, 2005). 
2.2.1. An operational definition of CPS 
The definition of CPS followed in this research was labelled the “Gap definition of CPS” by 
Frensch & Funke (2005). This gap is a separation between the current state and the desired 
state, and problem solving is conceptualized as a process of overcoming obstacles to achieve 
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goals. The problem solver can overcome these obstacles by means of behavioural and/or 
cognitive, multi-step activities. In traditional problem solving the presence of a single barrier is 
common while in CPS there are multiple co-existent barriers. Consequently, in CPS a long 
series of decisions is required to solve the overall problem and each new decision influences 
the conditions for the next one (Quesada, Kintsch & Gomez, 2002).  
2.2.2. CPS paradigm 
The Gap definition of CPS structures a paradigm of CPS focused on the interaction between 
task, environment and problem solver (figure 2.1). This interaction creates a CPS situation 
where the problem solver applies resources (cognitive and non-cognitive) to overcome 
obstacles. In this view the solution to the CPS situation implies an efficient interaction between 
the problem solver and the task environment (Wenke & Frensch, 2003). The importance of 
studying the problem solver and the task at the same time is also stressed by Brehmer & 
Dörner (1993). This paradigm also dictates that any transition from a given state to a goal state 
is constrained by the problem solver’s memory content, information processing capabilities, 
and by the tools that are available to the problem solver (Frensch & Funke, 1995). 
 
Figure 2.1: CPS situation (taken from Frensch & Funke, 1995, p. 22) 
 
2.2.3. Determinants of CPS performance 
From the problem solver’s point of view, several determinants have been identified as playing 
a role in CPS performance.  
2.2.3.1. Experience 
A skill acquisition theory has been tested using Air Traffic Control (ATC) tasks (Ackerman, 1988, 
1992; Taatgen, 2001). According to Ackerman (1988) there are successive stages during skill 
acquisition. Initially, during the cognitive stage, behaviour is error prone and participants need 
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to be more focussed on the task instructions. In the associative stage, participants memorize 
some of the rules for landing planes (i.e. instructions) and error rate is reduced. Finally, in the 
automatic stage, participants have dominion over the rules of the task, speed increases at the 
same time that errors are reduced. Experience also affects the strategies that are employed by 
the problem solver. It was proposed by Anderson & Lebiere (1998) that, as experience in a task 
is gained, the participant increments his or her performance by proceduralizing knowledge. 
Another explanation is that better performance is achieved when there is a more efficient 
schedule of perceptual, cognitive and motor processes. Two factors mediate changes in ability-
performance relations due to practice: complexity, which implies greater reliance on general 
intellectual abilities, and consistency (uniformity of information processing demands across 
practice).  
2.2.3.2. Cognitive and Non-cognitive factors 
Cognitive variables represent different abilities the problem solver can make use of for solving 
the task, such as information processing capacity, working memory and psychomotor ability. 
By analysing the information processing requirements of a task it is possible to determine a 
candidate set of these factors (Ackerman, 1992). Moreover researchers have used individual 
measures of these factors to predict performance in various tasks (Gonzalez et al., 2004; 
Rehling et al., 2004). For Dörner (1996), failure is not random but exhibits common patterns 
and the objective of his research is to discover how to improve our ability to control complex 
systems and reduce errorful behaviour by analysing their roots. Dörner identified various 
sources of errors, of faulty behaviour, when people deal with complex tasks, for instance 
insufficient goal elaboration, neglecting side and long-term effects (by not considering the 
interaction of variables and insufficient coordination of problem solving actions). When 
considering the use of strategies, Dörner identified two sources of errors: failure to detect 
inappropriate strategies, and failure to repair inappropriate strategies. One of the computer 
simulations used by Dörner to study these kinds of errors is Moro, a game involving planning 
the survival of a semi-nomadic tribe in the African Sahel (see section 2.3.1.4). Dörner also 
stresses the importance of self-reflexive examination in order to adapt to the given 
circumstances. In considering non-cognitive factors, Dörner identified a tendency to guard 
one’s feeling of competence as a reason behind the lack of adaptation. By not looking at one’s 
mistakes one’s estimation of one’s own competence is not endangered. In other example, 
Hesse et al. (1983), using a computer simulation called Epidemic, found that highly distressed 
participants obtained higher quality values, worked harder, took more effective actions, and 
recognized effective measures more readily. Brehmer & Dörner (1993) argue that emotions 
are elicited by success or failure, so participants need to cope with their emotions when 
dealing with this kind of computer simulation.  
 
Substantial differences have been observed among individuals interacting with CPS situations 
(Taatgen, 2001; Schunn & Reder, 1998; Rehling et al., 2004) and different approaches to study 
these differences have been developed. One of these approaches is the parameters approach 
which assumes that differences in performance can be attributed to fundamental differences 
in the cognitive system. Two examples or parameters are processing speed and working 
memory capacity (Taatgen, 2001). According to Gonzalez et al. (2003) very little is known 
about which cognitive abilities are necessary for successful performance on dynamic tasks (the 
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relevance of this kind of task is explained later) although Ackerman (1988) suggests that 
spatio-temporal task domains such as computer simulations have an important spatial 
component and research has found positive correlations between working memory and 
perceptual/motor ability with performance in an Air Traffic Control (ATC) task (Rehling et al., 
2004) and between working memory, proceduralization speed (ability to learn new rules) and 
psychomotor speed (time needed for a key-press) with performance in another ATC task 
(Taatgen, 2001). Various studies have found that processing/reasoning ability and learning 
potential tend to be related to good performance (Funke & Frensch, 1995). A parameter can 
be defined at a higher level, for example as “the ability to solve problems”. In this respect 
Funke and Frensch, based on the evidence of the importance of context, semantic 
embeddedness and knowledge, argue that there is no abstract context-independent capacity 
for solving problems. On the other hand Joslyn & Hunt (1998) developed a task for measuring 
the abstract decision making ability of participants. They found that performance in this 
abstract task was positively correlated with performance in an ATC and an emergency 
dispatching task.  
2.2.3.3. Environmental factors  
Environmental factors affect CPS by constraining the information processes that can be 
applied, by influencing information accessibility and by restricting which means can be used for 
solving the problem (Frensch & Funke, 1995). Environmental factors include the nature of 
feedback, expectations about the task and the possibility or necessity of cooperation with 
other problem solvers. Using a simulation called Temperature, in which participants control 
the temperature of an artificial system, Heineken et al. (1992) used an experimental design 
with three conditions: no delay, short delay and long delay when providing feedback 
concerning the quality of the interventions, that is, if the manipulation made to the system 
served or not to achieve the desired temperature. They found that feedback delay reduced 
performance. Another study looking at the impact of feedback delays in a fire fighting scenario 
was conducted by Brehmer (1995). The delays were due to slow reporting by the fire-fighting 
units about their location and actions. These delays force participants to coordinate their 
decisions by remembering information needed to organize their sub-goals and thus place 
demands on working memory. As a consequence of these delays not every action shows 
immediate consequences so participants need to have a way of representing the future state 
of the system. Expectations about a problem solving task are usually provided in the form of 
instructions. In the contexts of computer simulations these instructions range from a very 
precise set of rules to ambiguous statements such as: “improve the welfare of a tribe”. Group 
problem solving has also captured the attention of several researchers (Johansson, Persson, 
Granlund & Mattson, 2003; Gonzalez et al., 2004); in this case the problem solver needs to 
communicate and perhaps cooperate with other problem solvers.  
2.2.3.4. Task manipulations 
Various studies have found that specific task manipulations have an impact on performance. 
Task manipulation is paramount within the context of CPS due to the very nature of the 
experiments, where the degree of control over the development of the experiment is low. 
Alibali & Booth (2002) studied the influence of cues on the formation of representations. The 
materials used in this research were ten problems about constant change; for example, one of 
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these problems is to calculate the total growth of a sapling taking into account its growth rate. 
They manipulated the wording of the problem and the use of graphs to vary the intervention. 
Their hypothesis was that some cues can enhance the representation of the problem and 
hence improve strategy selection. They found that graphical cues play an important role in 
enabling strategy discovery by providing the means for problem solvers to create mental 
models of the task. Del Missier & Fum (2002) studied the toads and frogs puzzle (refer to 
section 2.3.1.2 for a description). The study was focused on the role of hints to improve 
performance. They defined a set of strategies and studied the way participants select among 
them. They manipulated the availability of hints: for one group the interface provides 
information about the movements that were legal. A legal move is one that complies with all 
the rules of the game. They also implemented a cognitive model (cognitive models are 
discussed in section 2.5.1) for each of the four main strategies. The dependent variables used 
for assessing the quality of fit of the model with the empirical data is the number of trials 
needed to interchange all the toads for all the frogs in two consecutive trials (the researchers 
consider that if the task can be solved twice in a row it can be considered as mastered by the 
problem solver) and the error percentage. After comparing the results of the four cognitive 
models with the experimental data they determined that participants shift strategies as 
experience grows and fewer memory demands are placed upon them. Charman & Howes 
(2002) studied the effect of highly constrained goal definitions on strategy generation. For one 
experimental group the task was to design two layouts: one for a computer room and one for 
a study area; the other experimental group was asked to copy a layout. Both groups use a 
software package for creating the layouts. In this study it was found that participants with a 
strong goal definition (design a layout) executed more mouse commands than participants in 
the not-strong goal group, indicating the use of inefficient strategies that require a larger 
number of mouse commands. A more efficient strategy used the mouse to select multiple 
items and then apply an action to all these items, therefore reducing the number of commands 
issued in comparison to an inefficient strategy where a single item is selected before applying 
the desired action. The authors argue that the strong goal task reduced the opportunity for the 
use of the most efficient strategies that involve working with multiple items at the same time.  
 
Problem context, also called semantic embeddedness, is also a determinant of CPS. The way 
the problem is presented to the person affects their chance of success, and the likelihood of 
transferring this success to a new problem (Kotovsky, Hayes & Simon, 1985). In an 
experimental study (Bechmann & Guthke, 1995) use a microworld similar to SINUS (Funke, 
1991). In this microworld there are three inputs that affect the value of three outputs and this 
effect is controlled by three linear equations. In the first stage of their experimental design 
participants interacted with the microworld for 21 simulation cycles. According to the authors, 
during this stage participants acquire knowledge about the structure of the task. In a second 
stage a target state (specifying values for the three output variables) is given to participants 
and they must reach and maintain this state for seven simulation cycles. Semantic embedding 
was manipulated by offering to participants two different cover stories: in the first one a 
“cherry-tree description” was used. In this condition the input variables were light, water 
supply and warmth and the output variables were cherries, leaves and beetles. In the second 
condition an abstract machine description was used, so variables had no meaning. In both 
conditions the microworld is governed by the same equations. The authors hypothesized that 
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the abstract version of the task would not activate prior knowledge. In order to test their 
hypothesis, after each simulation cycle participants were asked about the existence of causal 
relationships between variables and a measure of knowledge acquisition was obtained for 
each participant. Participants’ performance in this microworld was measured as the Euclidean 
distance of participants’ interventions and the optimal intervention (considering the desired 
target) and the result was averaged over the seven simulation cycles. This measure was 
considered by the authors as a measure of knowledge application. They found a correlation 
between traditional psychometric tests and performance only in the abstract condition. The 
authors concluded that “the semantic embeddedness of a complex problem mediates the 
relation between traditional measures of intelligence and CPS performance.” (p. 194). This 
finding can be transferred to other microworlds where there is considerable semantic 
embeddedness such as FireChief. The authors also found that knowledge acquisition only 
occurred in the abstract condition. In this respect Beckmann and Guthke (1995) argue that the 
familiarity caused by the semantic context may have led the participants to develop “sham 
confidence” that interfered with knowledge acquisition. This study highlights the importance 
of problem context in CPS: the amount of learning may be mediated by the semantic content 
of the task.  
 
Veksler, Gray & Schoelles (2007) studied how information access influences decision making. 
They used the Table Decision Task that displays a table “…in which each of six alternatives 
(arranged in rows) had a value on each of six attributes (arrayed in columns). The value of the 
alternative was derived by summing the attribute scores so that the higher the value, the 
better the alternative” (p. 1). The goal of the task is to select the best choice based on the 
relative values of its attributes, so the most effective strategy is to check the value of all the 
cells. In an experimental condition there was an extra cost in time associated with disclosing 
the information in each of the cells. This task illustrates how system characteristics can be 
altered for testing hypotheses. The authors of the study predicted that performance would 
vary based on exploration/exploitation costs that variations in the task environment imposed 
on the decision maker. This task was used to study how information access influences 
cognitive and perceptual-motor trade-offs. According to Veksler, Gray & Schoelles (2007) 
comparison of durations between commands can provide insights into how strategies evolve. 
Fu & Gray (2006) used a Map Navigation task where participants were given a start station and 
destination (end station), and were asked to travel from the start station to the end station. 
The researchers manipulated two variables: the cost and utility of information. They argued 
that the activity of “checking transfer time” represented the critical explicit information-
seeking action and designed an experiment to determine if people are able to adapt their 
information-seeking actions based on the cost of performing them. The way they manipulated 
this cost was similar to the study of Veksler, Gray & Schoelles (2007) discussed previously: they 
added a lockout time after the transfer station was clicked in order to gather transfer time 
information. Utility of information was manipulated by controlling the difference between the 
speeds of the slow and fast transfers (larger differences represented higher utility). They found 
that people adapt to the cost of accessing information by spending more time seeking transfer 
time information even when the cost of this activity is high in terms of time.  
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Chung & Byrne (2004) studied a failure called the post-completion error (omissions of actions 
required after the completion of a task's main goal). An example of a post-completion error 
given by the authors is “forgetting to remove the original after making a photocopy” (p.1). 
They tried to reduce its occurrence by creating appropriate visual cues. They controlled the 
availability of cues for helping participants remember to execute a final complementary task. 
The study identified false completion signals as the source of this kind of error and proposed 
that visually distinguishable cues presented at the right time can reduce its occurrence. Many 
real world environments can benefit from understanding why cognitive errors such as these 
arise (such as aerospace navigation).  
2.2.3.5. Strategy use 
As noted by Brehmer & Dörner (1993) when conducting research with complex tasks it is hard, 
if not impossible, to duplicate the same set-up for every participant (refer to section 2.3.5) so 
the study of complex behaviour should be focused on strategies and tactics. According to 
Schunn, McGregor & Saner (2006) a strategy is a coherent set of steps for solving a problem. 
Strategies can be classified in two groups: weak and strong (Jonassen, 2000). Weak strategies 
include hill climbing (small changes are applied to a random solution, each time improving it a 
little) and means-ends analysis (Anderson, 2000), weak strategies do not take advantage of the 
domain characteristics. Strong strategies are domain-specific. When people interact with 
microworlds for the first time, it is to be expected that they will try to apply weak problem-
solving procedures to the knowledge that they have about the domain in question (Anderson, 
1983). For Anderson, weak methods can be fed with knowledge acquired from the domain so 
that it is possible to apply them successfully. Another way of classifying strategies is to 
distinguish between compensatory and non-compensatory strategies (Kerstholt, 1992, Payne 
et al., 1993). Compensatory strategies involve the consideration of all relevant information 
that the environment can provide, whereas decision-makers using non-compensatory 
strategies generally utilize only a subset of the available information. For example, in 
Kerstholt’s study, a choice task involving selecting between apartments was used. Task 
complexity was manipulated by varying the number of known attributes, such as rent and 
noise level: either 4 or 8. During the task, a number of attributes were queried and one of 
them was selected. It was found that task complexity reduced the depth of search in this task; 
in other words, non-compensatory strategies appeared as a response to task complexity. In a 
typical non-compensatory strategy a low value for the most important attribute implies that 
an option is discarded, regardless of the value of the other attributes. In general, 
compensatory processes are thought to lead to better choices, but at a cognitive cost (Payne 
et al., 1993). Given the levels of complexity and dynamics of the FireChief task, it is anticipated 
that the type of strategies used by participants in this microworld will be non-compensatory. 
 
It has been observed that there are many different ways in which a task can be solved and 
individuals vary in the strategies they use (Schunn & Reder, 1998). Strategy selection can be 
explained by a combination of differences in knowledge (i.e. the participant either knows or 
does not know a strategy), cognitive factors (i.e. the participant is able to carry on the 
necessary mental processes for executing a strategy), and non-cognitive factors (e.g. 
psychomotor ability is necessary for executing the commands). It has also been observed that 
different groups of people share many, if not most, strategies (Reder, 1987; Lemaire & Siegler, 
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1995) and that participants vary in their distribution of use of strategies. These observations 
led to the creation of the strategy adaptivity approach to individual differences in CPS 
performance (Schunn & Reder, 2001). In this approach while two individuals may have the 
same set of strategies, they may differ in their ability to select the best strategy for a given 
situation. This approach assumes that people vary in their general ability to detect situational 
change and/or select strategies appropriate to the new situation (Schunn & Reder, 2001).  
 
From a methodological perspective during an initial phase it must be proven that individuals 
are in fact using different strategies and after that it is necessary to determine how individuals 
are choosing these strategies, for instance that participants are able to adapt their strategy 
choice and execution to the changing environment. This feature becomes particularly relevant 
considering the ever changing characteristics of microworlds.  Schunn & Reder used an ATC 
task for exploring strategy use; they focus mainly on proving that it is possible to predict 
performance in this ATC task by defining and measuring strategy adaptivity (see section 
2.2.3.6). Wenke, Frensch and Funke (2004) also highlight the importance of studying 
differences in knowledge and strategies. In this view behaviour is determined by knowledge 
and architecture (cognitive), and interactions between these areas explain differences in 
performance. This observation is important as the strategies that participants deploy in 
computer simulations are usually context dependent, mostly because they are executed to 
solve tasks that require the use of domain knowledge. 
 
Strategy choice is also constrained by the characteristics of the task. A study by Lovett and 
Anderson (1996) using the Building Sticks Task (where participants have to construct a stick of 
a certain length using an unlimited supply of sticks of smaller lengths) found it was possible to 
create a bias for either the undershoot or overshoot strategies by manipulating the length of 
the target stick. On the other hand, rational approaches assume that participants choose 
strategies according to their costs and benefits (Anderson et al., 2004). Neth & Payne (2001) 
studied the influence of different interface configurations for the solution of simple addition 
problems presented on a computer screen. In this task participants need to solve 72 addition 
problems presented in lists of 4, 8 or 12 single-digit numbers. Interface properties such as the 
colour, the location of numbers and the possibility of moving the numbers in the list were 
manipulated. In one experimental condition it was not possible to interact with the numbers 
forcing participants to rely solely on their memory; another condition allowed some degree of 
interaction such as the manipulation of location of numbers. The authors hypothesized that 
ordering the numbers on the screen facilitates the task by grouping numbers that add up to a 
round number. The study concluded that participants are sensible to the cost of accessing 
information, and that this sensitivity produces significant strategy differences. When more 
interactive features were available to participants, such as the option of moving the numbers 
in the list with the mouse, participants adopted a strategy that exploits this new feature. 
Schoelles and Gray (2001) used an Air Traffic Control task that requires participants to assess 
whether the aircraft in the radar are hostile or not. To make this evaluation participants use 
the display to query the attributes of every aircraft and apply a set of rules. One of the 
experimental groups had a visual aid which marks which objects have already been evaluated 
and it was observed that this aid improved their performance by avoiding re-selection of 
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aircraft. All these results reinforce the idea that subtle changes in the interface may 
correspond to significant cognitive changes.  
2.2.3.6. Strategy adaptivity 
Although some participants use the same set of strategies they can differ in their ability to 
opportunistically apply strategies in response to the situation (Schunn & Reder, 2001). 
Gonzalez et al. (2004) affirm that performance in dynamic tasks is highly determined by the 
ability of the problem solver to recognize that it is necessary to alter their decision processes. 
Adaptation makes sense when environmental conditions are not always the same (Schunn et 
al., 2001), and adaptivity is directly related to sensitivity to environmental change. Research 
has found that the problem solver keeps track of the base rate of success for each strategy, 
that is, the proportion of times a strategy is successful for his or her problem (Schunn et al., 
2001). As task characteristics change, individuals experience different success base rates for 
each strategy and learn to prefer different strategies (Schunn et al., 2001). In this respect the 
authors give the example of an adaptive participant in an arithmetic task: they choose to 
calculate in early trials, retrieve in the final/later trials, and to use a mix of strategies in the in-
between trials. Strategy selection is also related to recognizing which problems are familiar. In 
the case of arithmetic problems, the problem solver can decide to retrieve when presented 
with very familiar problems. These two kinds of adaptivity can be branded extrinsic and 
intrinsic respectively. Extrinsic adaptivity uses information external to a particular problem (i.e. 
learning the base rates of success) while intrinsic adaptivity uses information internal to a 
particular problem (i.e. familiarity with the problem). 
 
According to Schunn & Reder (2001) extrinsic strategy adaptivity can be measured at two 
levels: micro and global. At the micro-level there is sensitivity to the successfulness of a 
strategy on the immediately preceding attempt at using that strategy, similar to simple 
operant conditioning (Skinner, 1953). In their study using the KA-ATC task (section 2.3.1.7) 
they were focused on a strategy for landing aircraft. Sensitivity was detected at the micro-level 
because participants use this strategy more often when it is successful in the previous attempt. 
They focused their analysis on the first four trials because the rate of error decreases as 
experience is gained in the task. Sensitivity at the global level refers to sensitivity to changes in 
the frequency of success defined over an accumulation of past strategy attempts. This kind of 
sensitivity is closely related to the concept of utility in ACT-R (section 2.4.1.4) where the 
history of success is a component of its total value. Schunn & Reder conclude that strategy 
adaptivity at both levels is an important component of performance in complex, dynamic 
tasks. In the study of Schunn, Lovett & Reder (2001) using the Building Sticks Task (see section 
3.4) it was found that explicit awareness of success rate, which was measured by applying a 
questionnaire at the end of the experiment, is related to adaptivity and is positively related to 
performance. Also So & Sonenberg (2004) consider situation awareness to be essential in 
complex dynamic task environments and they stress the importance of switching between top-
down and bottom-up modes of control when dealing with these kind of tasks. This observation 
is particularly relevant for development of the cognitive model and will be discussed in 
chapters 4, 5 and 6. Friman & Brehmer (1999) found that building situation awareness is 
essential when dealing with battle situations and that a commander needs to develop 
sensitivity to changes in the battlefield. Friman and Brehmer consider that the critical 
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dimension in a dynamic process is time, and that the problem solver must make correct use of 
information regarding time; that is, the problem solver needs to be aware of the different time 
scales between decisions, actions and results. Time scales result from time constants, for 
example, in FireChief this time constant refers to the duration of commands. Situation 
awareness is directly related to bottom-up control because it depends on opportune 
perceptions of the environment but is also supported by the representation of the task. 
 
Some researchers use a similar concept to strategy adaptivity: cognitive flexibility (Cañas et al., 
2005). For Jonassen (2000) cognitive flexibility is considered to be a form of cognitive control. 
It is thought that problem solvers with higher levels of cognitive flexibility will outperform less 
flexible ones due to the fact that the former tend to consider more alternatives (Stewin & 
Anderson, 1974). But exploring more alternatives is not the only characteristic of flexible 
problem solvers; according to Kerstholt (1996) another condition for adaptive strategy 
selection is that the effect of a strategy on both accuracy and effort is known by the problem 
solver. Studies of strategy adaptation range from the retrieve vs. compute paradigm (Lebiere 
et al., 1998), and the Building Sticks task (Lovett & Anderson, 1996), to Air Traffic Control 
(Schunn & Reder, 2001). Schunn and Reder (1998) were able to measure strategy adaptivity by 
detecting decisions points for strategy selection and using problem solvers’ responses at these 
points. Using the KA-ATC task (section 2.3.1.7) the authors focused their attention on the stage 
at which a runway for landing the aircraft is selected. At this decision point participants can 
either select a long or a short runway. They observed that there are many advantages related 
to use of the long runway (there are fewer restrictions for using it and it involves fewer 
keystrokes) but that the use of the short runway allows the long runway to be kept free for 
aircraft that must land on it. They conclude that in order to obtain good performance 
participants must maximize the use of both runways and defined an adaptivity measure called 
optshort. Optshort is calculated as the proportion of times a participant opts to land an aircraft 
on the short runway relative to the total number of the times an aircraft is landed when both 
runways are open. They manipulated the number of 747s, which must land in the long runway, 
presented in each trial to increase/decrease the opportunity to make the strategic decision 
optshort and found that this measure correlates with general performance (r=.69, p<.0001). 
They also found that a different mix of aircraft (that is, different task complexity) used in a trial 
produces a strategy shift for more adaptive participants. The authors of the study found a 
positive relation between how much people adapt to the task and two psychometric 
measures: WM (measured using the Four-Term Ordering test) and inductive reasoning (using 
the Figure Sets, Figure Series and Figure Matrices tests). A description of these psychometric 
tests is provided in Schunn & Reder (2001).  
2.3. Microworlds as complex problem solving task domains  
Brehmer & Dörner (1993) commented on the difference in the amount of complexity between 
field research and laboratory studies: in the former there is too much and in the latter there is 
too little. They also present three reasons that explain why psychology is now better able to 
handle complexity. First, information technologies facilitate the analysis of larger sets of data. 
Data can be stored in well-structured databases and can be queried at will for obtaining a rich 
set of metrics. The second reason is the availability of means for the modelling of very complex 
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models of human functioning. For example cognitive architectures, described later in this 
chapter, provide a means for modelling human behaviour. And the third reason is the 
existence of tools for executing complex experiments in the form of microworlds, which is the 
topic of this section.  
In order to complete the picture provided by the CPS paradigm of figure 2.1 it is necessary to 
describe a microworld. A microworld is a realistic environment that allows the study of various 
kinds of responses to complex and realistic decision making situations (Omodei & Wearing, 
1995). It presents to the participant a number of different problems, rather than a single, well-
defined task (Brehmer & Dörner, 1993). Microworlds require the continuous application of 
controlled information processing, imitating in this way naturally occurring problem solving 
environments. It has been observed that the underlying structure of the task must be 
congruent with participants’ pre-existing understanding of the task (Omodei & Wearing, 1995), 
for example in a fire-fighting microworld simulated fire should behave in a way that reflects 
the dynamics of real fire. Microworlds bring the complexity of real-life problems to the lab in a 
way that can be partly controlled (Quesada, Kintsch & Gomez, 2002). Although microworlds 
can be relatively simple, they embody the essential characteristics of real-world dynamic 
decision making environments (Gonzalez et al., 2004) and can be considered as a middle point 
between naturalistic scenarios and laboratory tasks (Brehmer & Dörner, 1993). 
 
According to Omodei & Wearing (1995) there are three kinds of microworld. First there are 
computerized training simulators. An example of this kind is the Air Traffic Control (ATC) 
simulator. This kind of microworld can be used either for skill acquisition or for training in 
process control. In this kind of task it is important to understand and apply rules correctly. For 
example in the Kanfer-Ackerman ATC task (Ackerman & Kanfer, 1993) participants need to 
land different kinds of aircraft on two kinds of runway. After selecting a plan for landing, 
participants need to apply the rules for landing aircraft correctly in order to gain points. 
Another task of this kind is emergency dispatching, where participants need to classify 
incidents reported by a text interface and execute specific actions; in this case participants also 
need to apply a specific set of rules designed to attend to incidents properly.  
 
The second type of simulation is comprised by recreational video games. A difficulty posed 
when dealing with video games is that they are usually too complex to use as task 
environments for conducting research and it is not possible to modify the parameters of the 
game for experimental purposes. Omodei and Wearing (1995) argue that it is usually hard to 
adapt this kind of microworld for precise experimental studies, although there are some 
interesting attempts in this respect such as the Open Real-Time Strategy project (ORTS) (Buro, 
2004). ORTS provides a rich and fully customisable environment for running scenarios in which 
participants can take control of buildings and units and can play against other participants or 
AI agents. The complete source code is available making it possible to develop any number of 
scenarios, units, actions and data logging functions. Laird (2002) used simulated virtual 
environments to make it possible to study real-time decision making and interaction while 
reducing the considerable difficulties posed by sensing and acting in the real world. The third 
kind of simulation or microworld is specifically developed for research into complex decision 
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making processes. The European approach represented by Dörner has used a large quantity of 
these simulations, some of which are described in the following section.   
2.3.1. Eight problem solving tasks 
In order to provide a clear picture of what a microworld is eight problem solving tasks domains 
are described in this section, including a comprehensive description of the FireChief task due 
to its relevance for this research work.  
2.3.1.1. Tower of Hanoi (TOH) 
TOH is a well-defined task. There are three pegs and a fixed number of disks of different sizes 
(see figure 2.2). In the initial state all disks are stacked in descending order on a single peg. The 
objective of the game is to move all disks to the central peg. TOH is also knowledge-lean 
because there are only two rules: only one disk may be moved at a time (a move consists in 
moving the upper disk of a peg onto a different peg) and no disk may be placed on top of a 
smaller disk. The optimal solution to a problem with 3 pegs and 3 disks requires 8 movements 
and there is an algorithm for solving a problem of 3 pegs with 7 discs (although with more pegs 
finding the optimal solution is not that straightforward). TOH is time-invariant: the only way of 
changing the state of the task is by applying the “Move” operator, for this same reason there 
in no time pressure. It is a planning task because there is no advantage in reacting to the 
environment. Performance is measured as the number of moves required for moving all disks 
to the target peg. 
 
Figure 2.2: The Tower of Hanoi task 
2.3.1.2. Frogs & Toads (F&T) 
In the Toads & Frogs puzzle (Berlekamp, Conway & Guy, 2001) “... three toads are placed on 
the three leftmost squares of a seven-square board while three frogs are placed on the three 
rightmost squares. The central square is initially empty. The goal of the game is to switch the 
animals’ positions by having the toads occupy the three rightmost, and the frogs the three 
leftmost squares, respectively. A square can be occupied by only one animal at a time, and an 
animal can move only into an empty square. Toads can move only rightward and frogs only 
leftward. There are two possible types of move: a Slide to the next (empty) square and a Jump 
over an animal of a different type to a two-square apart empty position. A solution can be 
reached in exactly 15 moves, 9 jumps and 6 slides” (Del Missier & Fum, 2002, p. 1). Figure 2.3 
shows the user interface of this task, note that there are seven cells in total and only one is 
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empty at a time. As in the case of the TOH this task is well-structured. It is knowledge-lean 
because it suffices to know a couple of rules and how to move the pieces. It is time-invariant 
and there is no time pressure. It is a planning task. This task has an optimal solution (cf. Del 
Missier & Fum, 2002). When solving this task the problem solver needs to decide between 
’slide’ or ‘jump’ (although sometimes his or her decisions are forced). Performance is 
measured as the number of moves required for switching the frogs with the toads. 
  
 
Figure 2.3: The Frogs & Toads task (taken from Del Missier & Fum, 2002) 
2.3.1.3. Coldstore 
In the Coldstore microworld (Reichert & Dörner, 1988) participants need to manually control 
the temperature of a warehouse. Figure 2.4 shows the interface of Coldstore. The goal is to 
keep the temperature stable at an optimal temperature in order to keep products from 
freezing or spoiling (top indicator in figure 2.4). In Coldstore each trial lasts about 12 minutes. 
Performance on this task is measured by the total number of deviations from the goal 
temperature. This task is time-variant. There is a single input variable: to increment or 
decrement temperature (participants use the control wheel displayed at the bottom of figure 
2.4) but the effect of modifying this variable has a delay before taking effect, and the 
temperature varies continuously with time. The numbers of the control wheel do not 
correspond to the cold store temperature. Participants can change the position of the control 
wheel by clicking the arrows with the mouse (large arrows change temperature more). 
Variables in Coldstore are highly interconnected: the relation between the thermostat and the 
resulting temperature is governed by a linear equation. This task is also non-transparent 
because the linear equation is not known and there is a feedback delay. Güss et al. (2004) 
report that participants have the impression that the temperature does not immediately react 
to changes on the control wheel. This task is reactive because participants need to act in 
response to variations in temperature. It is well-defined because the goal is clear. According to 
Rigas et al. (2002) the best strategy in this microworld is to “wait and see”; excessive 
interventions are not recommended.    
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Figure 2.4: The Coldstore task (taken from Rigas et al. 2002) 
 
 
2.3.1.4. Moro 
In the Moro microworld (Dörner, Stäudel & Strohschneider, 1986) participants need to take a 
series of decisions in order to improve the quality of life (the goal given to the problem solver 
is not clearly defined) of the fictitious Moro tribe. These decisions are related to various issues 
such as the control of population, health measures and the development of the economy. For 
Dörner (1996) complexity is strongly related to the number (and variety) of variables and Moro 
has many. Figure 2.5 shows some of the most relevant variables in Moro and how they 
influence each other. For instance, an increment in Pasture Land reduces Erosion (of the land), 
while an increment in Cattle causes more Erosion. Variables are highly interconnected: there is 
a complex network of interdependencies not disclosed to participants and some variables are 
hidden, therefore this microworld is non-transparent. Moro is time-variant; it changes on its 
own, without intervention. Nevertheless, unlike FireChief, there is no time pressure in this 
microworld, as Moro is an event-driven simulation: it changes in response to inputs given by 
the participant. The interface of Moro is not presented here.  
 
When interacting with Moro participants are aided by a person who knows how to input the 
different variables. This microworld is knowledge-intensive: there are several concepts that 
participants need to understand in order to make good decisions. It is also a planning-problem; 
Dörner (1996) identified the different stages that the problem solver follows when interacting 
with Moro: gathering information, making decisions for particular problems of the tribe, and 
executing these decisions. The problem solver receives feedback from his or her actions and is 
able to gather further data, and make new decisions.  
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Figure 2.5: The relationship between variables in Moro 
2.3.1.5. FireChief 
 
Figure 2.6: the FireChief task (LISP version) 
 
In the FireChief task (Omodei & Wearing, 1995) players engage in complex high-level decision 
making activity involving the use of fire-fighting units combating a spreading fire with the goal 
of preserving as much landscape as possible for a predefined amount of time. A participant’s 
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overall performance is measured as the percentage of unburned landscape at the end of the 
simulation. At the end of the trial the participant is informed of the performance for that trial.  
In this task several events can occur when the simulation state is refreshed every 200 
milliseconds. Figure 2.6 shows the new version of FireChief created in LISP to enable 
interaction with ACT-R. This new version follows the same structure and is governed by the 
same equations that the original one. The task environment is comprised by a matrix of 25 
columns and 16 rows. Each element in this matrix represents a cell of terrain. There are 
different types of terrains with different values (considered when computing final 
performance). The values of these elements are: forest (4, colour green), pasture (6, colour 
light green), clearing (2, colour yellow) and house (30, colour pink). Problem solvers are 
informed about these values. When a cell is on fire its colour turns to red. A special type of 
landscape is the dam (in blue) where appliances can refill tanks; a dam can never catch fire. 
Terrain elements are labelled, this label is used to identify detailed information such as the 
intensity of the fire (for instance the fire located at the upper left has an intensity of 1). Blacks 
cells are burned out.   
A. Units 
In FireChief there are two types of units: copters (grey) and trucks (light-grey). Copters are 
three time faster than trucks and, because they are airborne, cannot be destroyed by the fire. 
Trucks are slower than copters but their tanks have twice the capacity (10 units). The main 
difference between trucks and copters is that the former are able to execute Control Fire 
commands. The trucks also have a value and because these units can be engulfed by the fire it 
is necessary to protect them as well. FireChief uses different icons to distinguish between 
copters and trucks, when units occupy a specific cell the icon of that unit fills that particular 
cell, in this way participants can know at all times the location of units. In the LISP version (see 
figure 2.6) cells occupied by trucks have a different shade of grey than the ones occupied by 
copters and a cell containing a truck is labelled “T” whilst a cell containing a copter is labelled 
“C”. 
B. Commands 
Execution of FireChief commands is accomplished by three mechanisms: moving the mouse 
pointer, clicking the mouse and pressing keys. Actions from the mouse (move pointer and 
click) can be executed on every terrain cell. Only two keys can be pressed: a “D” for Drop 
Water and a “C” for Control Fire. Commands are executed by fire-fighting units. At any one 
time, fire-fighting units may be inactive, in motion, extinguishing a fire, controlling a fire, or 
refilling its tank at a dam.  
 
The empirical data collected in FireChief is mainly related to command execution. The first row 
in table 2.1 shows the fields collected for each command, a collection of these entries 
comprises a FireChief protocol which is the empirical data collected for each participant. The 
first column keeps track of the command number. The second column is the command type, 
the third column represents the time in which the command was executed (in seconds). The 
fourth column is the current performance. The fifth and sixth columns represent the unit 
number and unit type respectively. The seventh column shows the Cartesian location of the 
command for the DW and CF commands and in the case of a Move command the seventh 
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column is the starting point and the eighth column the ending point of the movement. The last 
column shows the type of terrain in which the command is executed (for the Move command 
this is the terrain type of the destination location). Figures 2.7 (a) to (j) are snapshots of a run 
executed by the cognitive model; they illustrate how FireChief commands are executed. The 
resulting protocol is also presented to show how empirical data is collected.  
 
Number Type Time Performance Unit 
# 
Unit 
Type 
origin destination terrain 
7 Move 20.978 98.2 3 Copter 9,11 11,11 Forest 
Table 2.1: FireChief protocol the command described in figures 2.A to 2.D 
Move 
Copters and trucks can be moved to any cell in the landscape matrix. In order to execute a 
Move command the mouse cursor must be located over a unit and the mouse button must be 
pressed. After that the mouse pointer must be dragged to the target cell and the mouse 
button must be released. FireChief disables the unit for an amount of time directly 
proportional to the Euclidian distance between the cells (the type of fire-fighting units is also 
considered, copters are faster than trucks). When the Move command is completed the unit 
has moved to the new location and is ready to execute another command. When a unit is 
moved to a dam the tank is automatically refilled after 4 seconds.  
 
  
  
Figure 2.7 (a) (upper-left) A copter (CR in grey) is idle. 2.7 (b) (upper-ri7ght) The mouse pointer is located over 
the idle copter. 2.7 (c) (bottom-left) The copter is dragged two cells below, the copter starts moving and is 
disabled (white colour). The fire destroyed a cell. 2.7 (d) (bottom-right) the copter arrives and is idle again. 
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In figure 2.7 (a) the mouse cursor is over a cell where a copter is executing a DW command 
over a fire of intensity 0 (CFO). Attention is placed over a cell of type Forest where a copter is 
available (CR). The other copter is executing a DW command (“CFO”, in light-blue). Several 
fires are destroying cells to the left of these copters. Trucks are located to the right of the 
copters. One of the trucks is idle (the one in light-grey) and one is moving (the one in white). In 
figure 2.7 (b) the mouse is moved over the previously attended Copter and the mouse is 
clicked. No other changes in the environment are visible but the fire is destroying the 
inflammable material of several cells. In figure 2.7 (c) the mouse is placed on a different cell 
(two cells below) and the mouse’s button is released. This action completes a Move command 
and therefore the copter is disabled for the time required for a two-cell movement.  
 
Table 2.1 shows the resulting entry in the FireChief protocol. Notice that six commands were 
executed previously: four Move commands to move all the units and two DW commands. 
Performance is not 100 because three cells have been destroyed: [8,8] (second 10.708), [7,7] 
(second 18.964) and [8,9] (second 20.975). In figure 2.6 these cells are not destroyed. It is 
possible to see that cell [8,9] with label F4 is destroyed in the transition of figure 2.7 (b) to (c) 
The destruction of this cell produced two fires: one of intensity F1 to the right (this fire is of 
intensity 1 because it is a clearing) and one of intensity F3 to the upper-right (a Forest). In 
Figure 2.7 (d) the Copter arrives at its destination (showing a grey colour). 
 
There is an important functional dependence between the Move command and the other two 
FireChief commands. That is, before executing either a Control Fire or a Drop Water command, 
a fire-fighting unit must be located in the appropriate coordinate. In this sense the execution 
of a Move command can be considered as a pre-requisite to execute the other two commands. 
This functional dependence is discussed in further chapters.   
Drop Water 
 
 
Figure 2.7 (e) The copter that was moved to a new location executes a DW command 
Units must have water in their tank before performing a Drop Water (DW) command. The DW 
command cannot be cancelled so the problem solver must wait until its completion. To 
execute a DW command the unit must be placed in the desired spot and the mouse pointer 
must be over the unit. The Drop Water starts when the “D” key is pressed. If the command can 
be executed (there is water in the tank and the fire strength does not exceed the fire-fighting 
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capability of the unit) the unit will start dropping water on the spot for 4 seconds (during this 
time the unit is disabled). If the DW is successfully completed the fire will be extinguished but 
the damage done by the fire is still there (each cell has a limited amount of destroyable 
material, if this amount is equal to 0 the cell is considered destroyed). This same cell can catch 
fire again in the future. 
 
In Figure 2.7 (e) the “D” key is pressed while having the mouse pointer over the cell where the 
Copter is located starting a DW command. The cell has now a light-blue colour. It is possible to 
see in table 2.2 that the DW command is executed after the arrival of the Copter. The origin 
cell is equal to the destination field of the previous command.  
 
Number Type Time Perf. Unit # Unit Type Origin Destination Terrain 
8 Drop Water 21.937 98.2 3 Copter 11,11  Forest 
Table 2.2: FireChief protocol for the command described in figure 2.E 
Control Fire 
 
  
 
Figure 2.7 (f) (upper-left) the mouse is moved over the idle truck (light grey). One of the Copters 
finishes a DW command. Figure 2.7 (g) (upper-right) The CF command is executed. Figure 2.7 (h) the 
CF is completed. 
 
To execute a Control Fire (CF) command the mouse pointer must be located over the unit and 
the “C” key must be pressed. If the command can be executed (the cell is not on fire) the unit 
starts removing the inflammable material on that spot and finishes after 2 seconds (the unit is 
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disabled during this time). There are two conditions under which the command cannot be 
completed: the command can either be cancelled by moving the unit to another cell or by a 
fire developing in the same spot. If the command is successfully completed the cell changes its 
colour to brown and the fire cannot destroy that cell and therefore cannot cross that cell to 
reach adjacent cells. 
 
In Figure 2.7 (f) the mouse is moved over the idle Truck (light grey). Notice that one of the DW 
commands is now completed (the Copter is now in a grey cell) but the DW command executed 
in figure 2.7 (e) continues its execution. In Figure 2.7 (g) the “C” keyboard is pressed while 
having the mouse pointer over the cell where the Truck is located starting a CF command. The 
cell has now a white colour (for the next two seconds). In Figure 2.7 (h) the cell where the CF 
was executed is now in in brown indicating that the CF is completed. The other truck is 
executing a command and is in white. 
 
Number Type Time Performance Unit 
# 
Unit 
Type 
origin destination terrain 
9 Control 
Fire 
23.289 98.2 1 Truck 11,13  Forest 
Table 2.3: FireChief protocol for the command described in figures 2.6 (f) to (h) 
Table 2.3 shows that the CF is executed right after the DW described in the previous section. 
The current performance is the same because no more cells were destroyed.  
C. Fire Development and wind conditions 
If a cell is on fire, on each cycle (of .2 seconds) FireChief subtracts an amount of fuel according 
to the type of landscape, the intensity of the fire and the wind strength. If the total amount of 
fuel is depleted the cell is considered destroyed and fire propagates to the adjacent cells. If a 
cell is destroyed fire spreads to its six neighbouring cells with varying intensities. Fires are 
more intense in a forest than in a pasture, a fire in a clearing has low intensity, and fire spreads 
quicker in a pasture than in a forest. Although landscape distribution influences the 'shape' of 
a fire, wind strength and direction are the most determining factors because fires burn most 
intensely in the direction towards which the wind is blowing. Another important phenomenon 
is a change in wind strength, because fires can increase or decrease their strength depending 
on the size of the variation. This change of size happens suddenly modifying dramatically the 
complexity of the task. Not all fires change their intensity after a switch in wind strength; the 
ones that are affected are those located in the direction of the wind. So for example, if there is 
a circle-shaped fire and the wind is blowing to the right, if the wind increases its intensity only 
fires located to the right of the fire will increase their intensity. Wind strength ranges from two 
to eight and can blow towards the right, up-right, up, up-left and left. Wind strength and 
direction are displayed in the upper right-hand corner of the display (in figure 2.7 (f) the fire is 
blowing to the right with an intensity of 6).  
D. Alarms 
Alarms are emitted due to various situations: when a unit’s tank is depleted and a DW 
command is attempted, when a unit is executing a DW command and the problem solver tries 
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to interrupt it, when the problem solver tries to extinguish a very strong fire (that is beyond 
the appliance’s capacity to extinguish it) or when a truck is in danger of being destroyed by the 
fire. Alarms are presented in the form of sounds. 
 
FireChief is non-transparent because many aspects of the simulation, particularly those related 
to fire behaviour, are not visible to the problem solver. FireChief is non-linear; the equations 
that describe transformations to the fires based on wind intensity, flammability, humidity, etc. 
are not linear, there is a strong interconnection of variables. The intensity of emerging fires 
(also called spot fires) depends on the current wind strength; if it is above 7 the spot fire will 
have an initial intensity of 4. Timely identification of emerging fires is important as they can 
represent a threat due to an increase in wind strength. Following the task specification of the 
Cañas et al. (2005) study, for all trials in this research if the participant (or the model) gains 
control over the fire, at most two spot fires will appear at random locations and the participant 
will have to deal with them.  
2.3.1.6. Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) 
In the Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) microworld participants interact with a 
display that shows several aircraft and the task is to acknowledge and monitor these aircraft as 
they approach different sections of the display. Aircraft are indicated by cursors, with a label 
next to them indicating flight designator, altitude, bearing, and speed information. Information 
about commands and procedures is available to participants. Trial complexity is manipulated 
by adjusting weather conditions and the number of aircraft (Ackerman, 1992). Another way of 
controlling the complexity of this microworld is by manipulating the kind of flights that appear 
in each scenario. There are three kinds of flight that can be handled: over-flights, arrivals and 
departures. According to the study of Ackerman (1992) participants make about six times 
more manoeuvre commands for arrivals than for over-flights. It was found that trials with a 
higher number of arrivals imposed higher information-processing demands on participants. In 
the same study another dimension of complexity was used: some aircraft did not show full 
compliance to participants’ commands. The author proposes that there should be a clear 
distinction between complexity due to changes in content (arrivals vs. over-flights) and the 
compliance condition (not a change in content). Cañas et al. (2005) use a similar experimental 
design where the efficiency of fire-fighting appliances is reduced for one test group (this is 
similar to the compliance condition in TRACON) and the nature and behaviour of fires is 
manipulated in another (similar to changes in content in TRACON). Both kinds of changes 
affect performance in the aforementioned tasks by increasing complexity.    
2.3.1.7. Kanfer Ackerman Air Traffic Control Task (KA-ATC) 
KA-ATC (Ackerman & Kanfer, 1993) simulates various aspects of real life air traffic control. The 
objective of the task is to land as many aircraft as possible in the available time (the task 
consists of a sequence of 10 minutes trials). There are twelve hold positions for the aircrafts 
divided into three levels, and four runways for landing the aircraft. Important variables that 
need to be considered in this task are the weather (that changes approximately every 30 
seconds) and the wind direction and speed (because they affect the condition of the runways). 
Messages are given when there are changes in the weather and when the participants make 
errors. There is a set of rules that the participant must follow to land the aircraft such as that 
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747’s may never land on the short runway. This task can be decomposed into three unit tasks: 
moving an aircraft between the hold-levels, landing an aircraft on a runway and getting an 
aircraft from the queue into a hold-position. Landing the aircraft involves finding an aircraft to 
land, selecting the aircraft, moving the aircraft, finding a runway, moving to the desired 
runway and landing the aircraft (Ackerman, 1988). Each one of these actions requires a 
sequence of keystrokes, shifts of attention and encoding of information to be executed. In 
other words, issuing commands in microworlds, such as ATC task environments, requires a 
combination of cognitive, perceptual and motor actions and each of these actions demands 
resources in order to be completed. In this example, the subtask of moving an aircraft between 
the hold-levels requires a set of cognitive and perceptual actions that ultimately produce a 
sequence of motor commands; however the specific way of combining these actions is directly 
related to the strategy that is followed.   
2.3.1.8. Emergency Dispatching 
In the Emergency Dispatcher task (Franklin & Hunt, 1993) a computer-controlled display shows 
information about emergency incidents and available resources. The dispatcher can receive 
messages from a call receiver and from field units. Each new message is announced by a beep 
and then appears at the bottom of the dialogue window. Only three messages are available at 
a time in the display; earlier messages can be retrieved again but with a time penalty. The 
dispatcher needs to confirm the classification of incidents and assign the nearest available and 
appropriate unit to respond. It is also possible to use a “surprise element”. For example, 
consider an incident that at first appears to be a routine traffic stop. In this situation the 
dispatcher may send an officer to check why the motorist has stopped his or her car, but after 
five minutes the motorist draws a weapon on the officer. The goal in the Dispatcher task is to 
evaluate the available information and to decide which emergency incident to deal with next 
and which unit to dispatch; participants were instructed to attend to higher priority incidents 
first. In general terms participants are responsible for assigning personnel to emergency 
incidents and monitoring the status of each incident until it is resolved. In the study of Joslyn & 
Hunt (1998) complexity in the Dispatcher task is determined by the number of incidents 
presented over a 15-minute period. Every incident has a code (there are 15 different kinds of 
incident) and there is a priority level for each of them. In this study, 54 participants (aged 
between 18 and 22) interacted with this microworld for 3 sessions of 1 hour each. During the 
initial training session, participants handled 9 incidents using 8 units. A second period of 
practice involved 15 incidents with 10 units. Finally, during the testing session, there was a 
mixture of the same complexity as in the previous sessions with an increase of 2 or 5 incidents.  
2.3.2. Characteristics of microworlds 
The gap definition of CPS discussed in Section 2.2.2 introduced the concept of obstacles that 
the problem solver must overcome; this section explores the nature of these obstacles in the 
context of microworlds. Researchers in this area (Gonzalez et al., 2004, 2005; Brehmer & 
Dörner, 1993) have identified a set of relevant dimensions for characterizing microworlds 
which are discussed in the following sections.  
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2.3.2.1. Complexity 
Complexity is related to the number of elements present in the system and the number (and 
nature) of the relations among these elements, therefore complexity is a function of the 
interplay of variables (Funke, 1991). It has also been observed that problem solving quality 
decreases as a function of the increasing number of variables as well as the number of non-
linear functions (Hussy & Graznow, 1987). About this last point Dörner (1996) found that 
people tend to underestimate exponential growth. Complexity in microworlds is also related to 
the number of possible actions that a participant can take in a single moment. In these tasks 
there is often more information available than a human being can process at one time 
(information overload); this implies that the problem solver is responsible for the allocation of 
their own limited cognitive resources. Attneave (1954) proposed that given that our capacity 
to process separate items of information is limited, much of what is presented in the stimulus 
is ignored. This fact favours the exploitation of points of maximum information. Microworlds 
usually present the problem solver with an environment rich in visual elements. In this 
situation the problem solver needs to process a subset of this visual information whilst being 
aware of the consequences of his or her actions. This rich environment can be used as an 
External Memory (EM). For tasks such as microworlds the EM is comprised by the immediately 
available visual field and the opportunity for making use of this EM is available. In one study Fu 
& Gray (2001) found that the problem solver calculates the cost of accessing this EM and then 
decides either to use EM or internal memory.  
2.3.2.2. Transparency  
Transparency refers to the availability of information about the problem. Funke (1992, 1995) 
hypothesized that a participant exploring a dynamic task environment gradually constructs a 
causal model of the task. Also Eyferth et al. (1982) hypothesized that participants gradually 
construct a system representation and connect it to existing schemata. This representation can 
take the form of structural knowledge about the system. Structural knowledge describes the 
functional or causal relationships between variables (Buchner, 1995). This knowledge is the 
result of hypothesis-formation and hypothesis-evaluation processes which progress through 
various phases. In the first stage knowledge is restricted to the pure identification of a relation 
between at least two variables (relational knowledge). During the second stage a more 
differentiated view allows statements about the direction (positive or negative) of the relation 
(sign knowledge) and in the third stage the precise amount of influence can be specified 
(numerical knowledge). 
 
But in complex situations the problem solver does not always have access to all the relevant 
information and hence it is necessary to interact with the system to create the necessary 
mental models to deal with the task. According to Brehmer (1987), non-transparent 
microworlds place particularly high demands on participants’ ability to generate and maintain 
mental models of the task for successful control. Using an ATC task Ackerman studied the 
process of skill acquisition through the three phases previously mentioned in section 2.2.3.1. It 
was found that, if the levels of transparency are high, participants arrive at the automatic 
stage, but low transparency hampered this transition. In another study (Putz-Osterloh & Lüer, 
1981) it was found that when participants received a graphical representation of the relations 
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among the system variables as an aid to increase transparency, the correlation between 
system performance and intelligence test measures was improved. In a non-transparent 
situation, where both the given and goal state and also the barriers to overcome it are non-
transparent, it is difficult for a problem solver to evaluate his or her progress toward a problem 
solution, making it necessary for the problem solver to select and structure his or her 
interactions with the task in such a way that helpful information for evaluating progress can be 
extracted. 
2.3.2.3. Dynamics 
The state of dynamic microworlds changes both autonomously and as a consequence of the 
decision maker’s actions. This characteristic imposes a particular set of demands on the 
problem solver and shapes the problem solving situation, often making the opportunistic 
execution of an action in certain situations more important than the specific type of action 
(Omodei & Wearing, 1995). For example, in FireChief it is a good option to send a unit to drop 
water over a fire of low intensity that has just spread to a new cell, but if the decision is 
delayed the fire may increase in intensity, surpassing the capability of the unit to extinguish it.  
Research has found a negative relation between the level of dynamics and performance, for 
instance, an increase in dynamics yielded a decrease in the quality of system control in the 
SINUS microworld (Funke, 1993). An explanation is that the need to perceive and remember 
data while controlling the status of different units complicates the task and can hinder 
performance (Gonzalez et al., 2005). Decision making behaviour was considerably affected by 
dynamic aspects of the task environment in another set of tasks (Kerstholt, 1994) reinforcing 
this view. What is important is that the nature of the CPS situation changes as time elapses, 
becoming increasingly complex and by studying strategy use it is possible to determine 
whether a strategy is appropriate on a scenario-by-scenario basis (Schunn, McGregor & Saner, 
2006). The study by Cañas et al. (2005), which is described in section 3.1, uses an experimental 
design that stresses the importance of studying how strategies change, or not, as 
environmental changes are introduced.   
2.3.2.4. Time pressure 
A clock-driven simulation (in contrast with an event-driven one) does not wait for participants 
to make their inputs, thus increasing time pressure on the problem solver (Brehmer, 1995). 
Time pressure is an important factor relating to dynamic microworlds. In this kind of 
microworld, decisions have to be made in real time. As mentioned before, the morphing 
nature of the task makes it possible that a good decision at one moment may be obsolete in 
the next. From the perspective of the problem solver, there is evidence that the speed of 
information processing is increased as time pressure increases (Maule & Mackie, 1990; Payne 
et al., 1993). Research on military decision making (Thunholm, 2005) also stresses the 
importance of being fast and suggests that a cost-benefit perspective provides a good 
explanation of observed behaviour. Time pressure can yield to behaviours such as filtration 
(where less information is considered when making a decision) or acceleration of processing 
(Payne et. al, 1993). Several studies of strategy make use of combat scenarios (Schunn, 
McGregor & Saner, 2006) as this kind of task usually presents a high level of time pressure. 
Insights about strategy use under pressure can also be extracted from the Command and 
Control literature (Alberts & Hayes, 2002; Kuylenstierna et al., 2004; Thunholm, 2005).  
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2.3.2.5. Multiple goals 
The presence of multiple goals is another characteristic of microworlds. In a typical situation 
the problem solver is given an ambiguous goal definition, and s/he must derive a practical set 
of objectives. For example, in Moro, the problem solver receives instructions to “Improve the 
welfare of the Moro Tribe” and participants respond in many different ways: some of them 
focus on digging more wells, others on increasing the number of animals or improving health 
conditions, and so on. During interaction with Moro, players frequently face the situation of 
having conflicting goals. In a study about the relation of multiple goals and feedback delay 
using a fire-fighting microworld (Brehmer, 1995) the problem solver was given two goals: to 
protect the base and to put out the fire(s) as soon as possible. It was observed that 
participants learn to give a higher weight to the goal of protecting the base only when there 
are feedback delays. This result suggests that feedback delays make participants concentrate 
on the most important goal. This focus on protecting the base could be due to the fact that the 
feedback is less ambiguous with respect to the goal of preserving the base than with respect to 
that of extinguishing the fire as quickly as possible. Another explanation could be that 
participants underestimate the danger of the fire that is not threatening the base (Brehmer, 
1995). In the ORTS microworld (Buro, 2000) the objective is to destroy all opponent buildings 
within 20 minutes. In this game several players fight over resources, which are scattered over a 
terrain, by first setting up economies, building armies, and ultimately trying to eliminate all 
enemy units and buildings (Buro, 2004). In this simulation participants can be forced to change 
their goal of harvesting resources when presence of enemy units is detected. In all these cases 
participants need to choose among different paths of behaviour and somehow evaluate the 
effectiveness of their selections.  
2.3.3. Comparison of problem solving tasks 
Figure 2.8 shows a three dimensional graph depicting the categorical location of the first five 
tasks described previously. Each dimension represents a chief characteristic described in 
section 2.3.1. Complexity is located on the x-axis, the y-axis represents dynamics and the z-axis 
represents non-transparency. As can be seen in the graph, the TOH (TH) and the F&T (FT) tasks 
have a single component (complexity), whilst the other three tasks present all three 
components. This distinction is important because, as mentioned previously, studies using the 
European approach to the study of CPS mainly use tasks that have the three components 
shown in figure 2.1 (section 2.2) whilst studies using the American approach do not. Coldstore, 
Moro and FireChief are considered microworlds. The addition of dynamics and non-
transparency to the tasks poses a new set of demands on individuals in comparison to tasks 
that vary in complexity only. The graph also shows that Moro has the highest level of 
complexity while FireChief has the highest level of dynamics. Moro presents greater 
complexity as it involves more variables, more dependencies among them, and a wider range 
of actions. In FireChief the fire is developing continuously and in Moro variables are changing 
as simulation steps take place. FireChief therefore has the higher level of dynamics because it 
is clock driven rather than event driven. Güss et al (2004) found that participants consider a 
fire-fighting microworld similar to FireChief as more dynamic and complex than Coldstore.  
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Figure 2.8: Categorical distribution of different classes of microworld 
 
2.3.4. Methodological advantages of using microworlds 
Microworlds allow for an economic and standardized presentation of complex scenarios that 
support research into problem solving behaviour. For example, FireChief is fully customizable 
and allows the definition of scripts for running of experiments (Omodei & Wearing, 1995). It is 
possible to simulate various years in the life of the Moro tribe in a single session with the 
results of decisions appearing immediately (Dörner, Stäudel & Strohschneider, 1986). 
Microworlds also provide an efficient means of data registration. The usual inputs from 
participants come from the keyboard and the mouse and can be logged along with application-
related data. In the Kanfer-Ackerman Air Traffic Control task (described in the next chapter) 
sequences of strokes are stored including their duration (Ackerman, 1988). In addition, 
Brehmer & Dörner (1993) have observed that microworlds have acceptance from the 
participant’s point of view, owing to their game-like nature. Simulations also provide the 
opportunity for practice and learning by doing (enabling the acquisition of declarative and 
procedural knowledge). They also provide different levels of feedback and their complexity can 
be adjusted at will (Funke, 1991, 2001). For this research the most interesting feature of 
microworlds is that their dynamic nature poses new requirements on participants in 
comparison to standard task applications, enabling the exploration of different cognitive 
abilities (Brehmer & Dörner, 1993; Gonzalez et al., 2004).  
2.3.5. Methodological challenges using microworlds 
There is a set of methodological challenges to be considered when microworlds are used for 
research. Computerized scenarios tend to produce a lot of behavioural data whose 
psychological interpretation may be unclear. Information generated by microworlds can be 
compressed into other measures and indices, for example, a matrix of transitions between 
actions can be obtained for a FireChief trial (see section 3.4.2). A common approach for 
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analysing microworld data is to perform a task analysis to identify the required steps in the 
problem solving process (Ackerman, 1988; Taatgen, 2004; Dörner, 1996; Schunn & Reder, 
2001; Rehling et al., 2004; Joslyn & Hunt, 1998, Kerstholt, 1996; Gray & Boehm-Davis, 2000). 
The researcher must look for useful indicators, those related to performance and timing being 
the most popular. An important piece of information used for interpreting results is the 
definition of the best solution for a problem. If the best solution is known, it is possible to 
determine the quality of a problem solving activity with more precision. In the TOH and F&T 
tasks it is possible to identify a precise sequence of actions to arrive to the solution in the least 
number of steps. In microworlds, the process of finding the best solution is harder due to two 
main reasons: the dynamic nature of microworlds and the ambiguity of goals. In FireChief two 
participants can issue the same actions for an identical trial and yet obtain different results. 
The reason is that the temporal dimension is quite important in this microworld: the fire is 
destroying the landscape at all times. Two participants will only produce the same results if the 
sequence of actions are executed in the same spatial and temporal sequence and, considering 
the variability inherent to the execution of cognitive, perceptual and motor actions (a subject 
discussed in the cognitive architectures sections) it is unlikely that two participants will present 
the exact same pattern of actions. The ambiguity of goals also makes harder the definition of 
an optimal solution. In Moro the goal is to promote the welfare of the tribe; in this case the 
definition of welfare is ill-defined. Some participants may concentrate on providing medical 
attention to the population while others on increasing the amount of fertile land. In both cases 
participants are contributing to the welfare of the tribe but, without a clear definition of an 
optimal solution, participants may concentrate their efforts in following a path that is not 
considered optimal by the researcher’s definition of the optimal solution.   
 
There is a dilemma concerning experimental control related with the use of microworlds. In 
microworlds the stimulus is no longer under the full control of the experimenter but depends 
upon the initial configuration of the simulation (defined by the experimenter) and the 
sequence of interactions executed by the participant (Gonzalez et al., 2004). In other words, 
participants in the same control group do not receive the exact same treatment, and this is a 
violation of the experimental control assumption. In this scenario it is hard to compare 
participants' behaviour. This problem can be tackled from two perspectives: increase 
experimental control or modify the analytic approach. Funke (1998) proposed the reduction of 
stimuli variance whilst taking into consideration that strict control of the simulation is not 
compatible with the use of microworlds. Streufert et al. (1988) applied this approach in a study 
about the relation between managerial performance and training. In this work Streufert et al. 
make a distinction between free simulations, which are extremely dependent on participants’ 
actions, and quasi-experimental simulations in which the experimenter has control over the 
presentation of information. In a quasi-experimental simulation “each participant receives the 
same quantity of information at fixed points in simulated time” (p. 5). Dörner proposed an 
alternative solution that respects the simulation principle: focus the analysis on patterns and 
strategies. According to Schunn, McGregor & Saner (2006) a strategy is a coherent set of steps 
for solving a problem. Brehmer & Dörner (1993) say that in fire-fighting experiments stable 
results should be obtained at the levels of goal attainment and strategy rather that at the level 
of individual decisions; this approach is followed by various researchers (Cañas et al., 2005; 
Taatgen, 2005; Schunn & Reder, 2001).  
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2.3.6. Dealing with microworlds 
In order to successfully deal with microworlds a problem solver can make use of a set of 
mechanisms to maximize his/her cognitive resources utilization. These mechanisms are 
explored next as they will drive the construction of the cognitive model. 
2.3.6.1. Choose an appropriate representation of the problem 
A task representation includes a subset of all possible task features (Schunn & Reder, 1998). 
The ultimate goal of this representation is to enable to problem solver to gain control over the 
simulation. Niessen et al. (1999) stress the importance of coordinating activities in a dynamic 
environment by means of a mental representation. They identify three processing 
requirements for enabling situation awareness: the update of varying relations, the prediction 
of future states, and the determination of the temporal sequence of cognitive activities. They 
developed a model following these principles for an ATC task called EnCoRe that simulates 
traffic scenarios providing radar screen runs, electronic flight-strips, and headphone 
communication with a ghost-pilot. One of their studies investigated the selection of 
information and involved masking sections of the radar and the flight-strip with grey bars. It 
was found that “…the representation of the traffic situation is built up by means of a 
considerably reduced amount of information” (p. 9), that is, participants were able to build a 
sufficient representation of the situation by focusing on just a few aspects of the task. From 
the 6 available sources of information 3 were preferred over the rest: callsign (to identify the 
aircraft), Flightlevel (vertical position of aircraft in space) and predictor (flight direction). Other 
sources of information such as speed, cleared flightlevel and c/d indicator were not preferred 
by problem solvers. The authors argue that the callsign information is used to identify the 
aircraft and together with the Flightlevel and Predictor indicators a spatial representation is 
constructed.  
 
For some problems the difficulty resides in finding the right representation, because some 
representations might involve much simpler processing operations than others. Much research 
on expert-novice differences highlights experts' great advantage in properly representing and 
categorizing problems in terms of deep features (Demetriou et al., 2002). A difference 
between novices and experts found by Dörner (1996) with the microworld Moro is that the 
former tend to ignore side effects during interaction. Another difference is that novices focus 
on surface features while experts focus on deep features. In this respect Sloutsky & Yarlas 
(2000) studied novice-expert differences in the construction of arithmetic equation 
representations. Their experimental design consisted of a learning phase where items which 
present both superficial and deep features were presented. Deep features include deep 
relational properties such as principles of commutativity and associativity while surface 
elements include commonality of numbers or the same number of constituent addends in the 
equation. In a second phase, participants tried to recognize the items. After considering 
different processing models, they found that novices and experts represent both types of 
features but that there is an attentional competition between surface and principled features 
for novices. Anderson & Reder (1998) also observed that novices tend to lack the relevant 
knowledge structures to classify problems as well the experts, and that experts represent the 
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current knowledge state with fewer ‘chunks’ in comparison with novices. In this sense, experts 
and novices have different ways of selecting strategies and adapting to the environment. The 
process of structural knowledge acquisition can also be influenced by the semantic context of 
the task. For instance if participants are given instructions that frame a task with a familiar 
context they tend to show a confidence level that prevents them from properly exploring the 
system and hence obtaining useful structural knowledge (Beckmann & Guthke, 1995). Because 
the system variable most strongly related to the creation of a system representation is the 
level of transparency (Hörmann & Thomas, 1989); the less transparent the system (such as in 
the case of microworlds) the harder it is to develop a representation of the system. 
2.3.6.2. Implement strategies 
Regardless of the high complexity of microworlds, researchers have been able to successfully 
identify and describe strategies when conducting experiments. Lee, Anderson & Matessa 
(1995) studied different strategies using the KA-ATC task (see section 2.3.1.7). They observed 
an improvement in performance over trials and tried to explain it based on strategy change. 
Landing an aircraft typically involves progressing from the landing queue through 3 hold levels 
where level 1 immediately precedes landing. They identified a common strategy among 
participants which they called ‘hold 1’. This strategy involves bringing aircraft from the queue 
directly into priority hold level 1 (skipping two hold levels). The hold 1 strategy reduces the 
number of keystrokes needed to land an aircraft. This measure is defined as the percentage of 
aircraft brought directly from the queue into hold level 1. It was observed that this strategy 
was used increasingly until half way through the experiment and after that it’s used all the 
time. Another strategy was to maximize the number of aircraft landing simultaneously. When 
the wind changes direction, there is an opportunity to use the runways in the new direction 
while other aircraft are taxiing. They called this second strategy ‘runway efficiency’ and 
observed that the frequency of this strategy increases throughout the experiment. They also 
added two psychomotor variables: the number of keystrokes and the mean reaction time to 
wind direction change; together with the two measures of strategy and the score this summed 
up to give a total of five measures. From these measures, runway efficiency correlated most 
strongly with the overall score, from which the authors conclude that scores increase with the 
adoption of either the hold 1 or the runway efficiency strategies, and that overall speed also 
contributes to the score. The authors conclude that the strategy use of participants 
contributes significantly to performance and suggest that any model of this kind of task should 
be able to learn over trials which strategies are better and how to execute them more 
efficiently.  
 
Charman and Howes (2002) were interested in the effect of practice on strategy generation. 
Their study was focused on the tendencies of people when selecting between known 
strategies and the cognitive cost of learning new strategies. The task used was a drawing task 
where participants needed to either design the layout of a computer classroom and a study 
area (the higher-goal condition) or to copy series of elements into a blank area (the no-higher-
goal condition). In both cases, the items to be arranged are 148 computers and 54 desks. Three 
main strategies were identified: work with individual shapes, work with more than one item at 
a time by making multiple selections, and use the exponential copying strategy where an initial 
element is copied, then the resulting two elements are selected and copied producing four 
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elements, and then these four are selected and copied an so forth. The results show that 
participants with higher constraints are able to generate the most elaborated strategies 
observed in the no-higher-goal condition group, but generate them later in time due to the 
reduced opportunity to practice more efficient strategies (such as exponential copying) due to 
the existence of a higher goal. The conclusion of the experiment was that, as users become 
more familiar with the experimental environment, better use of its operators is enabled (and a 
shift in strategies takes place).  
 
Gray et al. (2005) studied strategic selection using the Blocks World Task, where the objective 
is to copy a pattern of blocks. They identified a trade-off between the accuracy of a strategy 
and the effort required to execute it. They divided the task into elementary information 
processes (fundamental cognitive operations). The experimental manipulation was a variation 
in the cost of accessing information in one experimental condition including hiding certain 
information and using delays. They found that participants are responsive to these 
manipulations and adapt strategy use to them: members of the group where there was a delay 
uncovered the information fewer times. Individual differences in strategy choice were also 
studied by Ball et al. (2003) using an ATC where participants fly seven distinct manoeuvres and 
their performance is obtained by calculating the RMSD of each trial with the ideal 
performance. The authors were interested in studying differences in knowledge and strategies. 
They used a cognitive modelling approach in which task different variants of the model are 
tested. Each new variant of the model incorporates more features than the previous one. In 
this task there are two types of indicator. Performance indicators reflect the behaviour of the 
aircraft (e.g. airspeed and altitude) and control indicators reflect the settings of the controls 
which affect the behaviour of the aircraft, such as engine speed. Particularly they compared 
two strategies: attending to control and performance indicators vs. focusing on control 
indicators only. The first strategy implies a crosscheck between performance and control 
indicators while the second allows the correct setting for control instruments. They found that 
the second strategy was more successful in five out of seven trials mainly because this second 
strategy allows a higher number of quick adjustments to airspeed, altitude and/or heading 
allowing better performance. Differences in strategy were also detected in the Emergency 
Dispatch task (Joslyn & Hunt, 1998). Participants who gave preference to higher priority 
incidents lost points mainly on low priority incidents.  
 
Implementing a strategy in a complex dynamic task also places significant psychomotor 
demands. The problem solver must issue a considerable amount of commands to the various 
objects in the simulation for achieving his or her goals, and doing so under time constraints. In 
a study using a different ATC task called AMBR, Rehling et al. (2004) studied individual 
differences. The task is similar to the KA-ATC task but uses radar to display aircraft locations. In 
this experimental design, psychometric tests were applied for assessing two cognitive abilities, 
working memory and psychomotor capacity, and an ACT-R cognitive model of the task was 
parameterised based on these same parameters. The authors report that, although measures 
of both cognitive abilities are able to predict performance on the AMBR task, psychomotor 
ability is a better predictor. As the ATC model developed by Anderson et al. (2004) gains 
experience motor ability becomes more relevant. This result provides more evidence of the 
importance of psychomotor ability in dynamic tasks.  
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All the studies discussed in this section have one thing in common: their focus on the 
strategies participants use to deal with the task at hand. Different aspects of strategy use were 
considered in this section: strategy identification, strategy choice, and the effect of practice on 
strategy choice. All these elements are further explored in the following chapters. Also 
different ways of analysing strategies (for instance, by decomposing the task) and measuring 
their impact on performance or other relevant measures have been presented here: the 
following chapter describes how a brand new set of strategies were found for a dataset 
obtained using the FireChief microworld. 
2.3.6.3. Use WM efficiently 
Studies using microworlds have found that performance is related to measures of cognitive 
ability (Brehmer & Dörner, 1993; Taatgen, 2001, Rehling et al., 2004). For example Rehling et 
al. (2004) found a positive correlation of working memory (WM) and psychomotor ability with 
performance in an Air Traffic Control (ATC) task. SüB et al. (2002) identified various functions 
of WM such as its influence over individual ability to simultaneously store and process 
information, required for the performance of supervisory functions (such as monitoring mental 
operations and controlling their efficiency). Schunn & Reder (2001) argue that, while 
performing the KA-ATC task,  WM is necessary for keeping information in mind (the rules for 
landing aircraft) to allow the appropriate selection of a runway (long or short) for landing the 
aircraft. In general terms a successful interaction with complex, dynamic tasks requires 
tracking the development of environmental variables such as the aircraft that have been 
classified (Ackerman, 1998), the current emergency report that is being attended (Joslyn & 
Hunt, 1998), or the strength of the wind (Schunn & Reder, 2001), and storing this information 
places demands on WM.  
Brumback et al. (2005) stress the importance of working memory for controlling the allocation 
of attention. They grouped participants according to their performance in the Ospan task 
(LaPointe & Engle, 1990) and compared their performance in a couple of auditory tasks 
involving mapping tones and specific buttons. Results show that participants with low-Ospan 
(4-9) scores are more distracted by changes in the stimulus than participants with high scores 
(19-41). Brumback et al. conclude that the capacity to control attention is important in tasks 
that require complex cognitive processing, such as the FireChief microworld. Gonzalez et al. 
(2004) concluded that FireChief is characterized by its dynamic nature and that participants 
show more dependence on WM because there is a lot of information and events to look at and 
therefore performance is associated primarily with the ability to store and process visual or 
spatial information.   
2.3.6.4. Focus on controlling the situation 
Instructions given to participants interacting with microworlds are usually diverse and vague. 
Nevertheless, research has found that there is a common goal people have when interacting 
with a simulation: to gain control over the situation (Brehmer, 1992, Brehmer & Dörner 1993). 
Brehmer and Allard (1991) give an example of how one process can control another, this 
analysis can be applied to the FireChief task, where on one hand there is a fire fighting process 
which uses appliances for fighting the fire and on the other hand there is a process that 
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represents a developing fire. In the case of a fire burning in a uniform environment (e.g. a 
forest), the size of the burning area increases linearly with time and the rate at which it 
spreads depends on the nature of the forest and the strength of the wind. The effect of the 
fire-fighting process also increases linearly with time; each fire-fighting appliance will be able 
to cover a constant forest area with water per unit time.  
 
 
Figure 2.9: Diagram of the Fire and the Fire-fighting processes taken from Brehmer and Allard (1991) 
 
Figure 2.9 shows the development of two processes involved in a CPS situation. The fire 
process is active from the beginning of the simulation (fire is burning and destroying cells when 
the trial starts) but the fire-fighting process is not: a period of time is necessary before starting 
to fight the fire (the situation should be evaluated, a course of action selected after which the 
units can move and start fighting the fire); this period of time is known as ‘dead time’. The 
critical point is where the two processes intercept. According to Brehmer and Allard (1991), 
before the first interception, the fire can be extinguished by direct attack, as the fire-fighting 
units are able to cover at least the same area that the fire is covering, but after the second 
interception, the best course of action is to stop the fire from spreading using fire-control. 
Spatio-temporal diagrams such as that in figure 3.1 can show the strategic options FireChief 
participants have (Brehmer, 1995). The assumption that participants will attempt to control 
the situation at hand (1) limits the set of possible actions/intentions and (2) favours those 
actions/intentions with higher possibility of achieving this control; these features are useful 
when the cognitive modelling approach is followed (described in chapter 5). 
2.3.6.5. Adapt to changing environment 
When participants interact with a complex, dynamic and non-transparent microworld two 
kinds of control can be exerted: top-down (by following a plan or a strategy) and bottom-up 
(by reacting to task events). In the words of Payne et al. (1988) “… a decision maker possesses 
a repertoire of well-defined strategies and selects among them when faced with a decision by 
considering the expected costs and expected benefits of each strategy” (p. 18). A strategy 
considered as a form of top-down control implies that the current representation of the task 
has an influence on the actions that are executed when interacting with the microworld. 
Section 2.3.6.2 showed the importance of implementing the right strategy in order to obtain 
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good performance in a variety of tasks. Nevertheless bottom-up control is particularly relevant 
when considering dynamic tasks. For Bettman (1979) strategies develop in an ad hoc fashion 
during the course of the problem solving process, and these strategies are generated by being 
receptive to the environment. Bottom-up control is driven by feedback obtained from the 
environment and is used for guiding the selection of actions; the outcome of this process is 
adaptation. 
 
Adaptation is also related to the ability to monitor your own strategies. The term 
metacognition is often used for this kind of cognitive activity (Metcalfe & Greene, 2007). 
Returning to the topic of the importance of gaining control, stressed by Brehmer (1992) in 
section 2.3.6.4, FireChief participants should continually ask themselves if they have the fire 
under control, that is, if their strategy is able to control fire development. In order to be 
adaptive, cognitive resources must be used for this end and, as Brehmer (1992) pointed out, 
there is a compromise between a strategy for controlling the task and a strategy that gives the 
problem solver control over the rate at which he has to make decisions. One of these decisions 
is whether a particular strategy should be changed. This topic is analysed further in section 
5.4.4 (sub-section 15). 
 
One of the research questions of the present work is how do choices arise in complex and 
dynamic situations. The answer to this question seems to be related to a combination of using 
strategies and being receptive to environmental cues. Payne et al. (1988) argue that a major 
problem is to understand and predict when a particular strategy will be used. If we focus our 
attention on the concepts of effort and accuracy and map them to ACT-R concepts we find first 
that in ACT-R effort is measured as the time associated with the firing of the productions 
related to a specific strategy. The time required for each production is a function of the actions 
executed by it: cognitive, perceptual or motor. And second, that accuracy is a function of the 
feedback received from the environment in the form of rewards. Chapter 5 describes these 
concepts in depth as they are critical to understanding behaviour during the running of the 
model. In FireChief, for example, accessing information requires a combination of cognitive 
and perceptual actions that are executed by the problem solver and have a cost that can be 
measured in time. In making a decision about how to use a fire-fighting unit (the most 
important resource) a participant can either follow a plan, and use a less perception-intensive 
approach, or base his or her choice on what is perceived from the environment. In the second 
case the problem solver needs to determine how much information is going to be gathered 
before making a decision. As the problem solver interacts with the FireChief task he/she learns 
to make this kind of decision based on their performance.   
 
For Lovett & Schunn (1999), as experience in the task increases, an individual will move 
towards a strategy representation that includes performance data and will use the strategy 
that produces the highest success rate, so a strategy will be used more often if it is successful. 
For Lovett & Schunn (1999) the problem solver’s task representation (a set of stimulus 
features) modulates his or her ability to learn base-rates when these base-rates are learned by 
experience. In this sense, a representation acts as a filter that determines what can be learned 
from interactions with the task (Lovett & Schunn, 1999). 
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2.4. Cognitive Architectures  
Cognitive architectures have the goal of providing a framework capable of enabling the 
versatility observed in human behaviour. A cognitive architecture embodies structures and 
mechanisms in the form of a general theory of how the mind works (Newell, 1990) and is used 
for creating simulation models of human cognition (Taatgen & Anderson, 2008). Cognitive 
architectures are implementations of what Newell called Unified Theories of Cognition (UTC). 
An UTC strives to cover a large number of domains (a single architecture should be used to 
account for as much regularity in empirical data as possible) and to consider multiple 
constraints in order to reduce the number of degrees of freedom in the theory that is being 
studied (Newell, 1990). The emergence of cognitive architectures was possible mainly due to 
two factors (Newell, 1987). On one hand psychologists shaped various theories about aspects 
of cognition such as memory, problem solving, perception and psychomotor actions (among 
many others). And on the other hand developments in computer-related technologies, such as 
more robust and faster hardware and better algorithms, allow the execution of increasingly 
complex computations. These improvements offer the possibility of implementing 
computationally demanding psychological theories in increasingly shorter times. The 
advantages of modelling psychological processes in computers are similar to the ones 
described in the microworlds section, namely, the economic and standardized generation of 
data (the model is able to interact with computer tasks in a similar fashion as human 
participants) and, mainly, the fine-grained level of detail in which the phenomenon of interest 
is captured.  
 
The rich and variable behaviour of humans can be divided into different bands based on time 
scales (Newell, 1990). Each band has its own set of operations that interact with each other to 
produce behaviour. The bottom level corresponds to the biological band; it represents the 
neural level and its operations are of the order of 1 ms. The biological band also includes the 
neural circuit level that uses activation levels of the order of 10 ms. At this level symbols 
correspond to patterns of neural signals. The existence of a biological band imposes a real time 
constraint on the cognitive band (the second layer) of the order of 100 ms. A sub-level within 
the cognitive band is called the deliberation level where an agent deliberates about when to 
use knowledge to choose among options. Deliberation requires three serial steps: knowledge 
retrieval, decision and execution, each of them of the order of 10 ms. This kind of deliberation 
is simple and is considered to be automatic. Most theories consider that cognition operates on 
a time scale of 10 ms. to 10 seconds. Above 10 ms. the cognitive band is capable of deliberate 
acts and operations (Anderson, 2002) and hence differences in behaviour need an explanation 
based on the task or particular architectural or epistemological features of the problem solver 
(or a combination of them). When operations last more than 10 seconds the system is 
operating in the rational band. In this band the agent applies all his available knowledge to 
obtain his or her goals. Regarding the time scale, the rational band encompasses tasks of the 
order of minutes to hours. There are other bands at a higher level that are not discussed here. 
In this respect Anderson (2002) stresses the importance of spanning the order of magnitude of 
cognitive models, that is, to create models of cognition that offer explanations of phenomena 
beyond the cognitive band. Returning to the definition of cognitive architectures and linking 
this to time scales, architectures are fixed definitions of the layer below the symbol level 
(Anderson, 2002) where more complex operations depend upon the latencies of the lower 
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layers, and these latencies can be changed by accumulating experience. Cognitive 
architectures constrain modelling and should only allow cognitively plausible models (Taatgen 
et al., 2006).  
2.4.1. Overview of the ACT-R cognitive architecture 
This section focuses on describing the cognitive architecture used in this research: ACT-R 
(Anderson et al., 2004). This discussion gives particular attention to how actions are selected, 
the focal point of this research. There are other cognitive architectures such as Soar (Laird, 
Rosenbloom & Newell, 1987), EPIC (Executive Process-Interactive Control, Kieras & Meyer, 
1997) which couples perceptual-motor mechanisms with a production-system and Cogent 
(Cooper & Fox, 1998). All of these architectures are capable of realizing intelligent behaviour. 
This discussion is enriched with comments of how cognition is realized in Soar.   
 
A cognitive model’s performance is intrinsically related to the cognitive architecture in which it 
is implemented and executed. The decision of selecting ACT-R is constrained by the CPS 
paradigm depicted in figure 2.1 in which there are two main elements: the problem solver and 
the task. In the case of the problem solver it is important to have a way of modelling different 
aspects related to strategy use; whereas in relation to the task the model must be able to deal 
with a complex, non-transparent and dynamic environment. In this research it is hypothesized 
that learning generated by feedback from the environment is particularly relevant to achieving 
good performance in a dynamic microworld such as FireChief. For this reason, the most 
important criterion for selecting a cognitive architecture was its ability to process feedback 
from the environment. The reinforcement learning mechanism in Soar creates rules and it 
adjusts the values of preferences for operators. On the other hand in ACT-R the sub-symbolic 
calculations modify the utility value of every rule. That is, ACT-R tunes the utility value of every 
single production according to environmental feedback. This learning mechanism allows an 
ACT-R model to adapt its selection of rules at a fine-grained level. This is particularly relevant 
when dealing with a highly dynamic task such as FireChief.  
 
An important difference between these cognitive architectures is in how performance 
limitations are explained. In ACT-R there is a central-processing bottleneck: only one rule can 
be fired at a time. The serial bottleneck in ACT-R limits the amount of parallelism. Soar has a 
more arbitrary way of matching patterns and performance limitations are explained more by 
lack of knowledge. Instead of making several elaborations (in parallel) before selecting an 
operator (for example, to execute a particular FireChief command) or switching between 
problem spaces, an ACT-R model fires a single rule at the end of each cycle. Considering the 
complexity and dynamic characteristics of FireChief, the number of elaborations made by Soar 
in parallel would escalate to such an extent that the analysis (and comprehension) of the 
model’s behaviour would become highly difficult. The parsimonious approach followed by 
ACT-R allows the exploitation of the utility learning mechanisms for analytical purposes (see 
sections 5.2.3.2 and 6.1.2.3). As pointed out by Taatgen & Anderson (2008) for Soar rationality 
refers to using available knowledge for dealing with the task whilst in ACT-R rationality is to 
optimally adapt to the environment. In Soar it is rational to use all the available knowledge. In 
the context of FireChief this knowledge includes, among other things, the position of the 
different fires, the location and status of the fire-fighting units, and the current strategy. Soar 
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would use all this knowledge for making this decision. On the other hand, an ACT-R model may 
choose to use less knowledge for making this decision if the cost of acquiring more knowledge 
is high.  
 
The characteristics of the ACT-R visual module are another reason for choosing this cognitive 
architecture. The ACT-R “visual interface” is designed to enable the modelling of dynamic, 
high-performance perceptual-motor tasks. ACT-R can also issue keystrokes and execute mouse 
commands and is able to handle movement and change, can be instructed to track moving 
objects, can adjust to very small movements, and can correctly identify objects in changed 
displays, just the kind of abilities required for interacting with dynamic tasks. In FireChief visual 
elements change frequently. Visual elements can be perceived by the model and this process 
creates facts in the memory of the model which are used to make a variety of decisions. ACT-R 
is also capable of hearing simple stimuli which is necessary for interacting with complex task 
domains such as FireChief. ACT-R can model individual differences in cognitive ability by 
manipulating architectural parameters. The ACT-R architecture contains a number of 
parameters that can be used to fix levels of performance (Rehling et al., 2004). This approach 
to modelling individual differences has been used in many ACT-R models. For example, 
differences in psychomotor speed have been modelled by varying the time needed for a key-
press (Taatgen, 2001), or the speed of proceduralization by controlling the learning rate 
(Rehling et al., 2004). The basic principle of ACT-R is that an agent executes actions according 
to rational analysis: it selects actions trying to achieve its goals. In this way the ACT-R cognitive 
architecture is constrained to follow a goal and to prefer those actions that are more likely to 
obtain positive feedback from the environment. Similarly SOAR is guided by the principle of 
rationality: if an agent has knowledge that an operator application will lead to one of its goals 
then the agent will select that operator (Newell, 1982). 
2.4.1.1. Architecture 
The ACT-R (Anderson et al., 2004) architecture is composed of several specialized modules 
interconnected by channels called buffers. The central block in figure 2.10 shows the 
procedural module where procedural knowledge is stored in the form of production rules. This 
module implements the procedural memory and connects the rest of the modules (Taatgen et 
al., 2006). The visual module searches and identifies objects in the visual field, the manual 
module controls the hands, the declarative module retrieves information from memory, and 
the goal and imaginary modules keep track of the model’s current intention and the context of 
the problem solving situation respectively. Communication between modules is achieved 
through buffers; the content of any buffer is limited to a single declarative unit of knowledge 
called a chunk (section 2.4.1.2). For this reason the system can only be aware of a limited 
amount of information at a single moment in time. This last constraint is inspired, for instance, 
by the fact that people are not aware of all the information in their visual field but only the 
object they are currently attending to, and people are not aware of all the information in long-
term memory but only the fact currently retrieved (Anderson et al., 2004). The central 
production system can only execute one rule at a time. ACT-R processes requests for a 
resource located in any of its modules on a first-come, first-served basis (Taatgen, 2005). Each 
module is mapped to the actual human cerebrum. For example, the goal buffer is associated 
with the dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex (Fincham et al., 2002) but also with other regions. 
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Figure 2.10: ACT-R architecture, taken from Anderson et al. (2004) 
2.4.1.2. Types of knowledge 
ACT-R makes a distinction between declarative and procedural knowledge. Anderson & 
Lebiere (1998) propose that chunks and productions are the atomic components of thought 
because they represent the lowest unit in the symbolic decomposition, that is, below chunks 
you only have unrelated combinations of values and below rules you cannot define steps of 
cognition. Declarative knowledge is represented by chunks, which are elements that encode 
things we know such as: “the wind is blowing to the right”. Procedural knowledge is 
represented by rules, and can be used to produce task-specific behaviour. Procedural 
knowledge describes how to do things, for instance it may specify: “to find a fire in the 
landscape look for a cell that is red”. There is evidence of this distinction in the brain: the basal 
ganglia are related to the processing of procedural knowledge and the area of the 
hippocampus to new declarative knowledge (Anderson et al., 2004).  
 
In the ACT-R theory, the goal of human memory is to retrieve appropriate knowledge to solve 
a current task. Requests to the declarative memory module retrieve a chunk from the 
declarative memory that matches certain criteria and place that chunk into the retrieval buffer 
(if found). Each declarative piece of knowledge has an activation level which determines its 
probability of being processed by procedural knowledge. As a result, activation ranks 
knowledge in order of potential relevance (Taatgen & Anderson, 2008). The activation formula 
has two main components, the base-level activation (general usefulness in the past) and 
associative activation (relevance to the current context). The base level component of 
activation fluctuates and decays with time allowing ACT-R to adapt to changing needs over 
time. Activation also has a random component which allows ACT-R to explore the usefulness of 
different facts and a partial-matching component that allows rules to fire even though not all 
conditions are matched. Bothell (2007) describes all these elements in detail.  
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Each rule, the unit of procedural knowledge, corresponds to a step in cognition and is 
comprised by two elements: a condition and an action. The condition of a production rule (the 
if part) is a collection of patterns to be matched (for instance, this pattern can correspond to 
the content of buffers in ACT-R) and the action of a production rule (the then part) consists of 
the execution of one or more transformations. ACT-R rules are in charge of querying and 
transforming the content of buffers and these transformations represent cognitive steps. 
There are specific constraints such as the use of one memory retrieval per production and the 
control of discrete behaviours (such as key press, eye movement, and generation of an 
utterance) by distinct productions. 
2.4.1.3. Basic Cycle  
During the basic rule-firing cycle in ACT-R the various buffers hold representations determined 
by the current task and internal events. Production rules recognize this set of representations 
or pattern and a single production fires, the firing of this production may update the content 
of one of or more buffers therefore activating other rules (50 ms. represents the minimum 
cycle time for processing). ACT-R uses the Rete algorithm (Forgy, 1982) for the pattern 
matching process. There is a latency associated with the firing of every production which is 
calculated by accumulating the time required for performing all the actions specified in the 
rule, such as retrieving chunks, moving the pointer of the mouse, hearing a sound, etc. Parallel 
processing exists if actions are executed by different ACT-R modules, such as moving attention 
and pressing a key in the keyboard or moving the eyes and the mouse at the same time. 
2.4.1.4. Action selection 
In ACT-R the next action is determined by the rule that is fired, nevertheless there may be a 
conflict resolution process when more than one production can be fired. Von Neumann & 
Morgenstern (1947) proposed that, in decision making under risk, a decision-maker should 
choose the course of action that maximizes the expected utility of the outcome. This principle 
is implemented by the ACT-R conflict resolution process, which is responsible for selecting the 
next rule to be fired from the set of rules whose preconditions comply with the current 
content of the different buffers (the conflict set). The productions in the conflict set are 
ordered in terms of their expected gain (i.e. utility) and ACT-R considers them according to that 
ordering (soft-max function) and a random component (noise). The formula used to obtain the 
utility of a production is shown below. When a reward is triggered it changes the utility of the 
most recent productions. The new utility of a production ( )(nU i ) is a function of its current 
utility ( )1( nUi ) and the value of the effective reward ( )(nRi ). The value of the effective 
reward decreases as the difference it time between the firing of the rule and the giving of the 
reward increases. It is important to note that there is a stochastic component during the 
process of conflict resolution. In ACT-R conflict resolution is adaptive and satisficing (it uses a 
threshold, and when the expected gain of a production exceeds it, it fires). It has been 
observed that satisficing rational agents do not select the most effective strategy for solving a 
task but rather set a specific aspiration level and select a strategy that exceeds it (Johnson, 
1997). After a production fires, the pattern matching and conflict resolution processes will be 
performed again and this loop will continue until the model has finished (i.e. no production 
can be fired).  
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The following formula controls the learning of utilities:  
)]1()([)1()(  nUnRnUnU iiii     Difference Learning Equation 
is the learning rate. 
Ri(n) is the effective reward value given to production i at time n. 
Ui(0) is set by a parameter. 
It is worth mentioning that for Johnson (1997) the different strategies for conflict resolution 
are the major difference in control between ACT-R and Soar. ACT-R uses an automatic conflict 
resolution method described above whilst Soar uses a knowledge-based conflict resolution 
method based on all available knowledge. Making good decisions is a critical aspect of 
performance when dealing with simulations such as microworlds. Being one focus of this 
research how actions are selected, and how this selection is influenced by task characteristics 
and the feedback participants receive from the environment, the conflict resolution process 
and its most important determinant, the utility of productions, are of the utmost importance.   
2.4.1.5. Learning 
In ACT-R there is learning at two levels: symbolic and sub-symbolic. ACT-R can learn new 
productions through the production compilation mechanism. In ACT-R there are special 
structures that must be explicitly created and tuned to accomplish the compilation of rules; 
these structures specify how rules can be compiled together to improve speed. Performance 
can be sped-up by reducing the amount of knowledge that needs to be retrieved. At the sub-
symbolic level ACT-R can modify the utility of production rules in response to environmental 
feedback (reinforcement learning).  
2.4.1.6. Goal representation 
In ACT-R the function of the goal module is to enable the model to respond differently to 
stimuli accordingly to a special structure called the goal. The goal determines the 
manipulations that the system applies to the available elements of the environment. In this 
way the firing of productions is organized into coherent behaviour (Anderson et al., 2004). The 
goal and imaginal buffers are considered as the working memory of participants (Veksler, Gray 
& Schoelles, 2007). A production must explicitly set a goal by placing a chunk in the goal buffer.   
2.5. Cognitive modelling of complex behaviour 
The most compelling reason behind the selection of FireChief was its salient dynamic nature. 
Anderson et al. (2004) propose the idea that dynamic tasks are ideal domains for testing the 
integration of ACT-R modules given that in these tasks is necessary to execute perceptual and 
motor actions whilst retrieving information from memory and all these processes are 
controlled by a central production system. This section starts by describing the technique used 
for developing this study: cognitive modelling.  
2.5.1. Cognitive Modelling  
As Newell (1990) points out, human activity implies an enormous variety of activities. Much of 
this behaviour is a consequence of cognitive processes which are not open to conscious 
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experience making it necessary to develop methods to study it. One of these methods is 
cognitive modelling. Cognitive modelling refers to the modelling of higher-level cognition by 
means of computational technologies such as production systems (Anderson et al., 1995). 
Cognitive modelling does not share the AI goal of creating intelligent programs (Taatgen & 
Anderson, 2008). For this reason it is not enough to solve a problem: the solution must be 
cognitively and neurologically plausible. Because a computational approach (with explicit data 
structures and mechanisms) is used in constructing cognitive models, a detailed specification 
of the theoretical elements is mandatory (Cooper et al., 1996). For Jones, Ritter & Wood 
(2000) the development of models forces the definition of ill-defined concepts, such as 
cognitive inflexibility (described in the following chapter). Cognitive modelling can be used to 
obtain predictions based on theories by means of simulation (Cooper et al., 1996).  
 
Various approaches have been used for developing cognitive models for tasks such as 
microworlds. For instance, for the Instance-Based Learning Theory (Gonzalez et al., 2003) the 
basic idea is that individuals acquire and store instances (an instance contains information 
about the situation, the action and the result of a decision) and then uses these instances to 
make decisions during subsequent interaction with a dynamic environment. This theory has an 
implementation in ACT-R called CogIBLT. For testing this model the Water Purification Plant 
task (a scheduling task where water is processed and performance is measured by the number 
of gallons not successfully purified) was used. It was observed that performance improves as 
the situation-decision-utility triplets are refined due to the environmental feedback. There are 
also some guidelines that can be use when developing models; for instance, when designing a 
cognitive model, Taatgen (2005) proposes the use of the minimal control principle: to use the 
least possible number of goal states to reduce/minimize brittleness. Avoiding brittle behaviour 
was a continuous concern during the development of the cognitive model for FireChief (see 
section 4.2.5). 
2.5.2. Strategy use and cognitive modelling 
As stated in Frensch and Funke (1995), a problem such as FireChief cannot be solved by 
“utilizing a small number of domain-general heuristics, but rather can only be solved by using 
domain-specific knowledge and procedures” (p. 12); these procedures come in the form of 
strategies. Because this research has the goal of increasing our understanding about the 
cognitive processes underlying solution strategies in complex dynamic tasks by following a 
cognitive modelling path, research related to this topic is presented here. Lee & Johnson-Laird 
(2004) suggested that research into strategy use should devise experiments able to reveal the 
solution strategy at detailed levels, including differences among participants and type of 
stimuli used in the experiments. They also suggested that, in order to investigate the 
development of strategies for solving problems, it is necessary to use problems that can be 
presented in a series that call for distinct solutions. The following chapter demonstrates that 
the selected dataset has those characteristics and that microworlds allow the intended 
experimental control; on top of this, cognitive modelling can provide a fine-grained level of 
description. The following examples show that considerable effort has been devoted to 
modelling strategy use in complex tasks.  
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Peebles & Bothell (2004) created an ACT-R model for the Sustained Attention to Response Task 
(SART). In this task participants are presented with the digits 1 to 9 in random order (one every 
1.15 seconds). If participants see the number 3 they must withhold the response. The authors 
tried to identify the performance determinant in this task: either the ability to sustain 
attention or speed-accuracy trade-off. The authors also explored another possibility: strategic 
factors, that is, the ability to find an appropriate strategy for minimising reaction time and 
error. In their ACT-R model they allowed two strategies to compete. One strategy is faster and 
less accurate: the model clicks the mouse after detecting the stimulus; the other is more 
accurate but slower: the model checks the stimulus to determine what to do. The model 
consists of 11 productions and strategy selection in the SART task is controlled by utility. The 
SART model also has an explicit way of modifying its strategy. If the model detects that it 
responded correctly it sticks with the current strategy for the next trial, but if it found that an 
error was committed then it can either stick with the current strategy for the next trial or use a 
more accurate strategy. To fit the model Peebles and Bothell adjusted the s parameter (this 
parameter controls the amount of variance in the noise added to utility calculation) to .01 (a 
small value compared to the standard value of 3). The authors argue that a low value of s 
allows the model to be sensitive to changes in the utility values of each production and to 
show some variability. The SART study found evidence of an interaction between strategy use 
and performance. The authors consider that the ACT-R utility learning mechanism has a central 
role in the appropriate selection of strategies. Nevertheless, in the SART model the selection of 
strategies is also influenced by explicit symbolic processes: after detecting an error the model 
changes strategy.   
 
Argus Prime (Schoelles & Gray, 2000) is a task that involves radar operation where military 
aircraft in a radar display are classified according to threat. The task is divided into four sub-
tasks: target selection, information retrieval, score calculations and feedback processing. The 
authors were interested in describing the microstrategies used by participants in this 
microworld. The authors identified different strategies for the different sub-tasks involved. For 
example, for the target hooking subtask they identified a strategy called Look-after where the 
participant encodes the target number, clicks on the target’s icon, looks at the information 
window (this windows contains information such as the speed and bearing of the target), and 
make a verification by matching the encoded number with the number displayed in the 
information window. Another found for the same subtask was called the Look-before strategy, 
in this strategy the cursor is placed over the intended target, attention is switched to the 
information window, and a click in the icon is executed whereby the participant can see how 
the information window changes at that moment. During the cognitive modelling phase the 
authors created different microstrategies for the various subtasks involved: target selection, 
information retrieval (either apply the Look-after or the Look-before strategy), score 
calculation (to assess the threat level of the aircraft) and feedback processing. A model is run 
using a combination of microstrategies and patterns of similarity are determined by comparing 
the output of the model with that of participants, in the end the researchers selected the 
combination of microstrategies that best fits each participant. This research work shows how 
microstrategies can be identified by combining data analysis and cognitive modelling and 
provides an important level of detail in explaining that performance.  
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Veksler, Gray, & Schoelles (2007) created a cognitive model for a Table Decision task in which 
information is obtained by clicking cells in a 6 x 6 matrix (see section 2.2.3.4). This task is static 
in nature thus allowing a considerable time for making decisions. The authors identified three 
subtasks: uncover a cell to reveal its value (using a mouse click), add the value of the current 
cell to the total for each alternative, and (because the goal is to find the aircraft with the 
highest threat) update the alternative with the highest value. They created four models 
following an incremental approach: when a new model was created it inherited the properties 
of the previous model. The found that the last model, the one with the highest complexity, 
shows the best fit to participant data; this model interleaves cognitive with perceptual-motor 
operations, prepares motor actions, and alternates transitions between rows, that is: after 
disclosing all cells from left to right in a single row, it starts disclosing the next row of cells from 
right to left reducing the length of mouse movements.   
 
Byrne & Kirlik (2005) use a task that involves moving an aircraft to the correct gate in an 
airport after landing. This study is focused on decisions related to the selection of paths to 
arrive at the target gate. Five strategies with different levels of speed and accuracy were 
identified in this study which considered different scenarios (i.e. airports). A fast but inaccurate 
strategy is to remember the required turns (there are many gates and airports in this task). A 
second strategy is to make turns towards the gate, and a third one is to select the turn that 
reduces the distance between the aircraft and the gate the most (the authors consider this 
strategy as more effective than strategy 2). A fourth strategy is the slowest because spatial 
knowledge is used, but it is only accurate if the pilot has experience of a specific airport. The 
last strategy is to choose the turn randomly. Aided by an ACT-R cognitive model, they found 
that participants use the most accurate strategy possible given the time available; specifically, 
when time is short, the problem solvers tend to rely on their past experience of the task (i.e. 
typical taxi routes), because it is computationally cheaper.  
 
Lovett & Schunn (1999) propose a model called RCCL (pronounced ReCyCle). Within this model 
a strategy choice is a function of how base-rate and case-specific cues are combined. Base rate 
refers to how often a strategy is successful and the information about the current situation can 
be used for predicting the success of an alternative. The RCCL model has four stages: represent 
the task, construct a set of strategies, choose among them according to their success rates and 
learn new success rates based on experience. In RCCL a task representation includes a subset 
of all possible task features; this selection is based on background knowledge and the salience 
of different features. In the example given by the authors, a driver represents time of day and 
the best route to take. This information provides a knowledge base for taking a decision. 
Strategies are expressed as rules with conditions and actions, for example: if the time of day is 
morning, then take the highway route. As mentioned, each strategy’s estimated success rate is 
learned via experience. For the purpose of being adaptive, the stage in which success rates are 
learned is critical. The most important predictions of this model are that people will learn to 
prefer the strategies that have higher base rates of success and that more strategy change will 
occur in tasks that have met with low success rates. In the study of Cañas et al. (2005) more 
strategy variability is found in the variable training programme where trials of low complexity 
and high complexity are mixed and there are more task features involved (e.g. the wind 
changes intensity during trials) compared to the constant training programme where trials 
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always follow the same course. The RCCL model predicts more strategy change in the variable 
training condition due to low success rates being the product of more complex trials plus the 
addition of the new feature related to wind strength change. 
 
The work of Payne et al. (1993) is relevant for the cognitive modelling of strategy choice. These 
authors consider that production rules can be used to transform knowledge states in order to 
execute decision strategies. A strategy has a range of characteristics that are taken into 
account when making a decision: availability, accessibility, ease of execution and perceived 
benefits (Payne et al., 1993). Using as an example the Cañas et al. (2005) study (section 4.1), 
availability varies for the different training programmes where the different distribution of 
terrain and wind conditions facilitate or hinder the applicability of strategies. Similarly, the 
condition where the environment is exactly the same for all sixteen trials facilitates 
accessibility to a strategy implemented in the previous trial versus the case where the problem 
solver is presented with a different scenario on each of the sixteen trials where the changing 
conditions may hinder the accessibility of a previous strategy. Processability and perceived 
benefits are further explained in the following chapter (section 4.3.2) where a detailed analysis 
of FireChief strategies is provided. For Payne et al. (1993) the question is how one decides how 
to decide. The authors offer a definition for a decision strategy as a sequence of “mental and 
effector operations used to transform an initial state of knowledge into a final goal state of 
knowledge where the decision maker views the particular decision problem as solved” (p. 8). 
In the context of this research what is relevant in the research of Payne et al. is the idea that 
individuals try to find strategies that will yield high degrees of accuracy (in relation to 
performance) for reasonable amounts of effort. So, if the level of accuracy of two strategies is 
similar, the problem solver will use that which involves as little effort as necessary to solve a 
problem and, if the level of desired effort is equivalent, the problem solver will try to choose 
the strategy that is the most accurate. Therefore, there is a compromise between the desire to 
make the most correct decision and the desire to minimize effort. Another observation by the 
same researchers is that the levels of accuracy and effort for a given strategy change 
depending on task characteristics. According to Gerjets et al. (2000) the adaptive selection of 
strategies should be of major importance for success in learning and problem solving. In the 
study of Charman & Howes (2002) practice resulted in more efficient performance on the task 
due an adaptive selection of problem solving strategies.   
 
Different strategies are characterized by different levels of accuracy and required effort but, in 
order to apply these ideas, there must be a way of measuring effort and accuracy. According to 
Payne et al. (1993) an effortful decision process is identified by a high number of operators or 
more demanding operators. Newell & Simon (1972) have suggested that cognitive processing 
effort can be measured in terms of the number of Elementary Information Processes (EIPs) 
needed to complete the task, while Shugan (1980) suggests that decomposing decision 
strategies into components can provide estimates of their relative costs; a similar proposal is 
to decompose strategies into smaller components called microstrategies (Schoelles & Gray, 
2000). Payne, Bettman, and Johnson (1993) used Elementary Information Processes to 
calculate the mental effort of each decision strategy in their choice task, such as reading an 
item of information, comparing two items of information, multiplying or adding items of 
information, and eliminating items of information. They present a framework for measuring 
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cognitive effort and accuracy for choice strategies. The relation between ACT-R production 
rules and EIPs is straightforward: Payne et al. argue that EIPs could be used as the actions of 
productions. On the other hand accuracy can be measured using a function such as 
maximization of expected value (EV). The task used by Payne et al. (1988) is a choice problem 
where participants search among probabilities and the values associated with them to 
compare the different decision strategies. Ten decision strategies were investigated in this 
research but only two of them are presented here, with the aim of illustrating how EIPs are 
used for comparing strategies. The first strategy is called weighted additive (WADD), it 
evaluates every available option by considering all relevant attributes and the option with the 
highest evaluation is chosen; this is an information-intensive strategy. The second strategy is 
called satisficing (SAT). In this strategy options are evaluated one at a time by comparing each 
of their attributes with a cut-off value. An option is rejected if any of its attributes is below the 
threshold and the first alternative that passes the cut-off is chosen (there is no guarantee that 
the best choice is selected). The WADD strategy is a compensatory strategy whilst the SAT 
strategy is a non-compensatory one (see section 3.4). On average, the cognitive effort required 
to execute the WADD strategy is greater than the SAT strategy. This effort is also related to the 
complexity of the problem: the number of EIPs required for the WADD strategy is 28 for a trial 
with two options and two attributes whereas 400 EIPs are required for a trial with eight 
options and eight-attributes. In their study it was found that the SAT strategy approximated 
the accuracy of the WADD strategy using a fraction of the effort and that time pressure often 
truncated the execution of the WADD strategy and hence its accuracy was reduced. 
 
Taatgen (2005) observed that complex dynamic tasks involve multitasking. A model was 
developed for the CMU-ASP task. In this task participants classify aircraft by asking information 
of the system. The most important information for classifying aircraft is speed and altitude. 
Aircraft are classified by means of the 12 function keys on the keyboard (F1 to F12). Each one 
of these 12 keys has a label that describes their function and that change dynamically 
depending on the context. For instance, F6 can activate the Track Manager but after the Track 
Manager is activated the label associated with the F6 key will change. Because the role of 
these function keys changes throughout the simulation the authors argue that considerable 
learning is necessary to achieve proficiency in this aspect of the task: instead of spending time 
reading the labels associated to the function keys participants can learn the value of these 
labels and therefore complete the task faster. To execute this task three stages are necessary: 
select a plane, determine its identity, and enter its identity into the system. Points are 
awarded for successfully classifying aircraft. An important feature of the CMU-ASP model is 
that it needs to keep track of where it is in the problem solving process, a feature that exerts 
demands on WM. Taatgen (2005) developed this model following a design in which a weak 
control structure with as few control states as possible were sought. Taatgen’s model is able to 
interpret a set of instructions and learn new rules through production compilation (see section 
2.4.1.5). In this model instructions are retrieved by paying attention to cues. Its instructions 
are organized into unit tasks that reflect the three stages needed to classify aircraft found 
during task analysis. Only one set of instructions is active at a time, that is, only the set of ACT-
R rules that belongs to the active unit set can be fired. This feature reduces the number of 
different chunks that can be placed in the goal buffer, therefore reducing the total amount of 
possible goal states (which is the goal of the minimal control principle). The CMU-ASP task is 
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fairly dynamic and the model is able to cope with it by having its rules organized into sets and 
by being sensible to the cues received from the environment.  
2.5.2.1. Identifying constraints in strategy use 
An important endeavour that should be taken into account when modelling behaviour is the 
definition of how constraints, on the way a sequence of actions implement a strategy, are 
applied. A coherent set of constraints on participants’ behaviour can be extracted by 
considering the demands imposed by complex dynamic microworlds described in this chapter. 
This set of constraints is combined with those obtained from the analysis of data described in 
the next chapter. Different ways of representing constraints have been proposed in the 
cognitive modelling research community. Some approaches use formal languages for 
specifying constraints. Sceptic (Cooper et al., 1996) is an executable specification language 
implemented in Prolog. In Sceptic, data is represented as a relation between zero or more 
parameters. Sceptic maintains a system’s state (defined at the beginning of the simulation) 
which is modified as execution progresses. During execution procedural knowledge can modify 
this state and trigger more rules (each Sceptic rule has 3 elements: a trigger, conditions and 
actions). The modelling methodology promoted by Sceptic is based on a distinction between 
theory and implementation (Cooper et al., 1996). The theory level specifies a systematic 
methodology for theory articulation. The implementation level refers to the mechanisms that 
have to be implemented to make the program executable in order to test the core 
assumptions of the theory. Howes, Vera, Lewis, & McCurdy (2004) propose a similar approach 
called Cognitive Constraint Modelling (CCM). In CCM, behaviours are described via constraint 
satisfaction over architectural, task and strategy constraints. Constraints are specified in terms 
of predicate calculus statements relating entities in the environment, task and psychological 
processes. Entities are represented as a set of attribute-value pairs. CCM depends on 
optimisation and cascaded information-processes. Cascading requires the specification of the 
processing resources for communication between processes. The authors give as an example 
the combination of two preparations and two executions of a click command to show the 
limits of temporal dependencies. The sequence init(x), init(y), click(y), click(x) does not violate 
a temporal dependency, but does not respect the ACT-R architectural constraints: that a buffer 
can only store a single chunk, so, in this case, the second preparation would reset the first one 
cancelling the execution of click(x). In ACT-R, production rules are in charge of cascading 
information-processes.  
 
To illustrate the use of CCM, a FireChief constraint expressed in CCM is presented next. The 
constraint is described as follows: “A Control Fire command starts after a C key is pressed and 
the mouse pointer is located above a free truck. The duration of the Control Fire is of two 
seconds.”  
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In CCM, after all constraints are defined, a constraint satisfaction engine can be used to get a 
sequence of valid actions that reports the greatest utility according to an objective function 
such as minimizing time, so the model’s behaviour is controlled by objective functions. Ohlsson 
(2007) uses an approach similar to CCM: the state constraint representation. This 
representation applies to declarative knowledge that is represented as a pair of patterns: the 
relevance criterion and the satisfaction criterion. These constraints are used for guiding the 
search for solutions using the Rete algorithm. Ohlsson affirms that a constraint base supports 
judgement by offering constraint functions that identify search states consistent with the 
principles of the domain. In the FireChief model constraints are embedded in the structure of 
the task, the ACT-R architecture and the production rules. Productions rules are fired if their 
conditions are met and these conditions are a combination of ACT-R buffer contents. 
Sequential dependencies are implemented by manipulating the contents of the goal buffer. If 
rule B must fire after rule A, the latter will modify the goal buffer in order to satisfy a condition 
of rule B. Because the model interacts with the simulation in the same fashion as human 
participants, many constraints are imposed by the simulation. For instance, if the simulation 
detects that a C key is pressed when the mouse pointer is located over a truck, a Control Fire 
will be started in that cell and will last 2 seconds. This is the framework within which FireChief 
strategies are implemented. 
2.6. Summary 
This chapter described how the study of CPS can be undertaken from the perspective of the 
interaction of the problem solver, the task and the environment (Jonassen, 2000; Frensch & 
Funke, 1995). From the set of CPS performance determinants described in section 2.2.3 the 
discussion was centred on strategy selection and implementation. A particular set of tasks 
called microworlds were described, examples of representative tasks were provided and their 
key characteristics were presented before discussing the cognitive demands imposed by these 
tasks. The importance of using strategies is considered in this section from the standpoint of 
dealing with microworlds. Cognitive modelling is introduced as an approach for studying CPS 
behaviour and section 2.4.1 describes how several characteristics of the cognitive architecture 
ACT-R make it suitable for creating a cognitive model of FireChief behaviour, mainly its ability 
to continuously adapt its behaviour by processing environmental feedback. The next chapter 
describes the process of analysing the data extracted in the Cañas et al. (2004) study in which 
the detailed interactions of participants with FireChief are taken into account to identify a 
comprehensive set of strategies. 
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3 Data Analysis of CPS behaviour 
The data to be modelled originated from the study of Cañas et al. (2005) using the FireChief 
microworld where various topics related to strategy use were explored. A description of this 
dataset and several interesting interactions comprise the first section of the chapter. Results 
obtained by Cañas et al. are taken into account in this research, but the goal of implementing a 
cognitive model demanded a more detailed level of data analysis. The chapter continues with 
a description of brand new data analysis process that resulted in the definition of a hierarchy 
of strategies. A set of metrics used to measure and discriminate these strategies are also 
included in this chapter. 
3.1 The Cañas et al. (2005) Dataset 
In the Cañas et al. (2005) study each participant interacted with 24 FireChief scenarios. The 
first 16 scenarios were considered as the training phase and the last 8 scenarios as the testing 
phase. There were two different training programmes: constant and variable. In the Constant 
Training (CT) the environment is exactly the same for all sixteen trials. In the Variable Training 
(VT) the problem solver is presented with a different scenario on each of the sixteen trials. 
There are also two testing conditions: either the direction in which the wind blows is changed 
(WC) or the effectiveness of units in extinguishing fires is reduced (ER). Table 3.1 shows the 
experimental groups of the study, the number between parentheses represents the number of 
members in each group. In table 3.1 group CTW represents the group which received CT and 
was tested with WC; the VTE group received VT and was tested with ER, and so on; this 
notation will be used throughout the remaining chapters for referring to the different groups.  
 
  Wind Change Efficiency Change 
Constant Training CTW(18) CTE (20) 
Variable Training VTW (16) VTE (18) 
Table 3.1: Experimental groups of the Cañas et al. (2005) study 
 
Cognitive flexibility “is the human ability to adapt the cognitive processing strategies to face 
new and unexpected conditions of the environment” (Cañas et al., 2005, p. 2). Cañas et al. 
(2005) hypothesized that the type of training would have an impact on the level of cognitive 
inflexibility of individuals: people in the VT group would show greater facility for changing 
strategies than individuals trained repeatedly on the same (constant) scenario. The study 
found that the type of training did affect cognitive inflexibility in this way. The theoretical 
explanations for this phenomenon come from studies about skill learning (Ackerman 1992; 
1988; Rasmussen, 1983). The explanation is that participants in the CT group have the 
opportunity to consolidate their strategies and hence generate quick, fluid actions; while 
people in the VT group keep executing more controlled, but flexible, actions. When the testing 
phase takes place, people in the CT group are less (cognitively) flexible in adapting to the new 
demands of the task. With regard to strategy learning, participants in the CT group have the 
opportunity to practise the same strategy over and over again, and more practice yields more 
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automatic behaviour. The authors also found that the changes introduced in the environment 
during testing generated significant effects on performance and that these changes affected 
the participants differentially depending on the strategy that they were putting into practice. It 
was found that strategies which rely on the execution of Control Fire (CF) commands are more 
affected by changes in the direction of the wind. The explanation given by the authors was 
that “the place where the fire control should be located depends on where the fire spreads 
towards” (Cañas et al., 2005, p. 4) and when the wind changes direction it is harder to locate a 
suitable position for a CF command. It was also observed that strategies based on Drop Water 
(DW) commands are more affected by the reduction in the efficiency of appliances. The Cañas 
et al. study was limited to finding interactions between experimental conditions but no 
attempt to explain these interactions, beyond theoretical explanations, was pursued. The 
following sections describe in detail this dataset which, considering the research goal of 
studying strategy use in complex dynamic tasks, provides a rich set of combinations of task 
manipulations and interactions, a considerable amount of empirical data to perform a fine-
grained analysis and also represents a challenging task for modelling.  
3.1.1 Training programs 
Remember that the instruction given to the participants in both groups is to save the 
landscape from destruction by fire so as to get as high a score as possible. In the context of the 
CPS paradigm described in chapter 2 the different training programmes can be seen as 
different kinds of obstacles that the problem solver needs to overcome using his or her limited 
cognitive resources. A FireChief scenario is specified by various properties: the landscape 
distribution, the number, position and type of initial fires, the number and direction of wind 
strength changes and the initial position of units. A single trial lasts 260 seconds and the 
simulation is refreshed each 200 milliseconds. Within FireChief each block of 200 milliseconds 
is called a generation, therefore each trial lasts 1300 generations.  
3.1.1.1 Constant Training (CT) 
As can be seen in table 3.1 groups CTW and CTE share the same training programme. Under 
this programme participants interact with the same task configuration (the trial “C”) 16 times.  
Trial “C” 
In this trial wind strength remains at six throughout and the wind always blows to the east. 
There are two blocks of fire close to each other. Assuming no intervention both initial fires 
spread fairly quickly to the east. At second 169 the fire arrives at the eastern limit of the 
scenario. Only the three top lines of landscape remain undestroyed. The remaining fire spreads 
north and south but at a slower pace. By observing protocols it was determined that the 
critical time for the CT scenario is around second 70. By this point in time, if the fire is not 
under control (there are many ways of achieving this) there will be a considerable amount of 
landscape burning and it will be difficult to stop it. Remember that after a cell is destroyed fire 
will expand to the neighbouring cells; if this phenomenon is occurring at all times for many 
cells the complexity of the trial could reach a level beyond the participant’s capacity to 
extinguish the fire. Because this trial is repeated sixteen times during the CT programme 
participants have the opportunity of becoming familiar with this trial. In this trial participants 
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may learn several aspect of the FireChief task but mainly that high wind strength produces 
strong fires. The first row in table 3.2 shows the characteristics of this trial.  
 
3.1.1.2 Variable Training (VT) 
As can be seen in table 3.1 groups VTW and VTE share the same training programme. In the VT 
programme every one of its 16 trials is different. Variations among trials include the diverse 
landscape composition, altered initial position of units and fires, but more importantly, there 
are changes in wind conditions. As an example, in trial number 3 there is one mature fire at the 
beginning of the trial and the initial wind strength is three (low intensity), after 40 seconds a 
spot fire appears then 110 seconds later wind strength increases to seven. In contrast, in trial 
number 13 there are two initial mature fires and the wind strength is seven (high intensity) 
after 140 seconds the wind strength decreases to four and then there is another change in 
wind strength after a further 80 seconds where the wind strength increases to six. To give an 
idea of the comparative damage produced by the fire in these two trials the base performance 
(explained below) for trial number 3 is 62.49 and for number 13 is 37.15. 
 
 
Key: 
CPX = complexity 
gen = generation 
Str = strength 
Perf = performance 
Table 3.2: Constant (C) and Variable Training (1-16) Trials  
The configuration of each trial is presented on table 3.2. The second column in this table shows 
the complexity (CPX) of the trial that can be VE (very easy), E (easy), M (medium), H (hard) and 
VH (very hard). This complexity was obtained by applying a range of criteria: the average 
performance of participants, the wind strength and the number of fires. Value refers to the 
Trial Terrain Initial Base Avg.
Number Value Mature Spot Mature Spot Wind Str Perf Perf
C H 1702 2 0 0 0 6 50.6 69.9
1 VH 1808 2 0 0 0 7 43.4 43.8
2 M 1708 2 0 750 0 4 8/1000 41.8 76.5
3 VE 1704 1 0 0 200 3 7/750 62.5 93.5
4 H 1630 1 1 0 0 6 7/750 4/1000 56.4 60.8
5 VE 1688 0 3 0 0 4 7/750 47.2 93.2
6 VE 1814 2 0 0 0 4 3/750 5/900 79.3 96.7
7 VH 1726 2 0 0 1000 7 6/500 2/1000 51.2 54.8
8 VE 1740 1 1 0 850 3 7/1000 86.8 99.2
9 H 1688 2 0 0 900 6 4/800 66.3 72.5
10 VE 1824 0 3 1100 0 3 7/750 56.5 94.0
11 H 1670 1 1 700 0 7 3/500 7/1000 54.3 70.0
12 VE 1762 1 1 0 750 3 7/900 70.1 98.1
13 VH 1714 2 0 0 0 7 4/700 6/1100 37.2 48.0
14 VE 1726 1 2 0 0 4 7/600 3/900 66.9 93.0
15 VH 1802 0 3 0 0 7 5/700 33.4 43.5
16 H 1666 2 0 0 0 5 3/700 7/900 55.8 81.6
CPX
# Initial Fires New Fires (gen) Wind Str Shifts 
(wind str/gen)
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value of the terrain; the value of a terrain is a function of its constitutive cells. The value of a 
landscape impacts performance because a more valuable landscape represents a greater 
opportunity for losing points. The following columns in table 3.2 describe the number of 
mature and spot fires both in the initial scenario and newly igniting during the trial. For fires 
igniting during the trial the number indicates the generation (remember that a generation is 
equal to 0.2 seconds). The next column describes the initial wind strength and subsequent 
shifts of wind strength. The penultimate column shows the base performance (the trial is run 
letting the landscape burn without intervention and the final performance score was 
recorded). In the last column the average performance of participants during the training 
phase is presented. 
Trial 1 
In this trial there are two blocks of fire close to each other and wind strength is 7. Both initial 
fires spread fairly quickly to the east. After 105 seconds the first fire arrives at the eastern limit 
of the scenario. The rest of the time the remaining fire spreads north and south. The problem 
solver needs to issue a high number of commands at the beginning of the trial in order to gain 
control of the fire quickly; otherwise the fire front grows quickly. One aspect that should be 
learned by the problem solver is that the fire spreads in the wind direction. The problem solver 
may also discover that some fires, (the ones with higher strength, their icons depicting a bigger 
fire) cannot be extinguished by copters or trucks dropping water.  
Trial 2 
There are two initial fires wide apart, but the wind strength is low (4) for many seconds, hence 
the fire spreads at a very slow rate. When a mature fire appears later the wind strength 
remains low so it does not represent a major threat. But at generation 1000 a drastic 
increment in wind strength to 8 makes the fire spread considerably faster and in the last 400 
generations the fire destroys a lot of terrain. In this scenario participants experience for the 
first time a shift of wind strength and the spontaneous ignition of new fires.  
Trial 3 
At the beginning there is one mature fire in this scenario, but a spot fire appears after 40 
seconds. The initial wind strength is 3. During the time that the wind strength is 3, the initial 
fire has minimal development, the same is true for the spot fire. After 150 seconds (750 
generations) the wind strength increases and the fire spreads quickly eastwards. At the end of 
this trial the problem solver may learn that a second kind of fire can appear (the spot fire). This 
kind of fire is less aggressive than a mature one but it is harder to locate within the landscape. 
The problem solver may also learn that very low wind strength reduces fire development.  
Trial 4 
A single mature fire grows at a steady pace followed by the onset of a spot fire. The spot fire 
and the mature fire become one at generation 375 and the mature fire reaches the eastern 
limit of the landscape by generation 590. When the first wind strength shift occurs, increasing 
to 7 (generation 750-1000), the fire has spread eastwards and reaches the landscape limit. 
Only four lines in the north are not destroyed. The second shift of wind (generation 1000), 
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where wind strength drops to 4, leaves a considerable number of low intensity fires burning 
until the end of the trial. The problem solver has experienced that spot fires can appear and 
that wind strength can reduce.  
Trial 5 
This is the first trial in which there are no initial mature fires. A combination of spot fires and 
low initial wind strength (4) makes this trial very easy. Perfect performance of 100% is easy to 
obtain. The three initial spot fires do not develop during the first part of the trial. The rate of 
spreading is very low until the wind strength increases to 7 (generation 750) making the fire 
spread quickly to the west consuming almost every cell in the landscape except the north-west 
corner. The problem solver has now experienced that mature fires are not always present in 
trials.  
Trial 6 
The two mature fires are far apart from each other. Both fires start at the same X-coordinate 
but are separated by 10 cells in the Y axis. The wind strength is low (4) deterring the 
development of the fires. When the wind strength reduces to only 3, the fire development 
almost stops. However, when the second shift occurs, increasing to 5 (generation 900) the 
western fire is capable of catching up with the eastern one by generation 1200 although in 
general the fire is not aggressive.  
Trial 7 
The two mature fires are wide apart. The eastern fire is strongest at the beginning of the trial 
and by generation 175 it reaches the eastern limit of the landscape. The western fire catches 
up with the eastern fire in generation 850. The first shift in the wind strength from 7 to 6 
(generation 500) reduces the spreading rate but, by this time, the eastern fire has destroyed 
almost all existing terrain. The second shift to 2 (generation 1000) almost freezes the fire’s 
development leaving a considerable number of low strength fires. A salient aspect of this trial 
is that one of the fires quickly arrives at one edge of the landscape; it is possible that problem 
solvers are now more aware of the consequences of certain combinations of fire position and 
wind direction.  
Trial 8 
This trial is similar to trial 3. For 1100 generations the wind strength is 3 so the one mature fire 
shows almost no development, and the one spot fire shows none. A second spot fire appears 
at generation 850. When the wind strength increases to 7 (generation 1000) the mature 
eastern fire quickly reaches the eastern border and the two spot fires merge into one and 
continue their way eastwards. The role of wind strength as a determinant of fire spreading 
rate may be reinforced in this scenario.  
Trial 9 
Two mature fires are wide apart. The eastern fire is close to the eastern limit of the landscape. 
The setup is similar to trial 7. Both fires have the same intensity. At generation 235 the eastern 
fire reaches the eastern limit. The western fire never catches up with the eastern one. When 
61 
 
the shift of wind strength from 6 to 4 occurs (generation 800) the western fire has not reached 
the eastern limit and, although there is some fire development, it never does. A spot fire 
appears at generation 900 when the wind strength is low and so does not develop. The 
problem solver can make use of the limits of the landscape to his or her advantage as they 
represent natural barriers to the fire. 
Trial 10 
This can be a very easy trial as the spot fires can be attended to quickly. The three spot fires do 
not develop until generation 525. When the strength of the wind increases from 3 to 7 the 
eastern fires merge into one and soon reach the eastern limit. The western fire also soon 
catches up with the other fires (generation 900).  
Trial 11 
At the beginning of the trial there is one mature fire in the west and a spot fire nearby. At 
generation 700 another mature fire appears in the south-east. The mature fire located in the 
west starts developing from the beginning of the trial; the spot fire destroys its containing cell 
30 seconds after the beginning of the trial. The wind strength is high (7) so the spot fire 
reaches the eastern limit 5 seconds later. At generation 490 the mature fire located in the west 
catches up with the spot fire located at the eastern limit. When the wind strength decreases to 
3 (generation 500) most parts of the terrain to the east of the initial fire are destroyed. While 
the wind strength remains low there is almost no further fire development. A second shift of 
wind strength from 3 to 7 (generation 1000) accelerates the development of the mature fire 
that appeared in the south and which quickly reaches the eastern limit of the landscape. In this 
trial the shifts of wind strength are large and represent major differences concerning fire 
behaviour. Particularly in this trial, it is possible to attack the spot fire directly even though the 
wind strength is high; this phenomenon gives more hints to the problem solver about the 
behaviour of different strengths of fire.  
Trial 12 
Both the one mature fire and the one spot fire develop a little while the wind strength is 3. 
This situation remains the same for three quarters of the trial. When the wind strength shift to 
7 occurs (generation 900) the spot fire expands and reaches the eastern limit at generation 
1125 while the mature fire catches up with the spot fire at generation 1185. The spot fire that 
appears at generation 750 is soon engulfed by the rapidly spreading mature fire. This trial is 
similar to trial 8. The role of wind strength as a determinant of the fire spreading rate is 
reinforced. Considering the experience of similar trials, it is most likely that the problem solver 
is by now more aware of the importance of acting quickly while wind conditions are 
favourable.  
Trial 13 
The two initial mature fires are close to each other; this trial is similar to trial 1. Both fires are 
initially located in the west of the landscape. The wind strength is high (7) so quickly both fires 
merge into one and advance eastwards very fast. By generation 590 (118 seconds) the fire 
arrives at the eastern limit and by the time of the first wind strength shift to 4 at generation 
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700 the fire has consumed almost all the possible landscape. The second shift increases wind 
strength to 6 (generation 1100). The rapidly spreading fire front has a very high intensity and it 
is not possible to apply DW commands effectively.  
Trial 14 
One mature and two spot fires are wide apart. The initial strength of the wind at 4 allows for a 
certain amount of development of the mature fire, and one of the spot fires soon reaches 
intensity beyond the reach of the DW command. The other spot fire develops more slowly. 
Although an increment in wind strength to 7 (generation 600) only lasts 300 generations, it is 
enough for all the fires to merge into one and reach the eastern limit at generation 840. When 
the second shift in wind strength to 3 occurs at generation 900 there are still some regions 
that can be saved from the fire. Again, if the problem solver has learned from past experience, 
they are prompted to attack the fire quickly, as in past trials initial low wind strength is 
followed by an aggressive increment.  
Trial 15 
The three spot fires are wide apart forming a triangle. The high wind strength of 7 that does 
not change until generation 700 produces fast development of the fire. The fire located in the 
north merges with the one located in the east at generation 275 and reaches the eastern limit 
of the landscape at generation 475. The southern fire also reaches the eastern limit at 
generation 680 burning the remaining cells to the south. By the time the wind drops its 
intensity to 5 at generation 700 most parts of the terrain are destroyed. This is one of the 
hardest trials.  
Trial 16 
In this trial there are two fires in the north. The uppermost is located closer to the eastern 
limit. Both fires are equally strong. The uppermost fire arrives at the eastern edge at 
generation 950 when the wind strength is 7. Both fires merge eventually and destroy 
everything to the east of their initial starting point. The distribution of fires in this trial is very 
similar to that in the CT scenario but the wind strength is lower.  
3.1.2 Comparison of training programmess 
As mentioned, Cañas et al. (2005) hypothesised that participants would consolidate their 
strategies in the CT trial. A common assumption is that people become effective when 
presented with recurring problem patterns (Anderson, 1983) so it is expected that members of 
the CT group will arrive at a good level of performance over successive trials and performance 
data confirms this hypothesis. In the end repeated exposure to a problem produces a certain 
degree of expertise and should therefore lead to better problem performance and 
representation. Another characteristic of FireChief that promotes performance improvement 
in the CT condition is its high level of consistency. According to Ackerman (1993), when the 
task is consistent, performance improvements result with increased levels of task practice. 
Also Rasmussen (1983) stresses the importance of the existence of constraints between 
human actions and their effects for promoting meaningful interaction with the task. Given that 
the different FireChief commands produce the same results under the same conditions the 
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problem solver can generate an adequate representation of the task. It is expected that after 
the problem solver has found a suitable strategy for the CT trial some degree of automaticity 
can be achieved. According to Gonzalez et al. (2004) decisions became increasingly similar with 
task practice as a consequence of a better understanding of the relevant variables of the 
system, so it is expected that strategy variation will decrease as more trials are completed. 
Learning the behaviour of FireChief under repeated conditions should improve the process of 
choosing operators (commands) because there will be more chance of knowing how to better 
implement the operators, to assess their applicability and effectiveness, although there would 
be less exploration of FireChief (this issue is explored using the cognitive model). Cañas et al 
(2005) argue that participants in the CT group assign their resources to the continuous practice 
of a strategy that has proven successful in the CT trial (which is repeated over and over). They 
expected that participants in this group would perform well and show more cognitive 
inflexibility during testing.  
 
This richer diversity of problems allows participants in the VT group to gain experience about a 
range of strategies. In the case of the VT programme different approaches for fighting the fire 
in a particular trial may be tried until an adequate sequence of commands is found. Following 
ideas from Thunholm (2005) the difference between training programmes may result from the 
fact that participants in the VT group perform a situation assessment process (see section 
4.3.1) while participants on the CT programme skip this step.  
 
Training programmes become particularly relevant when a change in the environment is 
introduced in the testing phase. The question is whether the different training programmes 
generate different ways of dealing with environmental change. An intuitive approach used for 
distinguishing the training programmes is the novice-expert paradigm. Participants in the CT 
are in some ways experts when dealing with the CT scenario. The first test trial looks identical 
to all the trials in the CT so will be familiar to the CT group, but for participants in the VT group 
the first test trial will look like a trial with yet another new and different configuration. The 
distribution of landscape and units is the same as for the trials in the CT programme, making 
participants in the CT group experts in comparison to participants in the VT group. For both 
groups the consequences of the changes in the system configuration for testing are not 
immediately visible. In the condition where the wind changes direction, the first change in 
wind direction occurs at generation 600, so for the first 600 generations participants in the CT 
programme presumably think that they are solving the same trial as in the previous sixteen 
occasions. In the condition where the efficiency of appliances is reduced, in order to notice 
that copters and trucks are less able to extinguish fires it is necessary to execute a DW 
command over a fire of certain strength to discover that instead of the command succeeding 
an alarm will sound.  
 
From a different point of view (Payne et al., 1993), differences between the training 
programmes can be traced to differences in how context variables are processed. In FireChief 
the process variable “wind conditions” has a significant impact on strategy selection. Because 
the CT programme does not present shifts in wind strength presumably participants in this 
group do not continuously check this value on the display. On the other hand participants in 
the VT group may be more prone towards checking this value due to the considerable amount 
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of wind strength shifts. In the latter case the variable wind conditions are processed 
continuously while in the former this variable may be seldom checked. This difference may 
have an important consequence for the testing condition where wind changes direction in the 
trials for both groups: participants in the VT programme may detect a change in the wind 
direction earlier in the trial just because they are more alert to changing wind conditions. The 
uncertainty about the environment requires the participant to modify his or her strategy 
continuously forcing them to attend to any change that could take place when a trial is 
presented. In the end it is expected that participants will be more attentive and less prone to 
cognitive inflexibility.  
3.1.3 Testing phase 
From the seventeenth trial until the end of the experimental session participants must deal 
with one of two types of environmental change. The landscape distribution, the number of 
fires and the initial location of units is the same as in the C trial for all eight testing trials.   
3.1.3.1 Wind Direction Change 
In the Wind Direction Change (WC) condition the wind starts blowing towards the east and 
after 300 generations the wind switches to the NW and thereafter shifts 60 degrees 
anticlockwise every 300 generations, finally ending once again in the east. These shifts in wind 
direction have a dramatic impact on fire development. Assuming no intervention the fire 
destroys almost all the terrain as the most eastern section of the landscape can now be 
destroyed when the wind blows eastwards.  
3.1.3.2 Efficiency Reduction 
The second type of change is called Efficiency Reduction (ER). The efficiency of an appliance 
refers to its ability to extinguish fires. A reduction in efficiency means that units are less able to 
extinguish fires. During the testing phase efficiency is halved so the ability of the unit to 
extinguish strong fires is seriously affected. In practical terms, during testing units are able to 
extinguish fewer fires than during training. Assuming no intervention the terrain suffers the 
same destruction as the C trial.  
3.1.3.3 A comparison between testing conditions 
 The nature of the changes under the two testing conditions is quite different. A change in 
wind direction is more salient: there is a specific icon within the graphical display that can be 
queried to find out the wind direction and fire behaviour is noticeably different. A reduction in 
the efficiency of the appliances is only noticeable when a participant tries to issue a DW 
command on top of a strong fire and instead of starting to drop water the simulation emits an 
alarm. Participants in the VT group have more experience in dealing with this kind of alarm due 
to the fact that they have faced trials with stronger wind and therefore more intense fires 
before. 
 
When wind changes direction, if participants are adaptive, there should be an abandonment of 
the use of Control Fire commands (Cañas et al., 2005). In the testing phase participants in the 
VT group will detect that a change in the environment occurs but that the same trial is being 
repeated over and over. The feedback they receive in the first testing trial should result in the 
quick selection of a more appropriate strategy. Participants in the CT group should take more 
65 
 
time before switching strategies. But if the right strategy is chosen in trial 17 both groups 
should repeat this strategy choice if it receives good performance feedback, because the 
environmental conditions are the same. In fact, cognitive inflexibility is exactly what was 
observed in the Cañas et al. (2005) study for the Constant Training group dataset. This 
inflexibility is described as a tendency to maintain the same strategy even when changes in the 
environment make it inappropriate.  
Continuing with the discussion about the importance of “gaining control” started in section 
3.2.4, the precise form of the fire-fighting process depends on the strategy selected but, in all 
situations, some area will be covered by this process at a speed that will be a function of the 
number of units used and the kind of commands executed. If the problem solver makes use of 
all four available units, the amount of area covered may be bigger and, because a Control Fire 
command takes less time to complete compared to a Drop Water command, using a mixture of 
commands may increase the total number of commands issued. Figure 3.1 shows a second 
spatio-temporal diagram representing a VT scenario. In the VT programme there could be 
changes in wind strength. These changes noticeably alter the rate at which the fire spreads. In 
the first stage depicted in figure 3.1 the problem solver is able to control the fire by issuing 
Drop Water commands but after a period of time the wind conditions change and the rate at 
which the fire spreads increases. At this point, the sensible thing to do is to issue Control Fire 
commands along with Drop Water commands (the Control Fire commands are aimed at halting 
fire development). In the last phase wind conditions change again, allowing the participant to 
regain control over the fire. As participants try to gain control over the complex situation in 
front of them, they generate a rich set of strategies which are the focus of this research. As 
discussed in the previous section, the use of strategies appears to be an effective way to deal 
with complexity.   
 
Figure 3.1: Example of Variable Training Program Trial 
3.1.4 The form of the dataset 
Data from the Cañas et al. (2005) study comprises precise protocol information about the 
nature of every command issued by the participants for each trial and details of the trial’s 
configuration; this information is stored in a set of ‘history’ files. Figure 3.2 shows the first ten 
commands issued by a participant; this is an excerpt from a FireChief history file (subsection B 
in section 2.3.2.5 describes each column in the figure). In this example the first command was 
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issued at generation 19, no terrain cells have been destroyed so performance is still 100%, it 
was a Move command that resulted on the displacement of Copter (number 4) from (11,4) to 
(13,10) which is of terrain type Pasture.  
 
  
Figure 3.2: An excerpt of a FireChief history file 
3.2 Analysing Strategic Behaviour 
Siegler & Shipley (1995) and Lemaire & Siegler (1995) identified three dimensions related to 
strategy use. The first one is strategy variability in the sense that that there exist multiple 
strategies for solving, for instance, the FireChief task (refer to section 3.3.2). The second 
dimension is the strategy base rate of success which is related to the relative frequency of use 
of each strategy and the types of problems for which they are used (cf. section 3.4.1). The third 
dimension of strategy use is strategy change: improvements in the way a strategy is 
implemented can occur due to practice. Siegler & Shipley (1995) developed a model of 
strategy choice called ASCM (pronounced “Ask-em”): Adaptive Strategy Choice Model where 
information about the solution, the time spent in solving the problem and the accuracy of the 
strategy used modify the perception about the strategy and the problem. ASCM was applied in 
the context of addition problems and two strategies were identified: direct retrieval of the 
answer and the computation of it. In ASCM strategy selection is based on the projected 
strength of each strategy in relation to the current problem. The authors argue that “problem-
specific information based on a substantial database is the best predictor of a strategy’s future 
effectiveness on that problem.” (p. 28). The ASCM model gives more weight to recent 
performance. When a problem is presented a stepwise regression equation computes the 
strength of each strategy for the problem (these ideas are similar to the concept of utility used 
in ACT-R). According to ASCM strategy execution improves with practice because there is an 
increase in its execution speed and a decrease in its probability of generating an error. With 
enough practice a strategy may be consolidated: its implementation becomes smooth and 
rather unreflective.  
 
Siegler & Shipley also noticed that it is “surprisingly difficult to override usual selection through 
metacognitive means…” (p. 14). They also stress the difficulty associated with learning not to 
use old strategies. These findings are related to the cognitive inflexibility reported by Cañas et 
al. (2005). The ASCM model is able to improve performance because, as more arithmetic 
problems are completed, the answers to these problems (obtained either by retrieving the 
answer or calculating it) increase their associative value with the problem (generating a 
peaked distribution), so eventually the direct retrieval of the answer happens more often. In 
FireChief performance improvement is significant too (see section 3.4.4). Consequently, it is 
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hypothesized that participants in the VT group are able to choose better strategies during the 
test phase because they are more flexible. It is also hypothesized that people in the CT group 
execute strategies more quickly and more effectively as more trials are completed due to 
strategy consolidation, but that their knowledge will be limited to fewer strategies.  
3.2.1 The Cañas et al. (2005) strategies 
The definition of a coherent set of strategies represented a challenge mainly because the 
FireChief environment changes independently of the actions of the individual and the available 
actions at each simulation step are numerous. The first step taken to arrive at a set of 
strategies was to look at the results reported in the Cañas et al. study. The two strategies 
described originally in the work of Cañas et al. (2003) and used again later in the Cañas et al. 
(2005) work are the Move-Drop and Control strategies. In the Move-Drop strategy participants 
move appliances to the closest unattended fires and drop water there. Trucks are not sent to 
fires that are too fierce and where they could be destroyed. The Control strategy involves 
finding the closest fire and then sending an appliance to execute a CF command two cells away 
from it in a randomly chosen direction. In the Cañas et al. (2005) study there is a further 
division of the Move-Drop strategy into the Frequent-Move-Drop and Infrequent-Move-Drop 
strategies. These strategies differ in the number of DW commands emitted but the pattern of 
commands (represented by a transition matrix) is similar. Although the strategies found by 
these authors served as a starting point a richer set was found through a new analysis 
described later. In a previous study (Cañas et al., 2003) the authors present an algorithmic 
description of a couple of strategies, these strategies are described below. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: FireChief strategies inspired in Cañas et al. (2003) 
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Two flow diagrams depicting the strategies from Cañas et al. (2003) are presented in figure 3.3. 
These flow diagrams were constructed following the textual description of the strategy; they 
are presented with the aim of showing that the Control strategy requires extra decision making 
steps than the Move-Drop strategy and for making a comparison with the new set of strategies 
found in this study. It is possible to see in figure 3.3 that in both strategies a unit must first be 
selected (in the case of the Control strategy it must be a truck). In the next step of both 
strategies a fire must be selected. The strategies then differ from the third step onwards. In 
the Move-drop strategy there is perceptual action that could produce two outcomes 
depending on fire intensity: either a drop water command is executed if the fire is not too 
strong or a new unit is selected if the selected unit is a truck. In the Control strategy there are 
more steps: a random direction for executing the Control Fire command is selected and the 
resulting location is shifted two cells to give a distance between the fire and the targeted cell. 
After that a perceptual action is executed over the target cell to determine if it is suitable. If 
the target cell is adequate a Control Fire command is executed; if not a new random direction 
is selected. 
3.2.1.1 Transition matrices 
The use of transition matrices for studying problem solving behaviour was originally proposed 
by Howie and Vicente (1998) and was adapted by the Cañas et al. (2005) study. A matrix of 
transitions is obtained for each FireChief protocol. Rows and columns of the matrix represent 
the full range of commands, and the cells contain the number of times one type of command 
follows another (see table 3.6). According to Howie and Vicente (1998) transitions between 
actions reflect the order in which a person issues the sequence of commands and this is more 
informative that just their frequency. This approach proved to be useful to detect differences 
in strategy use (see section 3.4.2). Nevertheless, a description of behaviour provided by a 
transition matrix is very abstract when the goal is to develop a cognitive model where 
behaviour is reproduced at the level of milliseconds. Given that FireChief commands take 
seconds to be executed, there are a considerable number of cognitive, perceptual and motor 
actions taking place in the execution of each command; and this information is not provided in 
a transition matrix. In order to classify participants according to strategy use, Cañas et al. 
started by identifying pure strategies (described in figure 3.3) and determining the degree to 
which participants present each of these pure strategies using transition matrices analysis 
(Antolí, personal communication, May 2009).  
3.2.2 The Protocol Analysis Tool (PAT) 
To assist with the analysis of protocols, a software tool called the Protocol Analysis Tool (PAT) 
was developed in Visual Basic.NET. The main input of the system is the history files generated 
by the FireChief simulation (figure 3.2). PAT populates and uses a comprehensive data model 
(figure 3.4) able to represent detailed FireChief performance. PAT enables the processing of all 
the trials for both participants and the cognitive model. Having in mind the goal of identifying 
strategies, PAT was extended to support the generation of plots of the problem solvers’ time-
contingent commands, the generation of transition matrices (section 3.4.2) and metrics 
extraction (section 5.2). 
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Figure 3.4: PAT’s database (main tables) 
One type of view depicts all the commands with their position within the landscape with their 
sequence number, type and unit. If many commands were issued in the same cell the 
sequence is preserved. The type of landscape is represented using different colours and 
environmental changes, such as wind direction and strength, are also shown.  
 
 
 
Landscape elements (coloured squares)                          Units (coloured writing): 
Yellow: clearing                                                       Pink: Truck 1 
Green: forest                                                       Orange: Truck 2 
Light green: pasture                                                                        Blue: Copter 1 
Pink: house                                                                                       Dark Blue: Copter 2 
Blue: dam 
Red: Fire 
Figure 3.5: Example of a view. The coloured writing shows two pieces of data: the generation at which the 
command was issued and the type of command (D for Drop Water and C for Control Fire) 
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Figure 3.5 shows an example of this view. The position of the initial fires is shown using red 
squares; each unit’s behaviour is distinguishable by a colour and different letters or numbers 
distributed throughout the landscape (in figure 3.5 it is possible to observe all the movements 
made by truck one by following the sequence of numbers in pink and the different commands 
issued by this unit). Within this view it is also possible to distinguish cancelled commands (a 
lowercase c/d represents a cancelled Control Fire/Drop Water while a capital C/D represents a 
successful Control Fire/Drop Water). All the numbers in this view are timestamps expressed in 
generations. The coloured squared at the bottom right of the cell represents the terrain. There 
is another kind of view that shows the distribution of commands in the landscape, their type 
and unit but also shows a timestamp for each command, the initial fire position and 
environmental changes (see figure 4.11). 
3.2.3 Methodology 
Using the PAT it is possible to gain an understanding of the patterns of commands issued by 
the participants providing some insights into the strategies implemented by them. In the initial 
phase of analysis, emphasis was put on creating a repertoire of strategies with the aim of later 
classifying all the protocols under this structure. Strategy definitions were constructed 
following two steps: (1) grouping similar patterns observed in the data and (2) constructing a 
specification at a level of command executions that could be translated into ACT-R commands. 
In order to classify a trial’s protocol, the collection of commands executed by a participant 
during a FireChief trial is loaded into PAT. The analysis conducted for every protocol produces 
a description of the pattern of commands observed during that trial. Various aspects of the 
data were considered when conducting this analysis. Typically, participants seem to have a 
priority guiding their behaviour which is catalogued for example as “create a barrier” or 
“attack fire”. They also have an initial focus of attention such as “the strongest fire”. If CF 
commands are used, their distribution and pattern of use is catalogued, for example: “a line of 
CF commands is created from north to west”, “CF commands are interleaved with DW 
commands…” and so on. These observations can be confirmed with other metrics, a transition 
matrix can also show if a participant is interleaving CF with DW commands. Stages of the 
problem solving activity are also identified, for example: “when a fire is under control”. 
Observer remarks about unit use are recorded: “only copters are used to issue DW 
commands”. Changes of strategy are also identified: “frequently the fire is not stopped by an 
incomplete line of CF commands; in this case a common adaptation is to follow a similar 
pattern that resembles following the fire’s path”. Observations about strategy implementation 
are made: “it is hard to implement this strategy when appliance efficiency is low”. To assist the 
process of analysing a protocol its corresponding replay files (also provided with the original 
data) can be used; this was very useful when the visualizations were not sufficient for 
understanding participant intentions. During this process it was also necessary to comprehend 
the different FireChief trials (table 3.2) to allow a better understanding of events and 
processes. The intention of the analysis was to arrive at qualitative descriptions of patterns of 
behaviour used by participants with the ultimate goal of using them in the implementation of 
the cognitive model. At a later stage these patterns of command use were compared by using 
the type and the spatial/temporal distribution of commands for creating the new hierarchy of 
strategies presented here.  
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The first group of participants that were analysed was constituted by the five participants of 
group CTW who showed the highest overall performance. The rationale behind this decision 
was that it was easier to find discernible patterns among trials that ended with good 
performance (i.e. the problem solver´s deployment of resources in order to fight the fire was 
clearer). Another reason is that there is every reason to believe that the high performers were 
more motivated to 'solve the problem' and therefore the strategic problem solving behaviour 
of interest to this research is more likely to be evidenced in these protocols. The next step was 
to analyse the five highest performers for the remaining groups.  
 
At the end of this process 480 protocols were analysed and the result was a set of 26 
distinguishable patterns (i.e. strategies). The next step was either to assign the remaining 1280 
protocols to each of the established categories or, if a new strategy appeared, add it to the 
repertoire. It is important to point out that this classification was carried out by a single 
observer, a cross validation of the results of the classification would improve the quality of this 
process. Nevertheless the identification and labelling of specific strategies does not have 
significant consequences for the key research questions related to strategy use, consolidation 
and adaptivity, particularly about how choices arise in complex dynamic tasks. The interesting 
part of this research is how these features are produced and how strategy execution is 
affected by environmental feedback. Chapter 6 demonstrates that the patterns found during 
this analysis are reproduced by a model that follows the strategy definitions described in this 
chapter, in other words, that by having the intentions defined by a strategy the resulting 
pattern is what is observed in the empirical data, including the considerable amount of 
variability.  
3.3 Hierarchy of strategies 
The goal in FireChief is not clearly defined so it needs to be decomposed and further specified. 
Participants are instructed to stop the development of the fire and hence the problem solver is 
not biased towards fighting the fire directly or issuing Control Fire commands to halt its future 
development. In general terms, the way of deploying resources in the landscape defines a 
strategy. The hierarchy of strategies depicted in figure 3.6 is a product of the brand new 
analysis conducted in this research.  
 
In order to minimize subjectivity during the process of finding strategies the following 
mechanisms were implemented. First, the strategy patterns found in the Cañas et al. (2005) 
study were considered. As two distinguishable clusters emerged from the reanalysed data, one 
group in which problem solvers use a mixture of DW and CF commands and a second one in 
which problem solvers use DW commands primarily, it was decided to re-use this classification 
as the second layer in the hierarchy (the names were altered: Move-Drop to only-DW, and 
Control to CF-DW). Second, for the third level in the hierarchy four criteria were applied: 
command frequency, command sequencing, spatial distribution of commands and temporal 
distribution of commands. For command sequencing transition matrices were created for each 
proposed strategy (see table 3.4) the other 3 measures were extracted by querying PAT’s 
database. Groups with similar patterns considering these criteria were obtained from the 
database. Significant spatial (less than 2 cells) and temporal proximity (less than 2 seconds) 
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between commands were used to identify those strategies that belong to the Barrier and Stop 
strategies. Using this information the third layer of figure 3.6 was created consisting of the 
Barrier, NonBarrier, Stop and Follow strategies. Third, to define the fourth layer in the 
hierarchy, every protocol was visualized using PAT to discover differences based on specific 
spatial distributions of commands that were not detected by the current functionality of PAT 
such as distinguishing between a circle, a line or a semicircle pattern of CF commands. During 
this stage those strategies that make use of CF commands were primarily characterized by the 
way in which these commands were used. Fourth, the criterion to limit the number of leaves in 
the hierarchy tree was the existence of at least five cases of a particular pattern of command 
use executed by at least two participants. In total 26 different strategies were found. After the 
hierarchy was completed, all participants’ trials were classified as members of one of the 
strategies at the bottom layer of the hierarchy.  
 
 
Figure 3.6: Hierarchy of strategies 
3.3.1 The Barrier strategy 
The Barrier strategy presents a very characteristic way of dealing with the fire: the issuing of an 
ordered pattern of Control Fire (henceforth CF) commands (the appearance of this pattern is 
similar to a barrier) which may stop the fire’s development. If the wind changes its direction, 
this barrier will not be effective. The existence and the form of this barrier is the most salient 
aspect of this strategy. There are many forms in which the barrier is created but a semicircle 
and straight line are the most frequent. The selection of a barrier form represents behavioural 
differences that will ultimately yield differences in the way fire is controlled (or not). The 
effectiveness of a barrier form depends on many factors: the morphology of the fire, the wind 
conditions and the implementation of the barrier. Graphical examples of the described 
strategies are provided. In these graphs a grey rectangle represents a cell in which a Drop 
Water (henceforth DW) command was issued and a black rectangle represents a cell in which a 
CF command was executed.  
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3.3.1.1 Barrier subtypes 
The Barrier strategy has nine main subtypes which differ among them in the shape of the 
barrier and in the ratio between CF and DW command use.  
A) Line - a line of CF commands forming a barrier.  
The barrier is created in the direction of the 
wind in a pattern similar to a line. It is good 
practice to use both trucks during the creation of 
the barrier. When the fire is under control the 
remaining fire is attacked. In this strategy the CF 
commands have the distinctive function of 
stopping the fire and the DW commands have 
two functions: to gain enough time to construct 
the barrier and to combat the remaining fire. 
This strategy can yield high performance.  
 
B) Semicircle I - a semicircular barrier of CF commands complemented by 
a semicircular line of DW commands.  
The idea is to stop the development of the fire 
with a barrier of CF commands and then to 
attack the remaining fire by dropping water. 
There is a clear priority of the creation of a 
semicircular barrier (frequently this barrier starts 
at the south-east of the fire when the fire blows 
to the east). After the barrier is finished the fire 
is fought using the copters in a semicircular 
fashion starting from the north and finishing at the south. The fire in the middle of the circle 
spreads freely. The result is a circle that has a high concentration of CF commands in the East 
and a high concentration of DW commands in the west. The diameter of the circle varies 
according to the wind strength (e.g. a wind strength of 4 generates a small circle and a wind 
strength of 6 creates a large circle).  
C) Semicircle 1A - a segment of a semicircular barrier is created with 
considerable use of DW commands.  
A greater proportion of DW commands are used 
in this version of the Barrier strategy compared 
to those above. Using as a reference the 
constant training scenario, fire is first attacked 
to the east of the eastern fire creating a 
semicircle. After this first attack, the fire is 
attacked toward the west (if the strategy is 
successfully applied the fire is stopped and 
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cannot spread further eastward) so that all units drop water creating a circle around the 
original fires. A distinguishable barrier of CFs is created in one of the quadrants of the 
protective circle in an arched fashion. The order of cells targeted in the formation of the circle 
usually takes into account changes in the behaviour of the fire (wind direction) so it is not 
always implemented clockwise. An advantage of this strategy over W-Circle (see section 
3.3.3.1) is that the barrier of CFs is often created at the same time as the circle of DWs 
employing more units at one time and thus exploiting the available time.  
D) Semicircle 2 - a semicircular barrier of control fires with low use of 
DW commands.  
A distinguishable barrier of CFs is created in one 
of the quadrants of the protective circle in an 
arched fashion. It is better if both trucks are 
used in this process (the distance to the original 
fire can be reduced) but there may be a 
preference for the use of one unit. The barrier 
creation process takes a considerable time 
(usually 800 generations). Most of the DW 
commands are issued close to the already 
partially formed barrier. After the barrier is 
finished a modest amount of DW commands are issued to combat the remaining fire.  
E) Semicircle 3 - segments of curved barriers supported by DW 
commands.   
There is a clear priority on the creation of a 
curved barrier. Usually both trucks are used in 
this process. The curved barrier is not as long as 
the one created when implementing Semicircle 
2. Other curved barriers are created at the 
circumference of the fire (but the final shape is 
not always circular). The barrier creation process 
lasts almost all the trial and the use of DW 
commands is very low.  
 
F) Circle 1 - a circular barrier of CFs around the fire. 
A full circle of CFs is created around the original 
fire taking into account the initial wind direction. 
A few DW commands are issued serving to give 
time to construct the barrier. Usually fire spreads 
freely in the centre of the circle but sometimes (if 
there are no spot fires) the inside of the circle can 
be protected. This strategy can be very effective 
when the wind changes direction.  
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G) Circle 2 - a nearly complete circular barrier of CFs around the fire plus 
a segment of DW commands.  
As in the Circle 1 strategy almost a full circle of 
control fires is placed around the original fires; 
the difference is that in some regions a curved 
section of DW commands are issued and so the 
CF barrier skips these regions. Usually the fire 
spreads freely within the circle.  
 
 
 
3.3.1.2 Other frequent patterns 
 In the following cases various attempts to stop the fire are made in the form of many barriers. 
Presumably the problem solver is trying to stop the fire with a single barrier but the fire is able 
to bypass it so new barriers are created in different locations.  
A) Diagonal 1 - a diagonal barrier of CF supported by DW commands.  
Usually fire is attacked near its origin. A barrier 
of CFs is created following a diagonal pattern 
from north-west to south-east. Both copters 
fight the fire under this barrier. This barrier is 
very effective in controlling the first change of 
wind condition (from east to north-east) but 
neglects the remaining wind changes. Other 
diagonal barriers can be created to control other 
developments. The DW commands can also 
serve to give extra time for the creation of the 
barrier.  
B) Lines - a set of linear barriers created one behind the other supported 
by DW commands.  
The focus of the strategy is in creating lines of 
CFs in the direction of the wind. The lines can be 
created from north to south or vice versa 
(considering that the wind blows east). A few 
DW commands are issued. If the fire bypasses 
the first line a second one is created. Usually 
only copters drop water. Lines can be straight or 
curved. This strategy is usually deployed with 
poor results (there is no real control of the fire).  
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The majority of trials catalogued under Barrier fall among one of the seven subtypes described 
above, but there are some trials where, although a barrier was created, it was not possible to 
categorize it as a subtype nor did it appear with enough frequency to justify a new subtype. 
C) Semicircle and horizontal line - a curved barrier of CF followed by a 
horizontal line supported by DW commands.  
A semicircular barrier is created from the SE 
towards N (when the wind direction is East). 
After reaching the north of the original fire the 
barrier changes direction creating a horizontal 
barrier towards the east. Fire is fought in a 
westerly direction (often with a similar DW 
pattern to that of Semicircle 1) above the 
horizontal barrier using all units. The region at 
the east of the initial fire can also be protected 
with DW commands. Another pattern of Drop 
Water commands is to create a semicircle from the South towards the West (ignoring the 
Northern section of the second part of the barrier). A hypothesis is that the second part of the 
barrier is created to protect a region with houses. Only participant A19 executed this version 
of Barrier.  
D) Line West-East - a line of CFs in the direction of the wind plus a curved 
line of CFs in the opposite direction of the wind supported by DW.  
There is a focus on the creation of a long 
horizontal barrier above the initial fire by 
alternating the use of the two trucks. The initial 
fire spreads freely towards the east, during the 
first generations of the trial, but the subsequent 
shifts of wind direction guides the fire front 
towards the barrier. Another section of the 
barrier is created at the western end of the 
initial barrier (in a semicircular fashion) in order 
to anticipate the last shift in wind direction. The 
rest of the fire is attacked to the east of this barrier typically using only copters. This strategy 
can be very effective when the wind direction changes and was observed in one participant 
only: A02. 
3.3.2 The NonBarrier strategy 
The noticeable dispersion of CF commands is the most salient characteristic of this strategy. 
Presumably there is less use of cognitive and perceptual actions for selecting a cell for 
executing the CF command so it takes less time to place it (the cognitive model explores this 
issue); the drawback is that the CF commands are seldom placed in a way that they can 
effectively control the development of the fire. In this strategy CF commands are alternated 
with DW commands. The CFs are placed not randomly but in consideration of the 
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development of fire, but allowing a little extra distance between the location of the CF 
command and the fire in comparison with the Barrier strategy. However, the choice of location 
for the CFs is not always the most useful. In general terms versions of the NonBarrier strategy 
use only 66% of the amount of CF commands used by versions of the Barrier strategy.  
3.3.2.1 NonBarrier Subtypes 
A) Mix barrier - a mixture of CF and DW gives the impression of a barrier. 
There can be a priority on attacking the fire in 
positions near the initial eastern fire before 
creating the barrier. CFs are deployed in the 
direction of the wind in a certain order (usually 
from south to north, following a line pattern) CF 
commands are interspersed with DW commands 
in order to create a barrier. After the fire is 
under control the remaining fire is usually 
attacked with DW commands. Frequently only 
copters are used to issue DW commands (it is 
better if copters are used alternately and to appropriately refill the tanks). Frequently the fire 
is not stopped by the incomplete line of CFs, in this case a common adaptation is to follow a 
pattern similar to W-follow 1 or W-follow 2 (see below) to combat the fire. It is hard to 
implement this strategy when the appliance efficiency is low: the fire will not be extinguished 
by the DW commands and will spread across the barrier.  
 
B) Semi ordered 1 - a semi ordered pattern of CF supported by DW 
commands.   
Cells on fire close to the initial fire are usually 
attacked with DW commands during the first 
few seconds of the trial. CFs are deployed in the 
direction of the wind in a certain order (leaving 
spaces, usually from south to north, following a 
line pattern). Although the fire bypasses the 
barrier there is more interest in fighting the fire 
at the left side of this barrier (where fire 
strength is low). Frequently the number of Drop 
Water commands is low. This strategy also 
includes trials where incomplete barriers of CFs are created with no support by DW 
commands. The usual pattern of the barrier is a line but also semicircles can be created. 
Performance is never high due to the spreading fire.  
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C) Semi ordered 2 - a semi ordered pattern of CF supported by DW 
commands.  
Cells on fire close to the initial fire are usually 
attacked with DW commands at first. CFs are 
deployed in the direction of the wind in a certain 
order (leaving spaces, usually from south to 
north, following a line pattern). Although the 
fire bypasses the barrier there is more interest 
in fighting the fire at the left side of this barrier 
(where fire strength is low) frequently the 
number of DW commands is low. The main 
difference with Semi-ordered 1 is the thickness 
of the barrier; in this case the barrier is created by (horizontal) lines of two or three CFs. It is 
also harder to identify a linear or semicircular pattern. This strategy appears less frequently 
than Semi-ordered 1. 
D) Follow mix - follows the development of fire with a mixture of DW 
and CF commands.  
A mixture of commands is issued but there is 
always more DW than CF commands. The fire 
could be closely attacked if the wind strength is 
low. After some time all units are fighting the fire. 
When the fire spreads from the centre different 
units fight different regions of the fire. There is 
considerable command dispersion; the fire is not 
attacked systematically so it covers extensive 
terrain. This strategy is a reactive one in the sense 
that it follows the development of the fire rather 
than attempting to control it. Commands may be issued in a pattern of lines.  
3.3.3 The Stop strategy 
The systematic use of DW commands which may stop the fire is the characteristic feature of 
this strategy. In this strategy DW commands are issued on the most intense fires and are 
issued in sufficiently close proximity to each other to stop the development of regions of fire. 
High wind strength makes the implementation of this strategy difficult. In the constant training 
group this strategy is not often used. By observing the protocols, and later by running the 
model (section 5.2.1), it was possible to see that the success of the Stop strategy depends 
upon the precise sequencing of actions. For example, there are two strategically-important 
fires (these fires are the first to destroy a cell and expand) at the beginning of the constant 
training trial; if these two fires are attacked quickly enough the trial can be solved more easily. 
Another important feature of the landscape is that the most intense fire will inevitably 
encounter a clearing in its path reducing its intensity, so the best approach is not to waste time 
attacking it but instead to wait until it arrives at the clearing.  
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3.3.3.1 Stop Subtypes 
A) W-circle - creates a circle of DWs around the fire.  
This strategy uses mostly DW commands. Using 
as a reference the CT scenario, fire is first 
attacked at the east of the eastern fire creating a 
semicircle. After this first attack, the fire is 
attacked towards the west (if the strategy is 
successfully applied the fire is stopped and 
cannot spread further eastward) so that all units 
drop water creating a circle around the original 
fires. This strategy can be highly effective and 
stop almost any development of fire. If this 
strategy is successfully implemented new spot fires will appear early in the scenario imposing 
new demands on the problem solver. The dynamic of fire development generates a rounded 
shape of fires so the Stop strategy must issue DW commands over this circle of fires. If the 
wind strength is 3 or 4 the diameter of this circle is of 3 or 4 cells wide; a wind strength of 5 or 
6 produces a circle of 7 or 8 cells, making it very hard to implement this strategy. When there 
is only one mature fire to attack, the application of this strategy is easier and on many trials in 
the variable training condition problem solvers are able to apply this strategy successfully 
many times. This strategy yields very high performance.  
B) W-semicircle - create one or many curves of DW to stop fire 
development.  
This strategy uses mostly DW commands. The 
characteristic feature of this strategy is that one or 
more arched DW barriers are created around the 
fire. Units are deployed to different surrounding 
regions using DW commands to try to stop the 
fire. Frequently the first arched barriers are very 
close to the original fires. This strategy also 
appears when many DW commands are issued to 
create a thick semi-circular barrier of DW 
commands. Often, when there are changes in 
wind direction, arched barriers of DW commands are created starting from the centre of the 
fire. The density of DW commands around the original fire varies. Usually many curves are 
created around the original fires, if the fire escapes then it is followed and again captured 
within them. This strategy focuses on stopping fire development (this distinguishes it from W-
Follow 1, section 3.3.4.1-A). Another distinction is that the semicircles are created one after 
another (a distinction with W-Encircle, section 3.3.4.1-D, where there is no clear order in the 
creation of the barriers, and with W-Follow 1 where the fire is followed in different regions at 
the same time).  
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C) Quick-spot-fire - stop a fire in its starting cell by using a DW. 
This strategy uses only DW commands. It can 
only be used for spot fires which the problem 
solver needs to attend to with enough speed so 
that its development is halted in the original 
cell. Wind strength is critical for performing this 
strategy: if wind strength is higher than 5 the 
spot fire will develop before the problem solver 
can attend to it (this can be seen by comparing 
trials 5 and 15 of the variable training set). If this 
strategy is applied successfully it can yield 
perfect scores on many variable training trials.  
 
D) W-encircle - issue DW commands around the fire without apparent 
order.  
This strategy is similar to a W-Follow 1 strategy, but the problem solver uses a distinguishable 
pattern of lines to attack the fire. These lines are placed around the fire, so the central part of 
the landscape is not protected. The main difference with W-Circle 1 is that there is no 
systematic use of commands; rather they are placed at different points of the final shape so 
there is activity in different areas of the landscape at any given time. This strategy combines 
following the development of the fire and trying to stop it.  
3.3.4 The Follow strategy 
The strongest fires are not considered at the beginning of the trial so the focus of attention is 
on the weakest fires. A characteristic of Follow is that there is a moment during the running of 
the trial in which the fire is allowed to burn and to develop to a certain extent. In this way the 
behaviour adopted by the participant is to follow the fire’s development. Copters and trucks 
are used when implementing this strategy but using trucks represents a higher risk because 
the fire is developing continuously and can engulf the trucks. The strongest fires may be 
considered but the whole behaviour looks as if the participant is following the development of 
the fire. It is frequently the case that in its latter stages the Follow strategy follows a process in 
which advanced fires (considering the direction of the wind) are sought and DW commands 
are used to extinguish them. An advanced fire usually has a high strength. This strategy is less 
structured because the selection of fires to attack is not as systematic as in the case of the 
Stop strategy.  
 
 
 
 
81 
 
3.3.4.1 Follow Subtypes 
A) W-follow 1 - follows the development of fire with frequent use of DW 
commands. 
First the closest positions to the eastern fire (or 
the western, but not both) are attacked using 
copters. After some time all units are fighting 
the fire. When the fire spreads from the centre 
different units fight different regions of the fire. 
Copters are used more than trucks and are sent 
to the furthest regions. There is a clear order 
when attacking the fire with the sense that 
some units work together to extinguish the fire 
in certain zones. This strategy is highly adaptive 
to changes in the wind: the units are sent to where the fire is. The fire is (usually) not stopped 
but much of the terrain that catches fire is saved from destruction. The fire continues its path 
but the amount of lost terrain is not much. Usually there is a space in the middle of the lines of 
DWs that is not attacked, and that allows the development of the fire. At other times the 
pattern of DWs is like a uniform block following the direction of the wind, so the normal 
pattern for individual units is a line following the wind direction. This strategy may be used 
when the fire cannot be contained in the centre. It seems to be more effective if only copters 
are used. 
 
B) W-follow 2 - follows the development of fire with less frequent use of 
DW commands.  
Only (or mostly) DW commands are used. First 
the closest positions to the eastern fire (or the 
western, but not both) are attacked using 
copters. After some time all units are fighting 
the fire. When the fire spreads from the centre 
different units fight different regions of the fire. 
Copters are used more than trucks and are sent 
to the farthest regions. The difference with W-
Follow 1 is that there is more command 
dispersion: there is a greater distance between 
the clusters of DW commands and the frequency of them is less. The fire is attacked less 
systematically and hence it covers a lot of terrain. This strategy is a reactive one and 
performance is usually poor.  
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C) W-follow-side - follows a distinguishable section of the development 
of fire with frequent use of DW commands.  
Mostly DW commands are used in this strategy. 
In the first stage of the strategy DW commands 
are issued in different regions of the fire. When 
the fire starts developing, one side of the 
spreading fire is chosen (north or south if the 
wind is blowing east) and the DW commands 
are focused on that part. The difference with W-
Semicircle 1 is that in this case some parts of the 
expanding fire are ignored and there is only one 
visible line. In this strategy there is less 
dispersion of commands due to this focus on one side. The DW commands are issued at the 
border of the moving fire. Another difference with W-Semicircle 1 is that the DW commands 
follow the development of the fire instead of trying to stop it. 
3.3.5 A comparison of strategies 
Patterns of command use can be compared by using the type and spatial/temporal distribution 
of commands. The first basis for comparison is the use of the CF command, specifically the 
degree of structure in the use of this command. Degree of structure is a function of the spatial 
and temporal proximity of commands and the existence of specific patterns such as lines and 
semi-circles. If we were to plot all strategies on a continuum representing the ‘degree of 
structure’ dimension then, in the centre of this axis we would place the Semi-circle 2 strategy 
and in the extremes the highly-structured Circle 1 and relatively unstructured Follow-mix 1 
strategies. While a full circle of CF commands is created around the fire in Circle 1, in Semi-
Ordered 1 CFs are issued leaving a noticeable distance between them.  
 
Another criterion refers to the degree of structure in the issuing of DW commands, particularly 
their spatial proximity. The W-follow 1 strategy tracks the path of fire development and 
extinguishes as much fire as possible by a systematic use of the available units while W-follow-
side focuses on a particular sector of it. Differences in the use of the DW command generate 
different versions of the Barrier and NonBarrier strategies. For example, the main difference 
between Semicircle 1 and Semicircle 2 is that in the latter there is no use of DW commands to 
extinguish the fire. Two criteria govern the differences among Only-DW strategies. The first is 
whether the strategy appears to try to stop fire development or not. In the case of W-circle 1 
the strongest section of the fire is attacked first in such a fashion that fire development is 
sometimes halted. The second is related to wind characteristics as some strategies can only be 
implemented under certain conditions: the Spot fire strategy can only be implemented during 
some VT trials: if the wind strength is under 5 and the spot fire is detected early, it is possible 
to stop its development by issuing a single DW command in the initial cell.  
 
Each of the four strategies found in this analysis have different properties: the Barrier strategy 
can halt the development of the fire by using the CF command in a structured and timely 
fashion; the Stop strategy can stop the development of the fire by focusing on attacking key 
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fires with copters and weak fires with trucks; the NonBarrier strategy can deter fire 
development by issuing a reduced amount of CF commands whilst at the same time issuing 
DW commands; and the Follow strategy can reduce the amount of terrain destroyed by 
focussing on extinguishing smaller fires in close proximity to the strongest fires. A mixed 
strategy such as Barrier contains a rich variety of behaviours that can combat the fire in many 
different situations; this characteristic makes this strategy a good choice when the efficiency of 
appliances is reduced during the testing phase. The comparison of these strategies continues 
throughout the following section by presenting a variety of metrics.  
 
As previously mentioned the Cañas et al. (2005) study found evidence of cognitive inflexibility 
in the CT programme participants. To be more specific: participants in the CT group who use 
strategies such as Barrier and NonBarrier continue to use these strategies when there is a 
change in wind direction, even though this renders them ineffective, and participants who use 
Stop and Follow strategies continue to use these when there is a reduction in the efficiency of 
appliances when they are similarly ineffective. The most salient (negative) impact on 
performance occurs when participants do not apply a CF-DW strategy when the efficiency of 
appliances is decreased. In the VT group there is less inflexibility and participants switch 
strategies sooner.  
3.4  Statistics and metrics 
In the Cañas et al. (2005) study there were 80 participants but some of the data is missing or 
incomplete therefore the statistics presented here consider 72 participants. These statistics 
are centred on two variables: general performance and strategy use (section 2.3.1.5 describes 
how performance in measured).  
3.4.1 Frequency of strategy use 
Strategy use refers to the strategies used during a trial (a problem solver can switch strategies 
in the same trial). Table 3.3 shows the frequency of each version of the strategies in the 
training and testing phases. Barrier and NonBarrier strategies are used more frequently during 
CT than during VT. In the C trial (see table 3.2), with a wind strength of 6, the Barrier strategy is 
a good option because it may stop the fire which is developing quite quickly and soon reaches 
an intensity that surpasses the capability of the fire-fighting units. The NonBarrier strategy can 
also have good results if the most advanced fires are stopped and the remaining ones are 
attacked with water. The Stop strategy can work if key fires are attacked promptly, but the 
empirical data shows that only two participants were able to execute the Stop strategy with 
success in the CT trials. 
 
Variable trials that start with low wind strength (trials 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12 and 14) favour the 
use of the Stop strategy. In these trials a quick execution of Stop usually may result in a 
performance of 100%. The Barrier strategy consumes time for creating the barrier allowing the 
destruction of a few cells. In trials 2, 5 and 10, if the problem solver is able to extinguish the 
fire before the wind increases its strength, there are no complications. If the initial wind 
strength is above 5 (trials 1, 4, 7, 9, 11, 13 and 15) the Barrier or the Stop strategies seem to be 
the best option, but Barrier should be preferred because fire intensity may overcome 
84 
 
appliance efficiency at any time. When implementing the Barrier strategy in a trial where the 
fires are in close proximity (e.g. trial 13) it’s a good practice to create a single barrier for both 
fires. When there is a significant reduction in wind strength (trial 11) it is a good option to use 
DW commands only. In trials where wind strength is high and one of the initial fires is close to 
the eastern edge (trials 7 and 9), a good option is to use the Follow strategy in order to 
minimise the damage until it reaches the natural barrier imposed by the edge of the 
landscape. In trials where the initial fires are wide apart, such as trial 4, it is advisable to attack 
each fire with different units. If there are two mature fires in the trial (trial 4) the one that is 
furthest away from the eastern edge of the landscape should be selected (because if the wind 
is blowing towards the east this fire is the one that can destroy the most landscape). If the trial 
has high wind strength, a mature fire and a spot fire (trial 4) it is advisable to extinguish the 
spot fire with a single DW command and block the development of the remaining fire with a 
barrier. When the wind strength is high, it is common for the spot fire to expand rapidly early 
in the trial making it impossible to execute the Quick-spot-fire strategy. In the last variable 
training trial the initial wind strength is 5; in this trial Stop is the best option because the 
majority of fires can be extinguished effectively by DW commands. As can be seen there are 
several cues that the problem solver can use in order to select the appropriate strategy for a 
specific FireChief trial.  
 
 
Table 3.3: Frequency of strategy use 
In the testing phase the Barrier strategy is used more often when appliance efficiency changes 
and the Stop strategy is used more often when the wind changes direction. Stop is used with 
less frequency when appliance efficiency is reduced, although it is used more frequently by VT 
participants. As previously mentioned, Barrier and Stop are more structured in comparison to 
Strategy Version Overall CT VT CTW VTW CTE VTE
Line 96 27 29 8 4 13 15
Semicircle 1 99 40 9 6 1 21 22
Semicircle 1A 49 17 22 0 5 4 1
Semicircle 2 91 35 25 8 6 7 10
Semicircle 3 20 6 1 4 5 4 0
Circle 1 42 6 10 9 5 3 9
Circle 2 7 2 2 3 0 0 0
Diagonal 13 5 4 1 0 2 1
Lines 31 16 4 2 0 6 3
Subtotal 448 154 106 41 26 60 61
MixBarrier 78 34 19 7 4 9 5
SemiOrdered 1 52 13 23 4 7 3 2
SemiOrdered 2 15 8 3 3 0 0 1
FollowMix 152 68 39 15 8 10 12
Subtotal 297 123 84 29 19 22 20
W-Circle 334 52 207 14 60 0 1
W-Semicircle 181 27 57 31 16 18 32
QuickSpotFire 171 0 170 0 0 0 1
W-Encircle 36 5 15 2 2 3 9
Subtotal 722 84 449 47 78 21 43
W-Follow 1 199 95 34 18 18 22 12
W-Follow 2 359 161 79 14 26 39 40
W-FollowSide 51 21 22 0 1 2 5
Subtotal 609 277 135 32 45 63 57
Total 2076 638 774 149 168 166 181
Barrier
NonBarrier
Stop
Follow
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NonBarrier and Follow, and between Barrier and Stop the former is more complex because it 
involves more types of commands. For these reasons Barrier is more effortful and error prone 
and requires more practice (cf. Schunn & Reder, 2001).  
3.4.2 Focusing the analysis 
The goal of the FireChief task is to stop the fire using all commands, participants that do not 
seem to pursue this goal were not considered for the cognitive modelling stage. The main 
reason is that the cognitive model pursues the ultimate goal of stopping the fire and will act 
according to this goal. The practice of leaving out participants has been adopted in other 
studies. Schunn & Reder (2001) encountered similar difficulties in accounting for the full range 
of performance data and they reduced the number of participants modelled (34 of 57) because 
they lacked the data for analysing the measure of strategy adaptivity that they were studying. 
The selected subgroup is comprised by participants that exhibit engagement with the task, 
that is, participants that demonstrate the intention of stopping the fire. Modelling behaviours 
not directly related to stopping the fire escapes the aims of this research. Because of the lack 
of other behavioural data, such as eye-movement data or verbal protocols, it is hard (if not 
impossible) to determine a participant’s intentions during the lapses in which they are not 
issuing commands and hence extracting meaningful elements for modelling is not possible. 
 
 
 
Table 3.4: Normative transition matrices for the CT (top) and the VT (bottom) conditions (M = Move, DW = Drop 
Water, CF = Control Fire. M-M indicates how many times a Move was followed by another Move) 
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Participants’ engagement is measured in terms of trial performance and pattern of command 
execution. In order to reduce the subjectivity during the selection process considering the 
pattern of command execution transition matrices were used. During the first stage transition 
matrices that represent the patterns of command use for each of the four main strategies 
depicted in the third level of figure 3.6 were created for both training programmes. These 
matrices were extracted by averaging the individual transitions between commands for every 
trial classified under the different strategies. Each matrix has 9 rows due to the permutation of 
the 3 FireChief commands. Table 3.4 shows the resulting normative transition matrices. Barrier 
and NonBarrier strategies use more CF commands than the Stop and Follow strategies and 
thus generate more CF-related transitions. Similarly Stop and Follow strategies use more DW 
commands. The Barrier strategy uses more CF commands than the NonBarrier strategy 
particularly before and after a Move. In the CT trials Stop uses more DW commands than 
Follow and there are more M-M transitions. In the VT trials Stop uses fewer DW commands. 
The less structured strategies, NonBarrier and Follow, use one DW followed by another DW 
many more times.  
 
During a second stage transition matrices are converted into vectors and a (stepwise) multiple 
regression analysis is performed with the empirical transition matrix (of each participant) as 
the dependent variable and the normative transition matrices of each of the four strategies as 
the predictors. This process distinguishes between training and test trials. After the results are 
obtained those participants whose predictors suggest engagement with the tasks are 
considered as cases for modelling. Figure 3.7 shows the results of this analysis considering the 
CT and CTW condition. The first column enumerates engaged participants. The second and 
fourth columns show which strategies out of the 4 normative strategies are the best predictor 
(the first strategy in the list is the one that has the highest predictive power) of the strategies 
executed by the participant during the training and testing phase respectively. The third and 
fifth columns show the value of the R coefficient for both the training and testing phases.  
 
Table 3.5: Strategy use considering transition matrices CTW group 
 
Table 3.5 shows that the (selected) “Subgroup” frequently uses the Barrier strategy during 
training, even though a change in the wind direction makes the execution of the Barrier 
strategy harder participants in this group do not tend to switch to another strategy during 
testing. This is evidence of cognitive inflexibility. In the “Rest” group the majority of 
participants use the Follow strategy during the training phase, and they show low performance 
in most of the trials. When the wind changes direction the “Rest" Participants in the ‘Rest’ 
87 
 
group show low performance in most of the trials, execute a low number of commands and do 
not adapt to the environment by changing their pattern of command use.  
 
Similar results were obtained for the other three experimental groups. The results are not 
presented here as they mirror the data presented in table 3.5 where participants in the Rest 
group are best predicted by the Follow (FL) strategy with low use of commands. What is salient 
is that the selected subgroup uses CF commands during training and during testing the 
majority of participants stick to the Barrier strategy which is the appropriate adaptation as 
there is no way of stopping the fire without using CF commands when the efficiency is reduced 
because strong fires cannot be stopped so they burn almost freely. In the VTW condition the 
“Subgroup” shows good performance during testing and many of its members changed 
strategies compared to the ones used during training. In the VTE condition the “Subgroup” 
uses a mixture of strategies during training and start using CF commands and attempt to 
create barriers for stopping the fire during the testing phase which is a convenient adaptation. 
In summary, the selected cases for modelling is comprised by those participants that show a 
pattern of command use other than an infrequent use of DW commands in both the training 
and test conditions.    
3.4.2.1 The limitations of transition matrices 
Table 3.6 shows the averaged matrix of transitions for the strategies used more frequently for 
the CT condition considering the selected “Subgroup”. The transition matrices of Barrier Line 
and Barrier Lines strategies are quite similar although the spatial distribution of commands is 
not (see the corresponding images of the strategies in section 3.3.1.1 for the Line strategy and 
in section 3.3.1.2 for the Lines strategy). The lack of consideration of spatial information is the 
major drawback of transition matrices. As a consequence transition matrices are not able to 
capture, for example, differences in the form of the barrier. Another example: consider the 
similarity in the number of M-DW and DW-M transitions for strategies W-Circle and W-Follow-
1. Although the number of these transitions is very similar, the essential difference between 
these strategies is how commands are distributed in the landscape.  
 
 
Table 3.6: Transition matrices for strategies in the CT 
 
Table 3.7 shows the transition matrices for the VT condition. Note that there is a difference in 
the number of M-DW and DW-M transitions for the W-Follow 1 and W-follow 2 strategies in 
comparison with the CT condition. Due to the variable complexity of VT trials the amount of 
DW commands required to successfully execute the Stop strategy tends to decrease. 
Nevertheless, once again, transition matrices do not distinguish between the W-Follow 1 and 
Transition Semicircle 1 Semicircle 2 Line Lines Follow Mix Mix Barrier W-Circle W-Follow 1 W-Follow 2
M-M 14.89 13.04 14.67 15.62 14.63 15.28 20.13 16.70 11.19
DW-M 29.47 17.61 27.39 25.08 23.71 27.00 38.37 38.00 29.38
CF-M 15.16 18.70 17.83 17.15 9.96 12.56 2.90 4.80 3.05
M-DW 30.82 18.61 28.44 26.23 24.58 28.78 38.53 38.10 29.95
DW-DW 4.97 4.35 6.17 10.23 10.04 7.89 4.23 10.60 13.19
CF-DW 0.89 1.00 0.67 0.46 0.71 0.39 0.73 0.20 0.24
M-CF 13.82 17.74 16.72 16.23 9.00 10.67 2.67 4.50 2.67
DW-CF 2.29 1.83 1.78 1.46 1.54 2.22 0.97 0.70 0.67
CF-CF 6.39 1.96 1.61 2.77 2.92 2.56 0.63 0.60 0.33
Performance 89.77 79.35 79.02 73.16 65.24 83.15 95.16 63.53 59.43
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W-Follow 2 strategies because they cannot capture the higher dispersion of commands 
characteristic of W-Follow 2.  
 
The second limitation of transition matrices is the lack of consideration of the temporal 
distribution of commands. Consider the M-CF transitions of strategies Semicircle 1, Semicircle 
2 and Line in table 3.7. This data is telling us that participants tend to issue CF commands after 
executing a Move command; if this sequence is executed by the same unit this is evidence of 
‘waiting’ behaviour (that is, a participant must wait until the unit arrives at the desired location 
before issuing the CF); nevertheless it is not possible to assume that this sequence is executed 
by the same unit nor is it possible to know how much time has elapsed between the execution 
of the Move and the CF command.  
 
 
Table 3.7: Transition matrices for strategies in the VT 
3.4.3 Subcultures 
An analysis of subcultures was conducted with the aim of identifying patterns of strategy use 
among participants. Subcultures are a means of labelling individual differences in 
predisposition for using certain types of strategies under particular circumstances. A 
subculture is defined as the set of participants who demonstrate a particular style of strategy 
use. The process of finding subcultures started by identifying the distribution of strategy use 
for each participant making a distinction between the training and testing phases. During the 
next step every participant was characterized in terms of dominant strategies. In most of the 
cases a single strategy was used more that 50% of the time, a phenomenon confirmed by 
transition matrices (see table 3.5). The last step was to group participants based on their 
dominant strategies. The result of this process is presented in table 3.4. Subcultures 1, 4, 6 and 
11 are the most frequent whilst subcultures and 1, 3, 8 and 10 are the most successful. The CT 
group is mainly distributed among subcultures 1, 2, 4 and 6. Problem solvers on the VT 
programme are distributed in subcultures 4, 10 and particularly 11. Subcultures 10 and 11 
made use of a version of the Stop strategy called the Quick-Spot-Fire strategy that can be 
implemented only under the VT programme. The majority of participants in group CTW belong 
to subcultures 1, 3 and 4 and therefore execute structured strategies more often. The majority 
of participant in the CTE group belong to subcultures 1, 6 and 8. The frequency of subculture 8 
is expected because a reduction in the efficiency of appliances makes the use of CF commands 
necessary in order to obtain good performance. The majority of participants in group VTW 
belong to subcultures 3 and 4 which are predominated by the Stop strategy. The majority of 
participants in the VTE group belong to subcultures 1, 4 and 6. As in the case of the CTE group 
the use of the Barrier strategy increases as a response to the appliance efficiency reduction.  
Transition Semicircle 1 Semicircle 2 Line W-Scirc Follow Mix Mix Barrier W-Circle W-Follow 1 W-Follow 2
M-M 14.70 17.20 17.75 17.33 17.08 14.33 17.11 12.75 14.54
DW-M 20.70 11.20 15.75 41.00 23.23 16.50 24.00 31.00 30.15
CF-M 18.50 19.00 20.50 1.67 12.23 13.50 7.21 2.50 3.15
M-DW 21.80 13.20 15.50 40.67 24.62 18.00 24.11 31.75 30.69
DW-DW 3.80 1.20 5.25 3.33 6.38 2.17 5.37 7.25 9.62
CF-DW 0.60 1.60 0.63 1.00 0.69 1.17 0.42 0.00 0.54
M-CF 17.50 17.00 20.25 2.00 11.08 12.00 6.79 2.00 3.00
DW-CF 1.70 3.80 0.63 0.33 1.54 2.83 0.84 0.50 0.77
CF-CF 1.50 4.00 3.13 0.67 0.85 1.83 2.63 0.50 0.54
Performance 87.79 68.69 61.87 62.90 48.42 66.01 96.16 56.8075 53.13
89 
 
 
Subculture Description CT VT CTW CTE VTW VTE 
1 Barrier toNonBarrier or Follow 6 1 3 4 1 6 
2 NonBarrier to Follow 4 0 0 0 0 1 
3 Stop 2 0 3 0 5 0 
4 Stop to NonBarrier or Follow 4 6 3 0 4 4 
5 Decrement-structure-Follow 3 0 0 2 0 0 
6 Increment-structure-Follow 9 1 1 4 1 3 
7 Follow 3 0 1 1 1 1 
8 Barrier 0 1 0 4 2 2 
9 Stop to Follow or NonBarrier 0 1 0 0 2 0 
10 Stop (spot fire) to NonBarrier  0 6 0 0 0 0 
11 Stop (spot fire) to Follow 0 15 0 0 0 0 
12 Follow to NonBarrier 0 0 2 0 0 0 
Table 3.8: Distribution of participants in subcultures 
 
Up to this point, the analysis of the data has produced three outcomes: firstly a hierarchy of 
strategies was identified. Second, the effectiveness of the different strategies in relation to 
types of scenarios was also identified. Third, the emergence of subcultures was observed. 
These findings pave the way for understanding the effect of training condition on (1) use and 
consolidation of strategies and the responses seen, both in kind (what the changes are and 
their effectiveness) based on individual preference and what the training condition trained 
participants for and (2) propensity to change strategies in response to wind or efficiency 
changes combined with the effectiveness of the preferred strategies in the new conditions. 
3.4.4 Performance by trials 
The mean performance of the 72 participants is 71.9. Trial complexity was taken into account: 
the base performance (section 3.1.1.2) of a trial is used to perform min-max normalization. 
Table 3.9 shows the average performance of all participants and the selected “Subgroup”. 
When considering all participants, the CTE and VTE groups have lower performance than 
groups for CTW and VTW during testing. The selected subgroup has a different pattern, 
participants in groups CTW and CTE have equivalent performance levels during testing. This 
phenomenon can be explained by resorting to strategy use (discussed in later chapters).  
 
 
 Training Testing 
Group Overall Subgroup Overall Subgroup 
CTW 68.90 76.55 74.39 78.81 
CTE 71.14 80.62 65.99 78.70 
VTW 75.56 76.63 77.31 82.12 
VTE 76.70 79.27 63.38 76.13 
 
Table 3.9: Average performance by conditions 
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Figure 3.7 shows the overall performance (CT and VT) and the performance of the selected-
subgroup (CT’ and VT’) by trials during the training phase. One-tailed one-way between-
subjects ANOVAs are used in this section. The average performance of participants in the 
“Subgroup” is significantly higher than of the “Rest” group. (F(80, 1) = 7.45, p<0.05). 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Performance (Y-axis) by trials (X-axis) during the training phase 
 
To assess the impact of practice in the CT group normalized performance in the first four trials 
was compared with performance in the last four trials. There is a significant effect of practice 
in the “Subgroup” (F(1,32)=5.175, p<.05). The “Rest” group does not show a performance 
improvement (F(1, 34)=0.27, p=.60). Another significant interaction was found between task 
complexity of VT trails and performance (F(2,42)=45.83, P<.001). This result supports the view 
that complexity in FireChief is heavily related to wind conditions. VT participants show 
considerable performance variability during the whole training programme.  
 
Figures 3.8 (a) and (b) show the average performance for the testing phase for all experimental 
groups. Performance is better for groups CTW and VTW in comparison with groups CTE and 
VTE (F(1,76) = 6.44, p<.05). This result suggests that a change in appliance efficiency was more 
demanding for problem solvers than a change in wind direction. There is no significant 
difference between groups CTW’ and VTW’ in comparison with groups CTE’ and VTE’ 
(F(1,34)=0.06, p=.80). This means that the selected subgroup is able to deal with the 
complexity presented by the reduced efficiency condition. The difference between subgroups 
CTE’ and VTE’ compared to groups CTE and VTE is larger compared to the CTW condition. The 
reason behind this significant difference is traced to the use of strategies in the following 
chapters. 
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Figure 3.8 (a): Performance (Y-axis) by trials (X-axis) for testing groups CTW and VTW 
 
Figure 3.8 (b): Performance (Y-axis) by trials (X-axis) for testing groups CTE and VTE 
 
Overall the selected subgroup exhibits the patterns described in the Cañas et al. study (2005): 
(1) there is more strategy variability in participants of the VT group compared to participants 
of the CT group, (2) VT facilitates better performance when the wind changes direction and (3) 
there are significant differences between strategies on various performance measures 
including the amount of landscape saved from the fire and the pattern of unit use. The 
following sections continue with the analysis of strategy use for the selected “Subgroup” only. 
The main reason behind this decision is that participants in the ‘Rest’ subgroup persist in using 
an unsuccessful version of the Follow strategy and therefore do not show strategy variation 
nor adapt to the environmental change that occurs during the testing phase. Relevant statistics 
related to strategy use are presented in section 6.2.2 where data generated by the model can 
be compared. The aim of the analysis in the following section is twofold: to understand more 
about how participants select and execute commands whilst achieving the appropriate level of 
granularity to construct and evaluate a cognitive model. In this sense the modelling work is 
used to understand the relationships evidenced by these measures. 
92 
 
3.4.5 Command use metrics 
Strategy execution depends upon how commands are issued. PAT (section 3.2.2) processes the 
protocols to obtain the measures of performance presented in these sections. The first set of 
metrics is based on the frequency and latency of commands. In gathering these metrics it is 
considered that the time elapsed between the timestamp associated with a command minus 
the timestamp associated with the previous command represents the time taken to execute 
the command. Another measure related to command use corresponds to the time elapsed 
between commands executed by the same unit. This measure is particularly useful for 
identifying repeated or cancelled commands. It is important to identify incomplete commands 
for many reasons: they can show us how many times a participant issued a DW command over 
a fire that exceeded the capability of a unit, how many times the fire cancelled the execution 
of a CF command or how many times participants repeated a command.  
 
As mentioned, given the spatio-temporal nature of FireChief, it makes sense to add spatial and 
temporal information to the analysis of commands. A set of metrics were extracted from 
participants’ protocols which incorporate these two dimensions. It is well known that motor 
actions have longer execution times than perceptual or cognitive actions. This fact makes the 
spatial distribution of commands quite important when comparing strategies. Assuming the 
same cognitive and perceptual actions, a group of commands issued within a smaller area will 
take less time than a group of commands issued over a larger area. The latter group requires 
more time because the mouse pointer must be moved longer distances. There are other 
factors besides the length of mouse movements, such as the complexity of the trial, which 
influence the duration of commands.  
3.4.5.1 Move command metrics 
The maximum length of a FireChief movement is around 30 cells (this happens when a unit 
moves from one extreme in the landscape to the other). Move commands are classified 
according to their length, where length is defined as the Euclidean distance between the 
extremes of the movement. Figure 3.9 shows the distribution of Move commands in relation 
to the length of the movements. The x-axis shows the different Move lengths and the y-axis 
shows their frequency. The shortest movements are 1 cell long whilst the longest movements 
are longer than 10. The Move command provides more information about differences in 
strategy use compared to other commands because it usually serves as a step in executing the 
other commands. Figure 3.9 shows that there is a preference for short movements (sizes 1 and 
2) for all strategies. A one-tailed one-way within-subjects ANOVA revealed that there is also a 
significant difference between strategies Barrier and Stop compared to NonBarrier and Follow 
considering movements of length equal to 1 (F(1,262)=29.670 p<.001). The reason is that 
strategies Barrier and Stop are more structured than Follow and NonBarrier and therefore the 
frequency with which commands are issued in close proximity to each other is higher.  
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Figure 3.9: Frequency of Move commands by distance traversed in the CT group 
 
Figure 3.10 shows the results of the movement length analysis for the VT group. In this case 
the Follow strategy has more movements of length equal to 1 than any other strategy. 
Presumably this is a consequence of some trials in which the wind strength is reduced when 
much terrain is on fire, allowing for an implementation of Follow in which units are moved 
short distances. Note also that the number of short movements executed by the Stop strategy 
is the lowest of all the strategies. This is a consequence of the number of trials in which Stop is 
used where low wind conditions allow for a quick extinction of the fire. 
 
 
Figure 3.10: Frequency of Move commands by distance traversed in the VT group 
3.4.5.2 Control Fire command metrics 
CF commands can be of two types: those that are part of a barrier and those that are not. 
Considering all trials a one-tailed one-way within-subjects ANOVA revealed that the execution 
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of a CF command involved in forming a barrier takes significantly less time than a CF command 
not forming part of a barrier (F(1,852)=167.5, p<.001). To determine whether or not a CF 
command belongs to a barrier a function that combines spatial and temporal information is 
used. A CF command is considered part of a barrier if its Euclidian distance to any other cell 
with a CF command is equal or less than 1.5 and there are fewer than 100 generations 
between the CF commands. This function is implemented in PAT.  
3.4.5.3 Drop Water command metrics 
There is a significant difference between using trucks and copters to execute DW commands: a 
one-tailed one-way within-subjects ANOVA revealed that DW commands issued by copters 
take less time than DW commands issued by trucks (F(1,1436)=101.13 p<.001).  
3.4.5.4 The Move command and the creation of barriers 
Results reveal that there is an interaction between how the Move command is used and the 
duration of this command (the intention of a movement is determined by the action executed 
next). All Move commands was classified under these categories: position a truck that will 
issue a CF command that will contribute to the structure of a barrier, position a truck that will 
issue a CF command that will not contribute to the structure of a barrier, position a copter, 
refill a unit, or precede another movement. On average participants spent 13.12 generations 
executing a Move command which will be followed by a CF command close to one or more 
completed CF commands (this is an operational definition of a CF that belongs to a barrier of 
CFs). In contrast, participants spend 16.57 generations when executing a Move command 
which will be followed by a CF command that does not belong to a barrier. A one-tailed one-
way within-subjects ANOVA revealed that there is a significant difference between these two 
types of movements (F(118,1)=30.85 p<.001). More cognitive processing is required to place a 
CF command that is part of a barrier than when it is not, and this excess of cognitive 
processing should represent a higher cost in time. Chapter 4 (section 5.2.3.1) describes how 
these cognitive processes were modelled.  
3.5  Modelling problem solving behaviour 
This chapter describes the results obtained by conducting a new analysis of the Cañas et al. 
(2005) data. Identifying strategies in a complex dynamic task such as FireChief required 
methods for dealing with the temporal and spatial dimensions of the data. The approach 
followed in this analysis was to use a tool that enabled the discovery of these temporal and 
spatial patterns of commands. 
 
A topic that emerges from this analysis is how a strategy is implemented, that is, in order to 
obtain good performance an adequate strategy selection is not enough as an adequate 
execution of the chosen strategy is required too. An adequate implementation of a strategy is 
based on the correct execution of the individual commands that make up the strategy. 
Constructs such as strategy consolidation and the use of bottom-up or top-down control play a 
role in how strategies are implemented. The statistics and metrics presented here show that 
participants execute commands with significant differences according to training programme 
and strategy selection. The cognitive model is particularly useful in exploring these topics. An 
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ACT-R model, in addition to a pattern of commands, provides plausible perceptual and 
cognitive operations with explicit latencies making it possible to compare these measures with 
participants’ data. There are many actions that lie behind the execution of each command 
registered in the protocols that are not explicated or explained. These actions include cognitive 
actions such as deciding what to do, perceptual actions such as looking for a unit in the 
landscape or manual actions such as moving the mouse pointer. The cognitive model fills in 
these gaps to reveal the complex problem solving processes behind the issuing of commands 
and by doing so provides a description of how strategies are executed at a finer grain of detail.  
  
Moreover there are interesting interactions found in the data that can be further investigated 
using the cognitive model.  
I. There is more strategy variability in participants of the VT group compared to 
participants of the CT group. This variability can be explained due to the ever-
changing characteristics of the VT trials that ultimately affect trial complexity and to 
the opportunity that the CT condition provides for the consolidation of strategies. In 
this respect the cognitive model can show how the different strategies are affected 
by changes in the complexity of trials and can provide a description of how strategy 
consolidation may occur.  
II. VT facilitates better performance when the wind changes direction. The group with 
the highest performance is VTW where every member improved their performance 
when the wind changed direction. The CTW group was slightly affected by a change 
in the wind direction and experienced a slight detriment in performance in this 
condition. This phenomenon can be explained due to the cognitive inflexibility of 
participants in the CT programme that have consolidated a strategy that is not the 
best choice for the wind-direction-change scenario. In this respect the model can 
explore two things: why VT participants are more prone to changing strategy as a 
product of their previous experiences with the task and how participants in the CT 
group have problems with environmental change.  
III. Participants that used the Barrier strategy during CT deal much better with a 
reduction in the efficiency of appliances compared with other participants. In this 
case participants that have consolidated the Barrier strategy during CT are less 
affected by the reduction in the efficiency of DW commands. Besides showing the 
advantages of consolidating the Barrier strategy in this scenario, the model can 
provide an account of the adaptations in the use of copters when supporting the 
creation of the barrier.     
IV. There are significant differences between strategies in various performance 
measures including the amount of landscape saved from the fire, the pattern of unit 
use, and the latency and use of commands. For example, it is hypothesized that the 
Barrier strategy is more difficult (i.e. requires more cognitive and perceptual 
operations) in comparison with the other strategies, and that a certain degree of 
consistency in task characteristics is necessary in order to successfully execute it. The 
cognitive model can shed light in this respect because the effort required by a 
strategy is related to the number of productions a strategy needs to fire.  
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3.6 Summary 
In conjunction with chapter 2, where a set of constraints has been extracted from the CPS 
theory (i.e. the CPS paradigm, determinants of CPS performance, task characteristics and 
cognitive demands) and the nature of the FireChief task, this chapter adds a set of constraints 
from two sources: the particular configuration of the training and test programmes (sections 
3.1.1 and 3.1.3 respectively) and a well-defined set of strategic patterns (section 3.3). These 
constraints are used in the development of the cognitive model. The next chapter describes 
the implementation of the cognitive model. The data offers a rich set of interactions that at 
this point can be traced to various theoretical constructs such as cognitive inflexibility, 
consolidation of strategies, strategy selection, time pressure, complexity, the dynamic nature 
of the environment, and feedback, among others. The objective of creating a cognitive model 
is to lay down these constructs in the form of well-defined computational representations (i.e. 
ACT-R chunks and productions) in order to test hypotheses and obtain explanations related to 
the interactions observed in the data. Because the model is implemented using the ACT-R 
cognitive architecture an additional set of constraints is placed upon the development of the 
model: the behaviour of participants must be modelled by means of pre-established ACT-R 
mechanisms. In this sense the model creates a bridge between the specification of CPS 
theoretical constructs and ACT-R theory elements.  
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4 The Cognitive Model of FireChief 
This chapter provides a detailed description of the ACT-R cognitive model of FireChief 
behaviour. For this study strategies are considered the basic block of behaviour in the attempt 
to explain performance differences. For this reason the modelling effort was centred on 
strategy use and implementation, this decision impacted several aspects of the model such as 
what processes are included, how the knowledge was encoded and how procedural and 
declarative knowledge is used. The first section provides a high level description of the model 
that should serve as the basis for comprehending the rest of the chapter. The second section 
describes the implementation of the FireChief microworld in the LISP language; this version 
was developed to allow interaction between the model and the task. The most relevant ACT-R 
mechanisms are discussed next. The fourth section is related to the different functional levels 
in which FireChief behaviour is modelled, this is the largest section of this chapter where the 
modelling of FireChief strategies is presented. In the last section the various outputs of the 
model and how they are used for understanding more about problem solving behaviour are 
described.  
4.1 An overview of the cognitive model  
A couple of cognitive paradigms were leveraged for the construction of the model. The first 
paradigm is called Competing Strategies (Taatgen et al., 2006) where several strategies are 
implemented and then compete with each other in solving the problem task. In this paradigm, 
ACT-R’s utility learning mechanism ensures that the strategy with the best probability of 
success and the lowest cost is used more often (see section 4.3.1). According to Taatgen et al. 
(2006) utility learning is a useful mechanism in tasks where there are multiple cognitive 
strategies, but where it is unclear which one is best. An important consideration here is how to 
implement these strategies in order to allow a fair competition, an issue that is explored in this 
research. The second paradigm is called Perceptual and Motor Processes (Kieras & Meyer, 
1997). In this paradigm the timing behaviour of the perceptual and motor systems is modelled 
in approximate form using formulas and standard parameters such as Fitts’ law (Fitts, 1954). 
Because perceptual and motor processes are frequently used during the interaction of a 
problem solver with FireChief the importance of modelling such actions is considerable. 
Taatgen et al. (2006) argue that modelling motor and perceptual actions increases the quality 
of the model.  
 
There are some principles that guide model behaviour. Brehmer & Dörner (1993) stress the 
importance of checking the development of important variables in microworlds, they being the 
temperature in Coldstore, the amount of destroyed cells in FireChief or the amount of ground 
water in Moro (section 2.3.1 describes all these microworlds). According to Quesada, Kintsch & 
Gomez (2002) relating feedback to the originating action (assigning blame to actions) can be 
complex. For example in FireChief it is hard for the problem solver to make sense of the 
feedback from dropping water over a cell on fire (and thus extinguishing it) while there are 
another twenty cells burning at the same time. Making sense of this feedback requires 
assigning a value to the particular action of dropping water. Dropping water over a cell 
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requires a rather complex chain of cognitive, perceptual and motor actions that ultimately 
consume time, and there are multiple ways of combining these operations for obtaining the 
same result: dropping water over a cell. In order to improve performance participants need a 
way to learn the best way to execute actions. Another example is when time is wasted. A unit 
in movement is disabled for a period of time; if a participant decides to wait until it arrives at 
its destination and meanwhile some landscape is destroyed, how is this feedback to be 
processed by this participant? It may be the case that the benefit of waiting for this particular 
unit overshadows the cost of allowing the destruction of terrain. Although FireChief represents 
an ill-defined problem, if a clear-cut way of assessing the effectiveness of one’s actions is 
established, it should be possible to guide behaviour. For this reason the adequate processing 
of feedback is paramount for controlling dynamic systems. How problem solvers process 
feedback from a dynamic environment (how they evaluate the effectiveness of their actions) is 
a focal topic of the research described in this document and is the central design consideration 
for the cognitive model. Atkin et al. (1999) defined some characteristics for high performance 
artificial controllers such as the ability to process sensor information, react to a changing 
environment in a timely manner, integrate reactive and cognitive processes to achieve abstract 
goals, and interleave planning and execution. In the context of ACT-R these abilities are 
realized through a combination of perceptual, motor and cognitive actions which are governed 
by a combination of top-down and bottom-up forms of control. Due to the dynamic nature of 
FireChief the state of the simulation itself is used as an external memory so there is no need to 
store complete information about the environment in memory, although some elements are 
kept in WM. The characteristics of FireChief require a monitoring procedure that renews the 
‘picture’ available for the ACT-R’s visual module at short intervals.  
 
The application of these principles generated the basic workflow of the model shown in figure 
4.1. Other authors have conceptualized cognition as a workflow such as Veksler, Gray & 
Schoelles (2007). This workflow iterates throughout the model’s execution and it finishes with 
the awarding of a (positive or negative) reward. A Decision Point requires the selection of 
single option among different alternatives, Nellen & Lovett (2004) use the term Choice Point to 
refer to the same idea. The high branching factor at every Decision Point allows the emergence 
of several behaviours and also there are external events that can interrupt the flow of actions 
in the cycle: alarms and visible changes in the environment (explained later). 
 
 
Figure 4.1: The local workflow of the model 
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In a similar fashion to a human participant, the model can use three kinds of commands for 
stopping the fire (Move, Drop Water and Control Fire) and in executing these commands it 
must adhere to the constraints imposed by the ACT-R architecture. The responsibility for 
presenting the trial, controlling the development of events, logging the model’s behaviour and 
in general enabling the task lies with a LISP version of FireChief developed for this research. At 
the beginning of the trial, a large set of productions is available in the model’s procedural 
memory; these productions are able to match the content of the different ACT-R buffers and 
execute actions (section 2.4.1.3). These rules will compete with each other during the running 
of the model because only one rule can be executed in each ACT-R cycle (section 2.4.1.3). This 
competition is based on utility; the initial utility of these productions is assigned randomly. The 
model needs to fire these rules for executing a diversity of cognitive, perceptual and manual 
actions which ultimately produce FireChief commands. The ultimate goal of the local workflow 
is to support a continuous competition of intentions mediated by the credit-assignment 
process described later. 
4.1.1 Purpose of the model  
The purpose of the cognitive model is to further explore topics related to the execution of 
strategies in complex dynamic tasks. Chapter 3 showed that there is significant interaction 
between strategy use and performance in the Cañas et al. (2005) data. In this respect the 
model offers a deeper understanding of this interaction by identifying the factors that explain 
these performance differences. The model is also able to explain differences in performance 
within the same strategy by identifying the key Decision Points during strategy 
implementation. For example a barrier for stopping the fire can take a variety of forms. The 
model replicates this variety of forms by allowing blocks of behaviour (microstrategies) 
compete based on their perceived utility. The impact of the two training programmes over the 
execution of strategies is further understood using the model. The cognitive model looks for an 
explanation of this impact using the utility construct: the different stimuli result in different 
learning outcomes that ultimately produce different rule weights. In a similar way the 
consolidation of strategies can be further understood. This same approach is used to offer an 
explanation of how the different training programmes facilitate or hinder the ability of 
participants to cope with environmental change during the testing phase. Because the model 
shows the sequence of cognitive, perceptual and motor actions at a fine-grained level it is 
possible to assess how a change in the environment impacts the execution of strategies. The 
cognitive model can also shed light on strategy change by describing the process in which the 
model stops rewarding the use of certain strategies in favour of others. An intrinsic product of 
developing this cognitive model was the evaluation of different ways of perceiving feedback 
from the environment. These different ways of being sensible to the feedback of the 
simulation generate different ways of adapting to the situation. Because the model is able to 
generate similar behaviours to participants (chapter 6) it is plausible that the model is being 
sensible to the same kind of feedback as individuals.  
4.1.2 Scope of the model 
The modelling effort is focused on what responses participants emit (their commands) and 
how long it takes them to emit these responses. There are four areas of interest. The first area 
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of interest is strategy use and implementation and this is modelled using a construct called 
microstrategies (section 2.5.2). In this case the pattern of command use is the right level of 
modelling. It is important to say that the lack of other data, such as eye movement patterns, 
makes the modelling of the timing of commands quite hard. For this reason participants who 
showed structure in their behaviour only are taken into account when data fitting while very 
low performers are not considered. Behaviour such as excessive waiting or seemingly random 
or purposeless execution of commands is not modelled (section 3.4.2 gives more reasons for 
why a subgroup of participants were selected). The second area of interest is the effect of 
training programmes on strategy use. Strategy variation is modelled as a combination of 
preferences for a strategy and the processing of the final feedback in a trial (section 4.3.2.1). 
This means that both an internal (utility) and an external (FireChief performance) method are 
used for evaluating strategies. The third area of interest refers to cognitive inflexibility during 
testing. After the training period the model exhibits inflexibility at two levels: strategy use and 
strategy implementation, and both kinds of inflexibility can be traced to variations in key 
production utility values (section 6.1.2.3) produced by the different training programmes. The 
last area of interest is more specific in nature and refers to the creation of a barrier of Control 
Fires. The higher level of structure observed in some protocols allows for a more precise 
modelling of the behaviour related to the creation of the barrier and for this reason stronger 
predictions are offered in this respect. 
 
As pointed out by Lewis et al. (2004) there is no explicit methodology for how to model task-
level behaviour using cognitive architectures such as ACT-R, but although there is no 
straightforward way of creating models there are a few methodological principles for guiding 
the development process (Cooper et al., 1996). For example the Minimal Control principle 
(Taatgen, 2005) advocates reducing the number of control states in a strategy. As pointed out 
by Taatgen a large number of control states increases the risk of brittle behaviour. The risk of 
brittle behaviour was ubiquitous during the development of the FireChief model. The high 
level of dynamics present in the FireChief task creates a rich set of combinations of buffer 
states and environmental situations that increase the risk of arriving at a state the model does 
not have the knowledge to deal with. The way of implementing a strategy following the 
minimal control principle is by combining top-down and bottom-up control. Top-down control 
is used when bottom-up control is unable to discriminate among options.  
4.2 The design of the model 
The core of the model is comprised by the basic workflow (figure 4.1) and the microstrategies 
described in sections 4.3.1 to 4.3.3. Nevertheless there is a set of features critical for the 
operation of the model. (1) Strategic governance, as the model must choose a strategy which 
exerts a weak amount of control over action selection. Section 4.2.3.2 describes how strategies 
are evaluated. (2) Display quick and recurrent choice behaviour given that in FireChief there 
are multiple decisions that must be made in a very short timeframe in similar situations 
(sections 4.2.3 to 4.2.5). (3) Enable the acquisition of interactive skills, as the kind of behaviour 
required by FireChief can be described as interactive in terms of Fu & Anderson (2008): 
“learning action sequences in situations that depend critically on the utilization of external 
cues” (p. 4). See section 4.2. (4) It must have the capabilities described by Larkin (1989) for 
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display-based problem solving. The basic idea is that each action is directly cued by the visible 
state of the simulation. This last feature is comprised by six elements: 
1. Very little must be held in internal WM therefore there is an exploitation of external 
objects (section 4.2.2).  
2. Resilience against errors where WM losses are not important (the content of the 
imaginal buffer can be correctly updated as it can be encoded from the display). This 
feature corresponds to the “distraction correction” mechanism (subsections 12 and 15 
in section 4.3.1).  
3. Little cost for interruption, the only cost is the loss of the internal information related 
to the current intention (subsections 12 and 15 in section 4.3.1).  
4. Little strategic knowledge, where the use of one sequence of actions over another is 
seldom favoured. The consequence is that the exact sequence depends on two factors: 
where attention is focused and when working around difficulties is required. This is 
related to the weak amount of control described before. 
5. Adapt behaviour around difficulties. In the FireChief model difficulties are sorted out 
by adaptation in how strategies are executed and even by changing strategies.  
6. Learning is required. The model fires productions to get useful information and 
determine actions.  
 
The seventh and last critical feature of the model is that it follows the one-model approach 
where the same set of rules is used for all experimental groups, in this way an account of 
cognitive inflexibility and other phenomena can be provided based on differences in training 
programmes.  
4.2.1 Knowledge representation (declarative) 
An important design decision implemented in the model is that there is no declarative 
encoding of relations between actions and outcomes, that is, declarative memory encoding 
was not pursued. For example, a chunk that explicitly states that a semicircular barrier 
represents a good option for creating a barrier does not exist. The rationale is that the rate at 
which decisions are being made renders the effortful maintenance of the consequences of 
decisions ineffective and also that the highly dynamic environment plus the considerable 
combination of task configurations and actions makes difficult the definition of a 
comprehensive set of predefined values for chunks. Another reason is the requirement for the 
model to be adaptive: reinforcement learning, the basis of ACT-R subsymbolic processing, is 
more sensitive to error feedback than declarative learning, which is just the kind of 
adaptiveness required by a model interacting with a dynamic task (Fu & Anderson, 2008). A 
consequence of leveraging the ACT-R utility learning mechanism for controlling the model’s 
behaviour is that learning tends to be slower in comparison with declarative learning as the 
utility of productions gradually accumulates the experience as opposed to creating new 
chunks. The knowledge acquired by means of reinforcement learning is implicit and a result is 
that the model becomes more sensitive to environmental feedback (Fu & Anderson, 2008). 
This feedback is mediated by the configuration of the different training programmes in the 
context of this research.  
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Nevertheless a set of important declarative chunks is used by the model to create an internal 
representation of the task. The chunks presented in this section are subjected to the activation 
mechanism described in section 2.4.1.2. There are chunks for representing goals, strategies, 
intentions, units, fires, landscape elements, dams, and wind conditions among others. Of all 
these chunks the first three are the most important and are therefore described in more detail 
in sections 4.2.1.1-3.  
4.2.1.1 Goal chunk 
This chunk is stored in the goal buffer and serves to keep track of the current goal by updating 
the current state of high level intentions. This goal chunk works in combination with the 
intention chunk (stored in the imaginal buffer). The model progresses through the task by 
making updates to the slots (i.e. elements) in the goal chunk. The goal chunk has a slot called 
intention and another called step, intentions are mapped to microstrategies and each intention 
has several. For example, imagine that at certain point in time the value in the intention slot is 
extinguish-fire and the value in the step slot is find-cell-on-fire. A rule can now be triggered to 
update the value of the step slot to identify-fire-strength.  
4.2.1.2 Strategy specification chunk 
By defining the current strategy a strategy specification chunk exerts a high level of control 
over the model. A particular strategy will impose a pattern of intentions and a way of carrying 
out these intentions on model behaviour. Because the analysis of participant protocols found 
four main strategies there are four strategy specification chunks than can produce the whole 
range of strategies presented in figure 4.6. A strategy specification defines whether the model 
will use a mixture of DW and CF commands, whether or not a barrier will be created, and 
which way of attacking the fire is preferred. During a trial the model retrieves a strategy 
specification chunk several times to help it decide upon its next intention. In ACT-R there is a 
cost associated with the retrieval of declarative elements, but because this chunk is retrieved 
frequently the time required for its retrieval tends to get smaller as the task progresses.  
4.2.1.3 Intention chunk 
The intention chunk is used for tracking the current intention and is stored in the imaginal 
buffer. This chunk stores a representation of the current situation of the fire fighting process; it 
holds information about the type of intention, the state of the barrier (if any), the method for 
attacking the fire and the status of the different units. Units can have one of the following 
statuses: moving, idle, attacking the fire, issuing a CF command, issuing a DW command, 
refilling, etc. Other models (such as Lebiere et al., 2001 and Taatgen, 2005) also make use of 
this module for maintaining information about the position of and actions to be performed by 
aircraft. In Veksler, Gray & Schoelles (2007) the imaginal buffer is used for storing values that 
were used during the Table Decision task for making comparisons. Intentions are closely 
related to the use of microstrategies: different patterns of values in the intention chunk enable 
the execution of different microstrategies.  
4.2.2 Searching 
In order to explain how a search is performed it is important to briefly describe the interface to 
FireChief. A LISP (Steel Bank Common LISP) version of FireChief was designed and 
implemented following the original specification provided in the FireChief manual (Omodei & 
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Wearing, 1992). Figure 2.6 in section 2.1.1.5 shows the display generated by the LISP 
simulation. This version is able to control, among other things, landscape behaviour, the 
development of fire, the execution of commands, and the calculation of performance. After 
the first view of the landscape is created it is made available to the ACT-R visual module and 
the model is run. From this moment the display will change according to the FireChief inner 
mechanics and the actions generated by the model, and the model will perceive these changes 
using the visual module: the model can switch its attention by firing rules and can recognize 
objects contained in the experimental display.  
 
A landscape description is represented in LISP as a matrix of strings where different strings 
refer to different landscape types, units and fires. Considering the training phase, there is a 
particular matrix for each of the sixteen variable training scenarios and one for the constant 
training scenario. For the testing stage, when a change is introduced into the environment, the 
same setup as in the Constant Training condition is used and only wind conditions or appliance 
efficiency are modified. Figure 4.2 shows one of these matrices of strings.  
 
 
Figure 4.2: LISP variable describing the CT scenario 
 
The visual module identifies the 400 cells in the landscape, the units, fires, wind strength and 
direction. The result is a table of features called the Visicon in which each row represents an 
element in the experimental window. Every cell in FireChief is represented as two entries in 
the Visicon: one for the colour of the square and one for the label in the middle of the square. 
To execute a perceptual action (a Find Location operation) a rule must initiate a search in the 
experimental window. This search is executed using the “where” system of the Visual Module. 
The “where” system receives a series of constraints from a production and returns a chunk 
representing a location. Figure 4.3 shows two productions that specify a series of constraints 
for the Visicon. In the rule on the left the model is looking for a copter (copters use the colour 
gray) nearest to the current focus of attention and that has not been recently attended. In the 
rule on the right the model is looking for a fire (in red) located towards the north-west of the 
landscape. ACT-R evaluates all the constraints and returns an entry of the Visicon that matches 
the criteria. If no candidate is available the visual-location buffer returns an error. If many 
elements comply with the constraints one is selected randomly. 
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Figure 4.3: Examples of ACT-R rules that search visual elements 
 
Once an element of the Visicon is located in the buffer it is possible to switch attention. The 
“what” system makes use of the location chunk in the “where” system and executes a shift of 
attention to that location. When this happens a chunk with the description of the element is 
placed in the visual buffer. In some cases it is useful to detect whether or not a visual element 
exists for making a decision; this same approach was used by Byrne (2001). For example when 
the model needs to determine if a unit finished a command it suffices to detect that a 
particular colour is present in a given cell by executing a pre-attentive action based solely on 
the “where” system. Summarizing, in FireChief much of the information required for making a 
decision is not stored in the goal or imaginal buffers but it is available in the visual field and is 
accessed via searching and verification rules. Tables 4.2 (b) and (c) in section 4.2.4 show 
examples of rules used for perceiving the environment. 
4.2.3 Learning  
The FireChief task can be characterized as the acquisition of interactive skills involving 
recurrent actions that are cued by external information. The FireChief model needs to learn 
how to stop the fire within a variety of scenarios. For Fu & Anderson (2008) the acquisition of 
such skill involves the use of internal and external cues. External cues are given in the form of 
fire and wind behaviour and particularly by displaying the final performance at the end of the 
trial. Internal cues are mainly in the form of the utility of productions, but there are important 
declarative elements. As previously mentioned, the behaviour of the model is largely 
controlled by internal cues, but it is important to say that the context in which the competition 
of rules occurs is set by the objects continuously perceived by the visual module. The reward 
scheme implemented in the model is discussed first; the way in which the model uses the final 
performance is discussed later.  
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As mentioned in Taatgen et al. (2006) “utility learning is a useful paradigm in tasks where the 
possible strategies are relatively clear, and where it can be assumed that people already have 
some sort of procedural representation of these strategies” (p. 49). 
  
The model’s ACT-R production rules are the product of the analysis of the participants’ 
protocols (see section 3.2.3) which revealed patterns of behaviour that were encoded as 
strategies. The firing of rules is the model’s engine, the number of rules is high and their utility 
is continuously modified by rewards from the environment changing their likelihood of being 
selected again. A practice adopted in this research is to focus the analysis of utility variation on 
those rules that are instrumental to the model’s behaviour: the key rules. The identification of 
key rules is also used by Janssen & Gray (2012). A key rule is one that enters the conflict set 
during ACT-R conflict resolution and hence competes in determining the next intention or 
action of the model. Rules not considered as key are the ones that carry out tasks such as the 
completion of commands or to carry out perceptual actions that have been specified by key 
rules. The pattern of utility variation in key rules reveals useful information about what the 
model is doing while interacting with FireChief. For example, if a key rule increases its utility 
this means that it contributes to the successful execution of commands; if there are no utility 
variation then the rule is either receiving stable (both positive and negative) feedback or is not 
being used. 
4.2.3.1 Reward scheme 
As Janssen & Gray (2012) put it, the rewarding scheme constitutes the “model’s reflection on 
its performance” (p. 3). Section 2.4.1.5 describes the ACT-R learning mechanisms. From the 
formula in section 2.4.1.4 is possible to see that the utility of a production is updated by 
considering the difference between the reward received and the utility of the production prior 
to the reward being received. This formula also considers an important temporal factor: the 
reward decreases as more time elapses between the firing of a rule and the moment in which 
the reward is granted. This temporal difference factor is used to estimate how much a specific 
rule contributed to the magnitude of the reward. Nevertheless not all productions contribute 
in the same way to the reward, in many cases some of the most proximal rules to the moment 
of the reward are not the ones responsible of completing a command, rather the ones that 
made specific decisions. This kind of problem makes the selection of the appropriate reward 
scheme a challenging task.  
 
Janssen & Gray (2012) describe different dimensions for characterizing a Reinforcement 
Learning (RL) problem: the moment, the objective function and the magnitude. Janssen & Gray 
used the Block World Task described in section 2.3.1.6 to test different combinations of these 
dimensions and found the strongest effect for the moment dimension: giving rewards by-trial 
vs. by-round basis. The authors propose that different conceptions of rewards lead to different 
model performance. In a similar fashion different approaches were considered for the 
FireChief model. Table 4.1 shows different combinations for the relevant dimensions for RL in 
the context of the FireChief model. 
 
The first reward scheme tested was to give a single reward at the end of a whole trial. This 
reward depended upon the final performance in that trial. The problem with this scheme was 
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that, because several hundred rules fire during each trial, the temporal difference factor 
updated the utility value of rules unevenly: those proximal to the end of the trial were able to 
receive positive feedback whilst the ones at the beginning of the trial were greatly affected by 
the temporal factor. This approach has been used successfully in other models where 
participants’ interactions require less time (Peebles & Bothell, 2004; Veksler et al., 2007). The 
second reward scheme tested was based on ‘subtasks’ defined by the four strategies described 
in section 4.3. For example, in the Barrier strategy a stage is ‘when the barrier is finished’, 
‘when units are refilled (and have issued several DW commands)’, or ‘when the fire is 
controlled’. This scheme increased the frequency and therefore the number of rewards and 
hence the utilities of more productions were affected more evenly. There were two problems 
with this scheme: the first problem was that, as in the first scheme, various extraneous rules 
could fire between rewards (for instance, completing a barrier may require around ten CF 
commands, and for executing them you need at least ten Move commands, and the model can 
in the meantime use copters to execute DW commands whilst completing the barrier). The 
second problem was that, as pointed out by Janssen & Gray (2012), there is no explicit reward 
signal in naturalistic-like settings such as FireChief, where the only one available is the end of a 
trial. In some trials it was hard to clearly identify subtasks during the execution of strategies, 
because they are defined by particular changes in the environment, such as the extinction of 
the fire, and this kind of event does not always occur, for instance, in the Follow strategy it is 
hard to determine a distinct stage within the continuous execution of DW commands. 
 
The moment Objective function The magnitude Comments 
Once-rewarded Number of non-
destroyed cells 
0-100 (100 means that 
all the terrain was 
saved) 
Temporal difference factor 
updated utility unevenly.  
Subtask-completion-
rewarded 
The completion of the 
subtask 
50 success / 0 failure The FireChief task is not that 
structured so that specific subtasks 
can be identified in all cases. 
Dynamic components and 
concurrent intentions make harder 
the credit-assignment process. 
By-command-
completion-rewarded 
The successful 
execution of the 
command 
-For Move: 3 success/ -
3 failure 
-For DW: 2 X Fire 
Intensity success / -2 X 
Fire intensity failure  
-For CF: 6 success/ -6 
failure 
Easy to identify moments when 
reward should be given and the 
polarity of the reward. Hundreds 
of rewards are given within a trial.  
Table 4.1: Different combinations of moments, objective functions and magnitude for reward learning 
 
In the third approach positive rewards are awarded for successfully completing commands and 
negative rewards are given for the failure in the execution of commands or the wasting of 
time. The outcome of a command is observable without considerable delay. For example, 
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when a CF command is issued there is a visual change in the display and the participant can 
see that the fire cannot spread to the cell in which the command was issued. The magnitude of 
the reward must be enough to affect the utility value of the rules responsible for taking a 
course of actions. There are fixed and variable rewards. Executing Move and Control Fire 
commands generates a fixed amount of reward but the reward of a Drop Water command is a 
function of the intensity of the fire that is extinguished. The model of Janssen, Gray, & 
Schoelles (2008) also gives variable rewards based on the number of blocks placed or the 
speed of placing them in the Block World task (section 2.3.1.6 describes this task). The first two 
approaches were rejected and the third approach was used.  
4.2.3.2 Final reward 
The final feedback (amount of terrain saved) represents the most important external cue 
related to performance in FireChief, this final reward mechanism represents an explicit payoff 
function in the sense of Janssen & Gray (2012) that enables the model to compare 
performance for the different strategies. Nevertheless the reward scheme described in the 
previous section did not consider this piece of information. As a result the model was unable 
to reflect strategy preference. A FireChief strategy is a complex and long term decision that 
impacts several actions and cannot be modelled through the selected reward scheme. Rules 
that select or change strategies have an initial random utility. At the end of the trial strategy 
selection is rewarded at a global level by considering two factors: the final feedback provided 
by the simulation (i.e. FireChief performance) and the base performance of that trial (table 
4.2). In the VT programme good performance in a harder trial generates a higher reward than 
the equivalent performance in an easier trial.  
 
To illustrate how final performance is calculated consider two trials: the 13th trial in the VT 
programme has a base performance of 37.2% whilst the 8th trial has a base performance of 
86.8%. Imagine that a final performance of 95% was obtained in both cases using the Barrier 
strategy. The difference between 100% and the base performance of the trial is considered as 
the total amount of terrain that can be saved due to the intervention of participants. This 
means that in much harder 13th trial a participant can save up to 62.8 % of the terrain whilst in 
the easier 8th trial a participant cannot save more than 13.2%. The proportion of the difference 
between the performance obtained in the trial (95%) and the base performance (i.e. 37.2% for 
the 8th) considering to the total amount of terrain that can be saved measures the success in 
that trial. By applying this formula the participant in the 13th trial obtained a score of 92% 
whilst the participant in the 8th trial a score of 62.1% based on the same final performance. The 
change in the utility value of the rule that selected the Barrier strategy is modified considering 
this new score (modulated to keep the utility of productions within a range of -10 and 10) and 
its current utility value. Manipulating the utility of a production, beyond the standard ACT-R 
mechanism discussed in the previous section, has also been used in other models such as the 
work of Schoelles & Gray (2000).  
 
There are other learning mechanisms used by other models that are also used in the FireChief 
model. As in the case of the Argus Prime Model (Schoelles & Gray, 2000) the FireChief model 
does not acquire new strategies. Taatgen et al. (2006) stress the importance of offering an 
explanation of how knowledge is acquired by the production rules; these researchers combine 
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production compilation with instruction to achieve this end. By using the production 
compilation mechanism, frequent reasoning patterns will generate new rules (Taatgen, 2005). 
This mechanism produces rules that will link different states of the model and, as a result, 
“...learning eventually produces rules that move the system from one perceptual input or 
motor output to the next (as far as they depend on each other), making perceptual and motor 
actions the main determiner of performance (Taatgen et al., 2005 p. 433). In the case of the 
FireChief model, strategies are encoded into a set of productions at the beginning of the trial. 
Nevertheless the opportunity for production compilation is not that frequent in the FireChief 
task. Production compilation would have been useful for increasing the speed with which 
actions were executed; however due to the small amount of productions that make retrievals 
from memory and because most FireChief actions require a perceptual action there are not 
many opportunities for compiling knowledge. To echo Anderson: “The perceptual and motor 
actions define the boundaries of what can be composed.” (Anderson et al. 2004; p. 1045). 
Section 6.2 discusses future lines related to this topic.   
4.2.4 Executing commands 
A CPM-GOMS (Jonh & Gray, 1995) diagram and data extracted from the model is presented 
here to describe how FireChief commands are executed. A CPM-GOMS diagram illustrates how 
cognitive, perceptual and motor processes are scheduled and the sequential dependencies 
among actions. A description of FireChief commands is given in section 2.3.1.5 The model of 
Veksler, Gray & Schoelles (2007) is able to determine ahead of time which movement will 
follow and can prepare for it. This preparation can shave seconds off the time required for 
executing a command. It is harder to implement the preparation of motor commands in the 
FireChief model in a similar fashion to Veksler, Gray, & Schoelles (2007) because it is harder to 
know the nature of the next motor action due to the dynamic nature of the environment that 
makes the whole situation less predictable. It is possible to determine if a command was 
cancelled (or repeated) by calculating the amount of time elapsing between the sequential 
issuing of commands for the same unit. If this amount of time is less than the time required for 
executing a CF (two seconds) or a DW (four seconds) the command is considered cancelled or 
repeated. Table 4.2 (a) to (f) shows a variety of rules that illustrate different aspects of the 
model and are referenced throughout this chapter. An example that makes use of all these 
rules is presented in section 4.4.2 to explain how these rules are combined to produce 
complex behaviour. Descriptions of how commands are executed presented in the following 
sections are enriched by referencing these rules. 
 
Step 1: determine unit use 
Rule 1-A: wait for the truck to move Rule 1-B: switch to the other truck 
IF the goal is to implement a strategy AND your 
intention is to create a barrier with Control Fire 
commands AND you are deciding what to do next after 
detecting that the current unit is not available AND the 
barrier of Control Fire commands is not completed AND 
the currently attended truck has not issued a Control 
Fire command yet 
IF the goal is to implement a strategy AND your 
intention is to create a barrier with Control Fire 
commands AND you are deciding what to do next 
after detecting that the current unit is not 
available AND the barrier of Control Fire 
commands is not completed AND the last 
command executed by the other truck is a Move 
THEN wait for the truck to be available THEN evaluate if the other truck has finished its 
movement 
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Table 4.2 (a): Rules 1-A and 1-B 
 
Step 2: search visual element 
Rule 2-A: get visual location 
IF the goal is to implement a strategy AND you want to check the status of a truck AND you know the 
coordinates of that truck 
THEN search for a visual-location in that area of the landscape with a light-gray colour 
Table 4.2 (b): Rule 2-A 
 
Step 3: check if the truck has arrived 
Rule 3-A: truck has not finished movement Rule 3-B: truck has finished movement 
IF the goal is to implement a strategy AND you 
checked the status of a truck AND the truck has 
not finished the move 
IF the goal is to implement a strategy AND you 
checked the status of a truck AND the truck has 
finished the move 
THEN decide what to do next  THEN move attention to the Truck  
Table 4.2 (c): Rules 3-A and 3-B 
 
Step 4: Check status of truck 
Rule 4-A: move mouse pointer to 
truck 
Rule 4-B: fire detected  Rule 4-C: distraction 
detected 
IF the goal is to harvest the features 
of a visual object AND the visual 
object was explicitly requested by 
the model AND the truck is ready 
AND in a cell not on fire AND the 
intention is to execute a Control Fire 
IF the goal is to harvest the 
features of a visual object AND the 
visual object was explicitly 
requested by the model AND the 
truck is ready AND in a cell on fire 
AND the intention is to execute a 
Control Fire 
IF the goal is to harvest the 
features of a visual object 
AND the visual object was 
not explicitly requested by 
the model 
THEN move the mouse cursor to the 
currently attended cell AND 
continue the intention to execute a 
Control Fire command 
THEN find a new location for 
moving the truck 
THEN decide what to do 
next 
Table 4.2 (d): Rules 4-A, 4-B and 4-C 
 
Step 5: issue a Control Fire 
Rule 5-A: execute a Control Fire 
(successful) 
Rule 5-B: execute a Control 
Fire (unsuccessful) 
Rule 5-C: detect fire 
IF the goal is to issue a Control 
Fire 
IF the goal is to issue a 
Control Fire AND the cell is 
on fire (controlled by 
simulation) 
IF the goal is to issue a Control Fire 
AND the cell is on fire (Visicon) 
THEN press the “C” key AND 
register that the truck is issuing 
a Control Fire  
THEN press the “C” key AND 
register that the truck is 
issuing a Control Fire AND 
emit an alarm  
THEN decide what to do next 
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Table 4.2 (e): Rules 5-A and 5-B 
 
Step 6: Detect alarm 
Rule 6-A: Detect alarm Rule 6-B: Ignore alarm 
IF an alarm (a tone) is detected AND a truck issued 
a Control Fire in cell x AND the truck in cell x is not 
executing a Control Fire 
IF an alarm (a tone) is detected AND a truck 
issued a Control Fire in cell x AND the truck in cell 
x is not executing a Control Fire 
THEN register that an alarm has sound AND start the 
intention of moving the truck to another location 
 
Table 4.2 (f): Rules 6-A and 6-B 
4.2.4.1 Move command (MV) 
The approach followed by the FireChief model to execute a Move command is similar to the 
one of Schoelles & Gray (2000). The first step for executing a Move command is to define a 
target. The definition of a target depends on the current intention of the model. After the 
target is defined a unit is selected based on the availability of units (because they can be busy 
executing a command). Table 4.3 shows the duration of a set of actions involved in the 
execution of a Move command by the model for different length movements. The movements 
were completed without the occurrence of alarms or distractions. 
 
Number Action 
Distance (in cells) 
1 4 9 
1 Locate Fire 0.06 0.11 0.05 
2 Store Fire Location 0.16 0.12 0.12 
3 Find Unit 0.05 0.05 0.05 
4 Attend Unit (not in fire) 0.13 0.15 0.12 
5 Move Cursor 0.38 0.46 0.50 
6 Click Unit 0.37 0.35 0.32 
7 Relocate Target 0.05 0.05 0.05 
8 Attend Target 0.16 0.14 0.11 
9 Move Mouse to Target 0.41 0.51 0.63 
 Total 1.77 1.94 1.96 
10 Press Button (finish) 0.29 0.34 0.24 
Table 4.3: Comparison of different length movements. Time is given in milliseconds. 
 
Table 4.3 shows that a movement is completed in 10 steps. The critical step is number 9 when 
the mouse is moved from the initial location to the target location (which takes longer for a 
distance of 9 cells). Step 5 depends upon the distance between its location prior to the 
execution of the Move command and the unit selected in step 3. The totals in table 4.3 also 
show that a difference between a movement of distance 4 and one of distance 9 can be 
masked by differences in other steps.  
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Figure 4.4: CPM-GOMS diagram of the Move command (S = simulation, P = perception, C = cognition, M = motor)  
 
Figure 4.4 shows a CPM-GOMS diagram of the execution of the Move command. The 
relocation of the cursor needs to be completed before initiating the click of the mouse two 
times. The click of the mouse allows for parallelization: after initiating the first Mouse Click the 
model starts looking for the target before the click is completed and after initiating the second 
Mouse Click the model can select an action. This diagram shows how the movement of the 
mouse is the bottleneck in the execution of the Move command. Table 4.2 (c) in section 4.2.4 
shows a couple of rules that can detect weather a truck has arrived or not.  
4.2.4.2 Control Fire command (CF) 
 
Number  Action 
A 
(8 cells) 
B 
(2 cells) 
C 
(0 cells) 
1 Confirm that unit is available 0.1 0.1 0.1 
2 Move Attention to unit 0.149 0.13 0.111 
3 Move Cursor 0.638 0.493 0.05 
  Total 0.887 0.723 0.261 
4 Initiate Key-Press 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Table 4.4: Comparison of Control Fire commands 
 
Table 4.4 shows the execution of three CF commands. As it can be seen the critical step is 
number 3, Move Cursor, the length of this movement depends upon its location before 
executing the CF. In case A the distance that the mouse needs to traverse is 8 cells whilst this 
distance is only 2 for case B. Case C occurs when the model decides to move the unit, wait for 
the movement to finish and execute the CF, because the mouse is already in position there is 
no cost associated to move the mouse (just the 50 ms. associated with the firing of a 
production vs. the .638 ms. required in case C). There are significant differences in the use of 
CF between strategies (this is discussed in the next chapter).  
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Figure 4.5: CPM-GOMS diagram of the Control Fire command  
 
Figure 4.5 shows the CPM-GOMS diagram of the CF command. The motor actions of moving 
the cursor to the desired cell and pressing the key are in sequence. As in the case of the Move 
command the relocation of the cursor is the key step for determining the total latency of the 
command. Tables 4.2 (d) and (e) in section 4.2.4 show rules related to the execution of a CF 
command if rule 4-A and 5-A are fired one after the other a CF is executed.  
4.2.4.3 Drop Water command (DW) 
In table 4.5 it is possible to see that the critical action for determining the timing of the DW is 
the mouse movement. As in the case of a CF the length of the mouse’s relocation can be 
reduced to a minimum. This command shares similar characteristics with the CF command, for 
this reason the CPM-GOMS diagram is not shown.  
 
Number  Action A B C 
1 Confirm that unit is available 0.1 0.1 0.1 
2 Move Attention to unit 0.157 0.116 0.118 
3 Move cursor 0.615 0.544 0.05 
  Total 0.872 0.76 0.268 
4 Press Key (finish) 0.05 0.376 0.2 
Table 4.5: Comparison of Drop Water commands  
 
4.2.5 Achieving flexibility  
In the FireChief task there are four units, three commands and four hundred locations. From a 
very broad perspective the model’s operations are devoted to determining the agent, type and 
spatial location of the next command and a strategy functions as a mechanism for helping the 
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model to take this decision. The process of making this decision must be flexible enough to 
consider the dynamic nature of the FireChief task. For this reason the FireChief model does not 
blindly follow a plan but rather is attentive to the state of the world. 
 
 
Figure 4.6: How time between command executions is used 
 
Figure 4.6 depicts how the model spends its time between command executions undertaking 
three activities. Taking a decision depends upon the utility of competing productions. Checking 
the environment to confirm the opportunity for executing commands involves more 
perceptual actions. Finally, the execution of commands has a significant manual component 
which requires the biggest share of time. The model is able to adapt to the environment 
because all its rules were created following the design proposed by figures 4.1 and 4.6. First, 
the competition of rules is promoted during the stage of taking a decision, therefore the model 
is continuously faced with the task of selecting a single rule from a pool of several options. 
Second, there are dozens of rules devoted to sensing the environment, these rules can alter 
the contents of the imaginal buffer and therefore affect how decisions are made. And third, 
those rules that increase the probability of successfully executing single commands are 
favoured. 
 
The status of an ACT-R buffer can be busy, free, requested, un-requested, or error (for 
example when no elements match the search criteria). Querying a buffer’s status (mainly the 
declarative and visual) allows the model to follow dependency chains. For example, the model 
needs to wait for an attention switch for checking the intensity of a fire to be completed 
before deciding how to deal with it. Buffer querying is also the mechanism used in ACT-R for 
indicating to the model that the element it was looking for is not present.  
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4.3 Modelling strategies 
Strategies represent an aggregation level constructed on top of the execution of single 
commands. Figure 4.7 shows the different levels of aggregation of actions. What is salient is 
that there is an intermediate layer branded Microstrategies. The bottom represents elemental 
ACT-R actions such as retrieving and modifying chunks or executing manual actions. In this 
hierarchy the FireChief commands, executed by rules, combine to form microstrategies, which 
in turn combine to form a full strategy. All strategies are formed from the same global set of 
elemental activities.  
 
Figure 4.7: Aggregation levels of actions 
 
The term microstrategy is taken from the work of Gray & Boehm-Davis (2000) and Schoelles & 
Gray (2000). According to these authors elemental activities (such as ACT-R commands) can be 
combined in a finite number of ways to accomplish subtasks called microstrategies. 
Microstrategies define various ways in which bottom level ACT-R operations can be combined 
to carry out tasks required to solve the FireChief problem. Section 4.3.1 describes how 
microstrategies are comprised of Intentions. The model can move a unit, select a unit, select 
the way of using unit, wait for something to happen, search for something, determine the 
strength of a fire, evaluate the situation, stop the fire by creating a barrier or issue isolated CF 
commands, drop water over the fire, refill water, and change strategy among others actions.  
 
The general approach for creating the model was to provide it knowledge about 
microstrategies (in the sense of Gray & Boehm-Davis, 2000) but to allow those microstrategies 
to compete freely based on their perceived utility. This competition is controlled by the 
principle of rational analysis embedded in ACT-R. Therefore each strategy is a collection of 
microstrategies linked by various Decision Points (figure 4.1) and coherence in behaviour is 
provided by a strategy definition represented as declarative chunks stored in the goal and 
imaginal buffers. As a result the model run is not determined by a strict top down plan but also 
uses the feedback that the model receives for executing actions producing different patterns 
of commands (in the temporal and spatial dimension) and, due to the dynamic characteristics 
of FireChief, these differences impact performance. This approach to model development 
centred the modelling effort on identifying Decision Points, encoding rules for executing 
actions and assigning rewards. 
Strategies
Micro-strategies
Elemental 
FireChief Action
Production 
Rules
Barrier
Start/Continue 
Barrier
Define target cell
Move Unit Execute Control Fire
Search element Move mouse
Execute Drop Water
Move attention Press key
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Considering the high number of visual elements and actions available in FireChief it was 
possible to create highly complex rules to handle several aspects of the task at once. As a rule 
of thumb whenever there were several options for defining the productions that comprise a 
microstrategy the option that offered the simplest solution was used. Simplicity is related to 
creating rules with the lowest number of chunks and actions involved. This method of creating 
the model emphasises parsimony throughout the model. Jones, Ritter & Wood (2000) also 
stress the importance of limiting the number of elements a rule can have (the number of 
elements to match). By following the principle of limiting rule complexity it was possible to 
arrive to a set of rules that supports the execution of the various microstrategies whilst 
preserving cognitive plausibility.  
 
The development of the model underwent many stages. During the first stage it was intended 
to obtain an ACT-R model able to just interact with the FireChief task and for this to pared 
down to be the simplest, most minimal model possible. This model represented a starting 
point based on task goals and environment and prescribed an optimal intervention when 
dealing with a task while being constrained by the ACT-R architectural features. This initial 
model had the characteristic of being quite successful mainly because there was a very 
efficient use of resources: all units were used all the time. Time wasting was effectively absent 
because the model exploited ACT-R’s parallelism and so executed perceptual, motor or 
cognitive actions at all times. This model followed a strategy definition quite closely, so for 
example a barrier always had the same form. As expected the data revealed that participants 
do not use time as efficiently as this initial model nor do they execute the exact same actions 
over and over again. This initial model served primarily as a basis for constructing an initial set 
of productions (which were preserved in later versions) for the model and for testing the LISP 
simulation of FireChief. By looking at how this model interacted with the simulation it was 
possible to get a feel for the interleaving of cognitive, perceptual and motor operations 
generated by the FireChief task. This initial model also made evident that it was necessary to 
increment the number and branching factor of Decision Points in order of achieve the desired 
amount of variability observed in the protocols. 
 
Sections 4.3.1 to 4.3.3 present the analysis of the four main strategies identified in the 
empirical data. The discussion is structured around the micro strategies that comprise each of 
these major strategies. The full range of behaviours described in the following sections was 
incorporated into the cognitive model.  
4.3.1 The microstrategies of the Barrier strategy 
Jones, Ritter & Wood (2000) noted that regular behaviour is easier to model. Because the 
Barrier strategy produces behaviour that is more regular in comparison with the other 
strategies it was modelled first. This strategy is described first also because its execution 
involves a richer repertoire of behaviours and hence a higher number of microstrategies. 
Figures 4.8 to 4.10 depict the flow diagrams of the four strategies. Blocks are numbered for 
reference in the descriptions below. A shaded block represents a microstrategy unique to a 
strategy whilst a non-shaded block refers to functionality shared by many strategies. The flow 
diagrams do not show all possible alternate flows; rather it is assumed that each block 
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successfully completes its intended actions. The conjunction of the basic cycle (section 4.1) and 
these microstrategies comprises the essence of the cognitive model.  
 
Figure 4.8: Flow diagram of the Barrier strategy 
1 Situation Assessment  
Because of the absence of verbal protocols and the fact that only overt commands were 
registered in the participant protocol logs, it is hard to determine which perceptual and 
cognitive processes were carried out by participants at the beginning of the trial. Based on the 
research described in chapter 3 it is expected that participants focus their attention on 
important aspects of the simulation. Taking as a reference the time needed for individuals to 
execute the first movement different approaches were tested. In one approach unit and fire 
locations were attended and chunks representing their characteristics were created. This 
approach was discarded as it exceeded the time shown by participants and situation 
assessment was limited to evaluating the distribution of fire. The assessment process locates a 
fire and creates a chunk to represent this location and rehearsal is used to compensate for the 
fact that while new fires are located the ones found earlier start losing activation (increasing 
the risk of their activation level dropping below the activation threshold). The identification of 
wind strength and direction also happens at this stage and a chunk with this information is 
created. The order of attention to the fires is guided by the direction of the wind.  
2 Select Strategy  
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There is one production for each of the four strategies (Barrier, NonBarrier, Follow and Stop) 
that when fired sets up that strategy in the goal module. The selection of the very first strategy 
is largely left to the randomness controlled by ACT-R parameters. What makes these rules 
different is the additional kind of feedback they receive (section 4.2.3.2).  
3 Select Intention 
Each microstrategy is comprised by one or more intentions. Intentions are the basic block for 
describing behaviour at the cognitive model level; what generates the model’s behaviour is the 
continuous competition of these intentions. This competition is possible because every 
intention has a rule representing that intention. The selection of an intention is governed by 
the current strategy, the current situation and the sub-symbolic level of ACT-R. The current 
situation and strategy serves as a filter for defining a set of possible productions and in order 
to select one rule from this set a noisy utility comparison is made. There are various intentions 
such as move unit, stop fire, create barrier, extinguish fire, protect landscape, refill tank, 
evaluate strategy, and check wind condition. An intention is executed by first choosing a focus 
of attention (called the action cell) and then selecting a command. Ultimately an intention 
comprises a set of ACT-R commands. The cognitive model is able to change its intention as a 
result of environmental changes or internal requests. The dynamic characteristics of FireChief 
interacting with the choices of the model continuously create opportunities for new intentions 
to be realised or inhibited. This competition occurs throughout the whole execution of the 
strategy, as a result the model is continuously deciding what to do next. The way of indexing 
units using the intention chunk is error free in the sense that a unit never loses its index. That 
is, the model can discriminate between units of the same type at all times so there is less 
opportunity for mixing intentions. To give a feeling for the number of decisions a model takes 
over a single trial the list of decisions taken during a single run of the model following the 
Barrier strategy is presented in table 4.6 where the model made 208 decisions that gave shape 
to the utility values of the rules involved in taking those decisions. Table 4.2 (a) in section 4.2.4 
shows a couple of rules that compete for determining the next intention to follow.   
4 Start/Continue Barrier 
Table 4.6 shows that at second 8.7 the model decides to start a barrier. The model must define 
a starting point for the barrier. The starting point of the barrier depends upon the current 
location of the fire and wind conditions. If the barrier is not started in the right place the fire 
can bypass it before it is finished. The initial point of the barrier also takes into consideration 
that this initial point must be at a sufficient distance from the fire because the fire must not 
reach the cell in which a CF is being executed (otherwise it will be cancelled). If the FireChief 
landscape is considered as a Cartesian plane with the origin at the top-left corner, the right 
place to start the barrier is a combination of a y distance wide enough to span the fire and an x 
distance long enough to leave enough time for creating the barrier. Various cognitive and 
perceptual actions are required for defining the starting point of the barrier. After this location 
is identified the model will try to move a truck to it to execute a CF command. If the barrier has 
been started previously the model can extend it by taking as a reference point the last section 
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of the barrier. Later in the trial the model can decide to start a new barrier in another section 
of the landscape.  
 
 
Table 4.6: Decisions taken by the model during a run of 260 seconds 
#
C
T
Choice/A
ction
#
C
T
Choice/A
ction
#
C
T
Choice/A
ction
#
C
T
Choice/A
ction
1
27
4.3
Select Strategy B
arrier
53
406
48.7
change unit
105
767
95.7
issue D
W
 copter 2
157
1365
164.7
m
ove copter 2
2
29
4.5
Select start attacking the fire
54
411
49.5
issue CF truck 1
106
775
96.4
w
ait copter 2
158
1367
165.1
w
ait copter 2
3
39
7.1
M
ove copter 1
55
422
50.5
issue CF truck 2
107
858
101.7
m
ove copter 2
159
1369
165.2
sw
ith to copter 1
4
42
7.6
W
ait copter 1
56
423
50.6
use truck 1
108
862
102.2
w
ait copter 2
160
1372
165.4
check refill copter 1
5
58
8.5
Issue D
W
 copter 1
57
426
51.0
w
ait for truck 1
109
874
102.8
sw
itch to copter 1
161
1384
168.0
m
ove copter 1
6
60
8.8
Start barrier
58
429
51.1
attack the fire w
ith copter
110
877
103.0
use trucks for attacking the fire
162
1388
168.5
sw
itch to copter 2
7
75
11.4
M
ove truck 1
59
443
53.8
m
ove copter 2
111
887
105.0
m
ove truck 1
163
1397
169.8
issue D
W
 copter 2
8
76
11.7
Change unit
60
458
56.8
m
ove copter 1
112
893
105.6
check refill copter 1
164
1403
171.2
issue D
W
 copter 1
9
91
14.3
M
ove truck 2
61
462
57.3
w
ait copter 1
113
905
108.2
m
ove copter 1
165
1412
172.0
sw
itch to copter 2
10
92
14.6
Change unit
62
464
57.4
sw
itch to copter 2
114
907
108.6
w
ait copter 1
166
1468
176.8
m
ove copter 2
11
96
14.8
W
ait unit 1
63
472
57.9
select advanced fire
115
932
110.0
issue D
W
 copter 1
167
1472
177.3
w
ait copter 2
12
100
15.0
U
se copter 2
64
482
59.9
m
ove copter 2
116
938
111.1
issue D
W
 copter 2
168
1479
177.7
sw
itch to copter 1
13
111
17.5
M
ove copter 2
65
483
60.1
ignore fire expansion
117
942
111.7
sw
itch to copter 1
169
1491
178.3
sw
itch to copter 2
14
115
18.0
w
ait copter 2
66
489
60.4
check copter 1
118
1004
116.5
m
ove copter 1
170
1497
178.7
issue D
W
 copter 2
15
136
19.2
issue dw
 copter 2
67
496
61.4
issue D
W
 copter 1 (too strong)
119
1015
117.3
sw
itch to copter 2
171
1513
181.5
m
ove copter 1
16
137
19.2
change unit
68
502
62.5
issue D
W
 copter 2 
120
1030
120.1
m
ove copter 2
172
1518
182.1
w
ait copter 1
17
149
21.2
m
ove copter 1
69
503
62.6
sw
itch to copter 1
121
1032
120.5
w
ait copter 2
173
1520
182.2
sw
itch to copter 2
18
153
21.6
w
ait copter 1
70
508
62.8
w
ait for copter 1
122
1056
121.9
issue D
W
 copter 2
174
1545
185.3
m
ove copter 2
19
159
22.1
issue D
W
 copter 1
71
530
65.3
m
ove copter 1
123
1057
122.1
sw
itch to copter 1
175
1549
185.8
w
ait copter 2
20
163
22.5
continue barrier
72
532
65.7
sw
itch to copter 2
124
1062
123.1
issue D
W
 copter 1
176
1551
185.9
sw
itch to copter 1
21
168
23.4
Issue CF truck 1
73
564
68.8
m
ove copter 2
125
1066
123.5
sw
itch to copter 2
177
1560
187.1
issue D
W
 copter 1
22
169
23.4
change truck
74
574
69.7
issue D
W
 copter 2
126
1128
128.1
m
ove copter 2
178
1566
188.4
issue D
W
 copter 2
23
175
23.8
w
ait truck 2
75
576
70.0
continue barrier
127
1132
128.3
w
ait copter 2
179
1567
188.8
sw
itch to copter 1
24
180
24.6
issue CF truck 2
76
593
72.3
m
ove truck 1
128
1147
130.9
m
ove copter 2
180
1570
188.9
w
ait copter 1
25
181
24.6
strick to truck 2
77
594
72.6
strick to truck 1
129
1151
131.4
w
ait copter 2
181
1632
193.5
m
ove copter 1
26
184
25.1
w
ait truck 2
78
599
72.9
issue CF truck 1
130
1153
131.5
sw
itch to copter 1
182
1634
193.9
w
ait copter 1
27
237
28.7
m
ove truck 2
79
601
73.0
continue attacking fire
131
1168
134.0
m
ove copter 1
183
1644
194.5
issue D
W
 copter 1
28
238
29.1
stick to truck 2
80
607
74.1
issue D
W
 copter 1
132
1172
134.5
w
ait copter 1
184
1645
194.7
sw
itch to copter 2
29
242
29.3
w
ait truck 2
81
608
74.2
sw
itch to copter 2
133
1179
134.9
sw
itch to copter 2
185
1660
197.2
m
ove copter 2
30
247
29.6
issue CF truck 2
82
621
76.3
m
ove copter 2
134
1188
135.9
issue D
W
 copter 2
186
1662
197.6
w
ait copter 2
31
249
29.7
w
ait truck 1
83
625
76.8
w
ait for copter 2
135
1194
137.1
issue D
W
 copter 1
187
1692
199.3
issue D
W
 copter 2
32
266
32.2
m
ove truck 1
84
631
77.2
issue D
W
 copter 2
136
1197
137.6
use trucks for attacking the fire 
188
1695
199.6
refill copter 2
33
267
32.6
stick to truck 1
85
634
77.5
use trucks for attacking the fire
137
1208
138.9
issue D
W
 truck 1
189
1697
199.7
use trucks for attacking the fire 
34
272
32.9
issue CF truck 1
86
644
79.9
m
ove truck 2
138
1221
141.4
m
ove truck 2
190
1712
202.5
m
ove truck 1
35
274
33.0
use truck 2
87
650
80.6
sw
itch to copter 2
139
1224
141.8
w
ait truck 2
191
1714
202.8
use copter for attacking the fire
36
291
35.2
m
ove truck 2
88
664
81.3
w
ait for copter 2
140
1230
142.4
issue D
W
 truck 2
192
1734
203.8
refill copter 2
37
292
35.6
w
ait for truck 2
89
666
81.4
refill copter 2
141
1233
142.5
sw
itch truck 1
193
1740
205.7
m
ove copter 2 to dam
38
297
35.9
issue CF truck 2
90
672
83.3
m
ove copter 2 to dam
142
1249
145.2
m
ove truck 1
194
1746
206.0
search fires
39
299
36.0
use truck 1
91
673
83.4
sw
itch to copter 1
143
1257
145.9
refill copter 2
195
1761
206.7
fire is still burning
40
320
38.6
m
ove truck 1
92
686
85.7
m
ove copter 1
144
1263
147.7
m
ove copter 2 to dam
196
1767
207.9
issue D
W
 truck 1
41
321
39.0
stick to truck 1
93
695
86.5
check copter 2
145
1264
147.7
sw
ith copter 1
197
1768
208.2
alarm
 detected insist
42
325
39.2
w
ait truck 1
94
702
87.0
issue D
W
 copter 1
146
1275
149.9
m
ove copter 1
198
1769
208.2
issue D
W
 truck 1
43
338
39.9
issue CF truck 1
95
704
87.2
use trucks for attacking fire
147
1277
150.3
w
ait copter 1
199
1770
208.4
alarm
 detected insist
44
340
40.0
change to truck 2
96
707
87.4
check copter 2
148
1286
150.9
issue D
W
 copter 1
200
1771
208.5
issue D
W
 truck 1
45
357
42.5
m
ove truck 2
97
711
87.6
change strategy
149
1288
151.1
check refill copter 2
201
1772
208.7
alarm
 detected insist
46
358
42.8
stick to truck 2
98
712
87.6
Select strategy Stop
150
1298
151.6
use trucks for attacking the fire 
202
1773
208.7
issue D
W
 truck 1
47
362
43.0
w
ait for truck 2
99
736
90.5
m
ove copter 2
151
1305
152.8
issue D
W
 truck 1
203
1775
209.0
m
ove truck to safe place
48
367
43.4
issue CF truck 2
100
739
91.0
use truck for attacking the fire
152
1318
155.4
m
ove truck 2
204
1776
209.0
m
ove truck 1
49
368
43.4
sw
itch to truck 1
101
746
92.1
issue D
W
 truck 2
153
1329
157.7
m
ove copter 1 to dam
205
1786
210.0
sw
itch to copter 1
50
385
45.8
m
ove truck 1
102
747
92.1
change to copters
154
1330
157.7
use trucks for attacking the fire 
206
1787
210.1
m
ove copter 1
51
386
46.1
sw
itch to truck 2
103
754
92.5
refill copter 1
155
1337
159.2
issue D
W
 truck 2
207
1790
210.9
issue D
W
 copter 1
52
405
48.4
m
ove truck 2
104
760
94.5
m
ove copter 1 to dam
156
1350
161.8
m
ove truck 1
208
1793
211.1
D
etect alarm
 end of trial
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5 Define Target Cell 
The data show that the form of a barrier has an important impact on performance. The form of 
the barrier is a result of the competition for identifying the next cell of the barrier. The barrier 
can be deployed in a top-down controlled way with a semicircular or linear shape or in a more 
reactive bottom-up way that depends on the configuration of the fire that is being stopped by 
the barrier. These two ways of deploying a barrier are inspired by research investigating these 
two different kinds of control (Taatgen, 2005, section 3.3.2). These two approaches to the 
creation of the barrier are competing throughout the model run and it is left to the internal 
mechanisms of ACT-R to decide which rules to apply. In the end the outcome of both 
approaches is the spatial identification of the next section of the barrier. In both cases the 
selection of a target cell follows a process in which the candidate cell is proposed and then 
various tests (based on perceptual actions) are conducted. The selection of a target for a CF 
command iterates until a suitable candidate cell is found. A candidate cell may be rejected if 
the fire has already reached it, if a CF command was already completed in that cell or if 
another unit is currently executing a command in that cell.  
 
 
 
Number Action 
Selection method 
Line-1 Reactive-1 Semicircle Line-2 Reactive-2 Line-3 
1 Locate Target 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.35 0.15 0.35 
2 Store Fire Location 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
3 Find Unit 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.09 
4 Attend Unit (not in 
fire) 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.14 
5 Move Cursor 0.05 0.57 0.45 0.44 0.47 0.05 
6 Click Unit 0.20 0.40 0.34 0.36 0.38 0.44 
7 Relocate Target 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.34 
8 Attend Target 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.05 
9 Move Mouse to 
Target 0.59 0.52 0.40 0.58 0.46 0.14 
 Total 1.44 2.05 1.75 2.19 1.88 1.66 
10 Press Button (finish) x x x x x x 
Table 4.7: Sequence of actions for identifying the target cell for the barrier 
 
Table 4.7 shows the duration of the different activities associated with moving a truck to a cell 
in order to create a fire-break that belongs to a barrier for a variety of different methods for 
constructing the barrier. The Locate Target action takes longer for the line-2 method shown in 
the fourth column because the model found that the other truck was already working there. 
For the line-3 method shown in the last column the Locate Target action also takes .35 
seconds; the explanation is that in this case the cursor is already in position and moving it to 
the target takes only 0.14 seconds. What happened in this case is that a fire started in the 
target position and the model relocated the unit to a neighbouring cell to attempt a new CF. 
The table also shows the variability in time of the Move Cursor movement. Although the 
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latencies for the Locate Target action are quite similar the actions themselves are different. 
What is manipulated by the model in order to locate targets is the scanning area. This idea is 
inspired by the work of Schoelles & Gray (2000) with the Argus Prime task (see section 3.4.2). A 
change in the scanning area is realized by manipulating the search constraints for a visual-
location chunk. A search of visual-location chunks from the spatial perspective is achieved 
using two slots: screen-x and screen-y. These slots can be compared against a range of values 
or by looking for the greatest or lower element among a subset. Other slots such as the type of 
element and particularly the colour of elements are also used for conducting searches. Using 
top-down control the next section of the barrier is selected by following a predefined shape. In 
the case of a semicircular barrier the model considers both locations at the top of the last 
barrier cell corresponding to curving to the left or the right. From these two locations the 
model must choose one; this selection depends on the number of CF commands issued before. 
In the reactive (bottom-up) control approach the model relies only on perceptual actions to 
select candidate cells. So it will use the previous section of the barrier as a reference point and 
then will start looking at the fire to determine the next section of the barrier. In the end the 
resulting shape of the barrier is a combination of top-down and bottom-up control mediated 
by the ACT-R conflict resolution mechanism. This way of creating the barrier may be 
maintained throughout creation of the entire barrier if no problems are found. A problem can 
occur when a CF command cannot be issued because the fire catches up with the barrier, as 
when a candidate location is on fire or the fire bypasses the barrier.  
6 Execute Control Fire 
See section 4.2.4.2. 
7 Update Barrier Status 
At some point in time the barrier may be completed and this fact changes the behaviour of the 
model by increasing the use of DW commands both by copters and trucks. A barrier is 
considered complete if a certain amount of CF commands have been completed with the 
intention of creating a barrier and the fire has not bypassed the barrier. In this case the 
imaginal buffer would acknowledge the termination of the barrier goal. 
8 Attack Fire 
All units have the ability to attack the fire, but copters have three advantages: they can 
extinguish stronger fires, are faster and are not at risk of being destroyed by the fire. The 
model can use any type of unit to attack the fire but it has a preference for using copters. If the 
model detects that the goal of creating a barrier of CFs has been completed it will use mainly 
copters to attack the fire; the rationale behind this is that the strongest fires will collide with 
the barrier but a lot of terrain can be saved by using the copters to extinguish as much fire as 
possible. Although used less frequently, trucks are sent to extinguish the weakest fires.  
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9 Select/Continue Attack Mode 
The model must choose a way of attacking the fire; a way of attacking the fire serves as a guide 
for placing constraints on the search for fires to be attacked with DW commands. There are 
distinguishable ways of fighting the fire. The first one is to Attack Weak Fires. In this attack 
mode fires of low strength (0 to 1) are selected. In a collection of fires burning together with 
the wind blowing eastwards weak fires are located at the West. The second is Attack Strong 
Fires. In this attack mode fires with high strength (3 to 5) are selected. In the example given 
earlier this means that the model will look for fires that are located towards the East. These 
fires are more threatening because they develop faster. Because copters are able to extinguish 
stronger fires than trucks, it is good practice to use them more frequently for attacking strong 
fires. The third mode is Attack Strongest Fires. In this attack mode the strongest fires are 
selected first. Using this approach to attack the fire at the beginning of trial can represent a 
significant advantage: if the strongest fires are extinguished quickly the spread of fire may be 
significantly slowed. The risk of this approach is that the fire’s strength often exceeds the 
capabilities of the units. The selection of an attacking mode is not fixed; the model can switch 
between modes if required. In the case of the Barrier strategy the use of DW commands 
usually has two functions: to provide more time for creating the barrier and to attack the 
remaining fires after the barrier is completed.  
10 Select Fire 
This microstrategy is similar to Define Target Cell: the approaches to attacking the fire delimit a 
scanning area for searching for fires. After a way of attacking the fire is selected the next step 
is to choose a particular fire to attack. The fire selected serves as the target for a DW 
command. The search for a new fire is a result of placing constraints on a search over the 
entries of the Visicon. The result of this search is a single chunk representing the target cell. 
Select Fire is more reactive than Define Target Cell because a DW command should be issued 
over one of the fires that are developing in the landscape.  
11 Execute Drop Water 
See section 4.2.4.3.  
12 Opportunistic Action 
Due to the dynamic nature of FireChief it is possible for a combination of events to create the 
opportunity to execute an action that could benefit the overall process of fighting the fire that 
is not part of the current flow of intentions. In these cases an Opportunistic Action rule can be 
fired. For example, the model may detect that the tank of one of the copters is depleted and 
start using trucks to extinguish the fire or send the copter to a dam to refill. Another example 
is a response to when a CF command is cancelled. The model is able either to move the truck 
to a new location or alternatively execute a DW command in the same spot. Sending copters 
for refill is quite important for all strategies. The model must select a dam in order to move the 
unit. After the dam has been selected the model performs an action quite similar to a 
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movement, the difference is that the unit start refilling its tank automatically when the 
movement finishes. Refilling usually requires longer movements because the location of dams 
in fixed and there are few of them. The model can wait until the tank is refilled and then 
resume the intention that the unit was executing before initiating the refilling. Because a 
copter’s tank capacity is 4 units of water (a truck’s capacity is 10) the need to refill the tank 
occurs quite frequently. Table 4.8 shows the steps required to refill a tank. Note that the 
detection of the depleted tank is done by an ACT-R pre-attentive check. As in the case of the 
Move command the time-critical actions are the mouse movements.  
 
 
Number Action Duration 
1 Detect depleted tank 0.05 
2 Move Attention to unit 0.05 
3 Move Mouse to unit 0.78 
4 Click unit 0.05 
5 Locate Dam 0.35 
6 Move mouse to dam 0.67 
7 Total 1.95 
Table 4.8: Refilling a unit 
 
An important issue relating to the execution of opportunistic actions is how the model 
“recovers” the intention that was in mid-execution before the opportunistic action arose. The 
imaginal buffer is used for storing the state of the intention making it possible to identify the 
current state of a particular intention and continue its flow of actions. Recovery rules are also 
in charge of allowing the model to keep running after a distraction occurs (see the buffer 
stuffing mechanism in block 15 of this section).  
13 Change Strategy 
The model can change strategies during a trial if it determines that the current strategy is not 
effective. It is possible to assess the effectiveness of a strategy by being attentive to the 
number of burned cells. Table 4.6 shows that the model changed strategy at second 87.6. At 
this point in time the barrier has been completed and the model replaces the Barrier strategy 
with the Stop strategy. From this point onwards the model will not try to use CF commands.  
14 Wait For More Fires or End Of Trial 
If the model detects the absence of fires in the landscape it considers the fire to be under 
control and waits until the end of the trial to check its final performance. If a new fire appears 
in the landscape in the meantime the model resumes its current strategy. At the end of the 
trial an alarm will sound and the final performance score is presented to the model.  
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15 Detect Fire Development 
The model is aware of changes related to fire behaviour by means of two ACT-R mechanisms. 
Scene change is used for detecting a significant increment of fire development; if such an 
increment is detected the model can adapt (e.g. change strategy). Determining whether a 
scene has changed is achieved by looking at the proportion of modified elements from all the 
elements in the display at a certain point of time and comparing this number to a threshold. 
The only phenomenon that can alter the environment in such a way that a scene change can 
be detected is the spread of fire (considering that there are 800 visual elements). The standard 
way of checking for a scene change is by querying the visual module, but it was not possible to 
follow this approach due to the fact that the function that refreshes the contents of the 
Visicon consumes a lot of computational resources (remember that there are 800 visual 
elements refreshed every 200 milliseconds). The solution was to avoid calling the proc-display 
function (Bothell, 2007) that regenerates all the visual elements in the Visicon and call a 
customized function instead. This customized function only updates those elements that 
actually changed during each 200 milliseconds block. A consequence of this workaround was 
that the value of the scene-change slot is not updated automatically and therefore it was 
necessary to implement another function to apply the ACT-R scene-change formula. The ACT-R 
manual (Bothell, 2007) describes the equation used for calculating scene change.  
 
The second mechanism is buffer stuffing where a chunk is stored in the visual buffer without 
an explicit request from a production rule. For the FireChief model buffer stuffing represents a 
recurrent source of distraction for the visual system but also allows the detection of 
unforeseen events. While the model is engaged in carrying out intentions many things 
happening in the environment may attract its attention. For example such as when the model 
has its attention fixed on a cell and a request to change its attention to other cell is started 
and, before this switch of attention is executed, a fire starts in the current (or adjacent) cell 
stuffing the visual buffer. The model makes constant use of the information in its buffers for 
representing the world and executing intentions; that is the reason why an unrequested chunk 
placed into the visual buffer prompts the model to evaluate the situation. In some cases it is 
not possible to recover the intention, as when the distraction occurs just after an attention 
shift was requested stuffing the visual buffer with an invalid visual element. In other cases, for 
example when a motor command has been initiated, the motor command is executed while 
the model attempts to recover from the distraction. These recovery rules are activated when a 
non-requested chunk is placed in the visual buffer. Table 4.9 shows an example of how a 
distraction causes a delay. At second 49.771, while the model is checking the status of a truck, 
the model detects that an unrequested chunk is placed by the visual module; the model 
continues with the intention of checking the truck status (using the recovery rule that fires at 
second 49.821, this rule uses the content of the imaginal buffer to identify which specific truck 
it should wait for) and ends up issuing a CF command at second 50.508.  
 
It was considered to alter the way a scene change is detected by the model to increase 
accuracy. This new scene-change detection method would have a more selective way of 
evaluating the amount of change. The model’s sensitivity to the development of the fire is 
controlled by a single number that represents how many elements in the environment must 
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change, between two updates of the visual stimuli, to allow detection by the model. The 
problem with this approach is that it does not discriminate the visual elements involved in the 
scene change (a limitation inherent to ACT-R). That is, the total number of cells that are 
changed due to fire activity is added to the number of cells that are changed due to actions 
executed by the model, so it is possible that the model is detecting a significant change as a 
consequence of events generated by its own actions. Because a version of the FireChief 
microworld was developed from scratch for this research and it was necessary to construct 
methods to manage updates to the visual memory in a less memory-demanding way, it is 
technically possible to discriminate between changes generated by the model and changes 
generated by the simulation, so this upgrade to the model would not require a lot of effort. 
With this upgrade the model would be more accurate in detecting significant changes in fire 
development.  
 
49.503 AFTER-CF-SWITCH-TO-OTHER-TRUCK 
49.553 CHECK-FOR-UNIT-READY-FOR-CF 
49.603 CHECK-FOR-UNIT-READY-FOR-CF-TEXT 
49.653 CHECK-FOR-UNIT-READY-FOR-CF-END 
49.771 CHECK-FOR-AVAILABLE-UNIT-UNREQUESTED 
49.821 CHANGE-INTENTION-NO-UNIT-READY-FOR-CF-WAIT-ACTIONS-FROM-BARRIER 
49.871 CHECK-FOR-UNIT-READY-FOR-CF 
49.921 CHECK-FOR-UNIT-READY-FOR-CF-TEXT 
49.971 CHECK-FOR-UNIT-READY-FOR-CF-END 
50.095 CHECK-FOR-AVAILABLE-UNIT-OK 
50.508 ISSUE-CONTROL-FIRE-ON-SPOT 
Table 4.9: Example of actions resulting from recovery rules following a distraction 
16 Detect Alarm 
Alarms can be triggered at any time and the model is able to detect and process them. Alarm 
detection is carried out through the aural module. This module is similar to the visual module 
having one buffer for locating sounds and one buffer for harvesting them in the form of 
chunks. This module also has a list of features called the Auricon (which behaves like the 
Visicon). Section 2.3.1.5 describes alarms in FireChief. Because the alarms emitted by FireChief 
are all at the same pitch it is necessary to observe the context of the simulation in order to 
identify the appropriate response. For example if the model detects that the tank is empty the 
sensible choice is to refill it at a dam. Alarms do not always generate adaptive responses as 
they can be ignored. Alarm rules were hard to introduce in the model because they can be 
fired at any time and their interpretation may require information that is not available 
anymore such as a visual chunk that is lost after a shift of attention. Table 4.2 (f) in section 
4.2.4 shows a couple of rules that compete for detecting an alarm or not.  
4.3.2 The microstrategies of the NonBarrier strategy 
The difference between the Barrier and NonBarrier (figure 4.9) strategies resides in the 
selection of the target cell before issuing a CF command. The remaining microstrategies 
needed for executing this strategy have already been explained.  
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Figure 4.9: Flow diagram of the NonBarrier strategy 
 
4B Define Target Cell  
In the case of the NonBarrier strategy a target cell is identified with the intention of issuing a 
CF command, but there is no higher goal of creating a barrier. The outcome in this block of 
activity is a location that will be used for the execution of a CF command. To identify a target 
cell the model will look for an advanced fire and will select as a candidate target cell a location 
a certain distance away from this fire. If there are no problems with that location the target 
cell will be viewed as acceptable and the flow of activity will continue. The Select Intention 
block is also shaded with the intention of highlighting the fact that the strategy definition of 
the NonBarrier strategy exerts control over the behaviour of other functionality blocks, for 
example, it exhibits a preference for attacking advanced fires.  
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4.3.3 The microstrategies of the Stop and Follow strategies 
 
Figure 4.10: The Stop and Follow strategies 
The Stop and Follow strategies are based on the execution of DW commands. As can be seen 
in figure 4.10 fewer microstrategies are required for executing these strategies. The block of 
functionality that determines the difference between Stop and Follow is Select Fire.  
10A/B Select Fire 
The selection of which fire to attack is what distinguishes Stop from Follow. This process of 
selection is more systematic in Stop that in Follow. At the beginning of the trial a model 
following the Stop strategy will locate and select a few of the strongest fires burning in the 
landscape and will send the fastest units (copters) to attack them. Remember that the 
strongest fires are identified during the Situation Assessment. The Follow strategy may select a 
strong fire, but a weak fire is also an option. In Stop, when selecting a new fire to attack, the 
model uses the previously attacked cell as a reference and tries to extinguish a fire in the 
immediate vicinity. As fire develops in the landscape it tends to create a round shaped 
formation where destroyed cells are in the centre and fires burn in the periphery. For this 
reason execution of the Stop strategy seems like tracking the periphery of the fire with DW 
commands. If enough DW commands are performed over frontal fires the spread of the fire 
can be halted. In Follow the previous location of a DW is not considered, only the location of 
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fires. This implies a less systematic way of attacking the fire. Although many fires can be 
extinguished using the Follow strategy fire development is not stopped.  
4.3.4 Comparing strategies: a cognitive modelling perspective 
The effort-accuracy framework (Payne et al., 1993) suggests that the structure of FireChief 
determines the quality of the strategies and interacts with the cognitive capabilities of the 
problem solver to determine the required cognitive effort for each strategy. The average 
number of productions used by a key microstrategy for each of the four strategies is presented 
in table 4.10. The strategy with the highest cost is Barrier while Follow has the lowest cost. 
Besides being more structured, strategies Barrier and Stop also show a higher level of 
cooperation among units in comparison with NonBarrier and Follow. For instance, during the 
creation of the barrier the behaviour of one truck usually depends on the other truck’s actions 
and in Stop a determinant of the next action is the current location of the unit and the fire 
situation. The effectiveness of CF commands for stopping the fire is positively correlated with 
the degree of proximity among them. When participants (or the model) are creating a barrier 
not only are the CF locations close to each other but they are also purposely distributed 
considering the morphology of the fire and the direction of the wind. The creation of a barrier 
increases the demands of the search for the next target cell. 
 
Strategy Microstrategies Average number of rules  
Barrier 16 Define target cell: 12 
NonBarrier 14 Define target cell: 5 
Stop 12 Select Fire: 8 
Follow 12 Select Fire: 4 
Table 4.10: Average cost of key microstrategies 
 
The Barrier strategy on average takes more cognitive steps than the NonBarrier strategy when 
issuing a CF command, but the manual actions of the NonBarrier strategy take longer. It is also 
observed that a CF issued in the construction of a barrier takes less time than a CF command 
issued outside a barrier. The reason behind this phenomenon is that the trucks involved in the 
creation of the barrier are closer to each other because the previously executed CF command 
serves as a reference point for the next block of the barrier. Also the barrier is normally 
constructed by issuing CF commands sequentially. Consequently the trucks creating the barrier 
tend to be in close proximity to the cell they will next be moved to, reducing the time needed 
for moving the mouse pointer and hence the overall time needed for executing the CF 
command. In the case of the NonBarrier strategy CF commands are more dispersed from each 
other and their execution interleaves more with the execution of DW commands, increasing 
the distance that the mouse pointer needs to travel between commands and therefore overall. 
Table 4.11 shows the action times for executing a Move command for six CF commands 
executed for a barrier and six executed when not constructing a barrier. The model 
demonstrates more variability in the cognitive and perceptual actions required for selecting 
the next section of the barrier. The amount of processing depends on the proximity of the fire, 
the location of units and the wind strength. The model also demonstrates shorter mouse 
movements and shorter times for movements executed when creating a barrier.  
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Table 4.11: Comparison of Move commands before issuing a CF command for a barrier and when not constructing 
a barrier. The time is measured in milliseconds. 
 
Executing a CF command requires more effort (i.e. there are more rules involved) than a DW 
command. This means that the Stop and Follow strategies should benefit from the effort saved 
by issuing mostly DW commands. Because a DW takes twice the time to complete compared 
to a CF, the former offers a bigger time window for using other units. The use of the DW 
command differs between the Stop and Follow strategies. DW commands issued while 
following the Stop strategy take less time than DW commands issued while following the 
Follow strategy. There is also a difference between using trucks and copters: DW commands 
issued by copters take less time than DW commands issued by trucks (section 6.2.7). The Stop 
strategy focuses on the strongest fires and therefore copters are preferable; because the 
proximity of fires targeted by the copter is closer the time relating to moving the mouse is 
minimised. Only two participants in the CT condition were able to execute Stop with success 
due to the high wind strength, the model was able to do it as well a few times. In the VT 
condition Stop is used frequently and if the wind strength is low this strategy generates 
excellent results. In general terms the experience of participants/model with the Stop strategy 
differs considerably between training groups. This is important because in the unit efficiency-
reduction testing condition using the Stop strategy may be disastrous.  
 
A frequent decision is about what to do next after a unit has been moved with the intention of 
issuing a CF or a DW command. Just after initiating the last click for issuing the movement 
command the model must decide whether it will keep its attention on the same unit or 
whether it will move attention elsewhere. In either case a positive or a negative reward will be 
awarded depending on the outcome of the command. The decision about what to do next has 
an important impact on performance, and is reflected in the way units are used. There are two 
broad ways in which units are used: either sticking to one unit or alternating between them. 
Taking as an example the creation of the barrier, if the model chooses to alternate between 
units it may start by moving both trucks in order to execute two CF commands for constructing 
the barrier. Because these two commands are executed in sequence and the speed of the 
trucks is low (comparing with copters) both units will be disabled at the same time because 
they are moving and the model may decide to wait. When the model detects that one of the 
trucks has arrived at its destination it switches attention to that unit, places the mouse over it 
and executes a CF command that will finish after two seconds. Because the model is using both 
Action NBA BA
Locate target 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.35 0.15 0.35 0.20 0.22
Store Fire Location 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Find Unit 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.08
Attend Unit (not in fire) 0.12 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
Move Cursor 0.70 0.77 0.52 0.55 0.72 0.97 0.05 0.57 0.45 0.44 0.47 0.05 0.70 0.34
Click Unit 0.30 0.37 0.37 0.33 0.34 0.39 0.20 0.40 0.34 0.36 0.38 0.44 0.35 0.35
Look Target 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.34 0.05 0.10
Attend Target 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.11 0.16 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.05 0.13 0.11
Move Mouse to Target 0.81 0.71 0.49 0.72 0.71 0.53 0.59 0.52 0.40 0.58 0.46 0.14 0.66 0.45
Total 2.42 2.51 1.98 2.28 2.37 2.55 1.44 2.05 1.75 2.19 1.88 1.66 2.35 1.83
Averages
Non-Barrier
Strategy
Barrier
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trucks, after issuing the first CF command, it then switches attention to the other truck (which 
by then has probably arrived) and issues the other CF command. If the model waits for a unit 
to arrive at its destination it will waste a certain amount of time, but the command, CF or DW, 
will be executed as soon as the unit arrives, increasing the probability of executing the 
command successfully. If the model switches its attention to other units instead of waiting, a 
waste of time is avoided if the newly attended unit is available; but the situation may arise in 
which the first unit arrives at the target location and remains idle for a while before receiving 
further commands. In such situations the probability of completing a command is reduced 
(because the fire is constantly developing). As the model interacts with the simulation it must 
make these kinds of decisions continuously and the outcome of these decisions is reflected in 
the utility values of its productions. Using many units at a time increases the number of 
cognitive and perceptual actions, but usually improves performance because waiting times are 
reduced. Unit use is governed by the competition of productions. To support this, the model 
maintains an index for each unit, so it is able to distinguish between the two copters and the 
two trucks. This index is stored in the imaginal buffer. The idea of an index for tracking 
multiple objects is taken from the FINST model (Pylyshyn, 1989).  
4.3.5 Patterns of behaviour not covered by the model  
The most important feature considered during the development of the model was how to 
enable it to adapt to the ever-changing FireChief environment. Ceteris paribus, observed 
variations in strategy are the product of the runtime selection of a particular microstrategy 
based on rule utility strength resulting from its interactions with the trial scenario. Chapter 3 
presents the hierarchy of strategies found during the analysis of the data. These strategies 
cover the most frequent patterns found in the data and it was a design decision to focus 
modelling on these patterns and as a result the model captures the most prevalent strategies 
and intentions observed. Nevertheless patterns not covered by these strategies were found. 
For instance, in several participants’ protocols it can be observed that, after the fire is under 
control, various commands are issued “randomly” at different locations in the landscape. The 
model does not exhibit this behaviour because as soon as the fire is under control the main 
goal is completed. This is an interesting behaviour that is not accounted for in the current 
model, it may be an emergent phenomenon owing to the uncertainty in the task, where spot 
fires may appear at any time.   
 
Another behaviour not reproduced by the model was executed by one of the participants on 
several occasions: a horizontal barrier, completed to the north of the original fire (see the 
sequence of CF commands, in red, issued in a straight horizontal line in Figure 4.11), affects the 
fire’s behaviour throughout all the test trials of the CT programme (when the wind changes 
direction). The fire will switch its direction first to the NE at second 80, and this barrier 
extinguishes some of the fires that start spreading with more strength in that direction. When 
the wind switches its direction to the N at second 120, more fires collide with this barrier. This 
barrier is not that effective when the wind changes to the north-west at second 160 and later 
to the west at second 200; notice that this participant finishes the trial fighting the fire at the 
north-west of the horizontal barrier. The model never produces a pattern of behaviour similar 
to the one depicted in figure 4.11, it has the knowledge to do it, but other behaviours were 
preferred instead. It seems that the participant has the goal of creating a horizontal line of CF 
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commands. It may be the case that this participant failed to discover the Barrier strategy. Why 
people show these behaviours needs further investigation. Section 6.2 discusses other topics 
that can be further explored with the model.  
 
 
Figure 4.11: Participant creating a horizontal line of CFs 
4.4  Running the model  
Each ACT-R model run is meant to be equivalent to a participant’s intervention over an entire 
sequence of training and test trials. To this end the model does not behave deterministically 
but, by being constrained by the ACT-R architecture, there is meaningful non-determinism 
(Lebiere et al., 2001). The protocols generated by the model are processed and stored in a 
database in the same fashion as those generated by participants thus allowing their analysis, 
including the generation of views (section 4.2.2). Anderson et al. (2004) argue that strong 
constraints on parameter values are necessary in order to make real predictions about 
performance. The model therefore uses the values considered as standard by the ACT-R 
research community. The most relevant parameters include the activation of subsymbolic 
computations and utility learning, and a value of 3 for the expected gain noise parameter used 
during the conflict resolution stage. Fitting the model was limited to manipulating the location 
(and size) of rewards (table 4.1).   
4.4.1 Model output 
The model is run by calling the following LISP function:  
(run-participant <identifier:string> <training-type:symbol> <testing-type:symbol>   
 <initial-trial:int> <final-trial:int> <trial-duration:int> <debugging-mode:t|nil>).  
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An example of this function’s call is: (run-participant "M01" 'C 'W 1 24 260 nil).  
 
The first parameter is the identifier for the data to be generated. The second is the type of 
training; either ‘C for constant training or ‘V for variable training. The third is the type of 
change in the environment during the testing phase; either ‘W for a change in the wind or ‘E 
for a change in unit efficiency. The fourth and fifth parameters define the starting and ending 
trial numbers respectively. The sixth parameter controls the amount of time that the model 
will be run per trial and the last parameter controls whether the model is to be run for 
debugging or not. A run of the model generates 3 files: 
1. A protocol of commands in the same format as the original FireChief simulation with 
the information about the timing, location, unit, landscape, performance and 
sequence of commands.  
2. The utility value of productions for each trial. Utility values are recorded when the trial 
is finished and are used for determining how the model is tuning its behaviour to the 
characteristics of the task as rewards are awarded. 
3. The pattern of strategy use for each trial for keeping track of which strategies are 
selected for each trial. 
 
4.4.2 Putting it all together: a close-up view of the model running 
The final cognitive model is comprised by the following features: (1) the same set of rules is 
used for all experimental groups and experimental conditions (2); a model run starts by 
explicitly selecting a strategy; (3) the model can change strategies during a trial; (4) the model 
does not acquire new strategies but the way in which the available strategies are implemented 
is variable; (5) at the end of the trial strategy selection is rewarded (section 4.2.3.2); (6) the 
mechanisms that allow a weak amount of control over action selection is described in the 
following sections 4.3.1 to 4.3.4, strategies are specified using the Strategy Specification chunk 
(4.2.1.2); (7) the model adheres to the basic cycle which produces quick and recurrent choice 
behaviour, the Intention chunk supports this feature (section 4.2.1.3); (8) there is a strong 
reliance on perceptual actions, this means that several actions are cued by the visible state of 
the simulation (section 4.2.2); (9) the model is able to suffer distractions and recover from 
them; (10) positive rewards are awarded for successfully completing commands and negative 
rewards are given for failure in the execution of commands or the wasting of time  
 
As an example of how productions compete to generate complex behaviour, Table 4.2 (a) to (f) 
presents a detailed description of the rules referenced in Figure 4.12. The context of the 
example is as follows. The model has chosen the Barrier strategy and decided to start attacking 
the fire, so the imaginal buffer registers the intention to drop water over the fire. A Decision 
Point arrives when the model decides which particular way of attacking the fire will be 
followed. Because the model is following the Barrier strategy the possible ways of attacking 
the fire are constrained. At this point the model chooses to attack the most threatening fires 
located at the front of the fire (the east). The model locates one of these frontal fires by 
making a search of the landscape or by retrieving a stored chunk created during the initial 
assessment of the situation. The next step is to select a unit for attacking the fire: the model 
selects a copter. When the copter is found a series of motor commands are performed for 
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moving the copter to the desired fire. When the last manual action for the movement is 
finished the copter initiates its movement towards the fire and the unit is disabled for some 
time generating a new Decision Point to decide between waiting for that unit to finish its 
movement, attacking another fire with another unit to pursue a different intention. In this 
example the model decides to start a barrier of Control Fires to the east of the fire. This 
mixture of dropping water while the barrier is created is well rewarded: by attacking the most 
advanced fires with copters precious time is gained and that allows the model to finish a 
barrier. In the example shown below the model has just started a Move command for one of 
the trucks so the FireChief simulation has disabled that unit. The other truck is ready to receive 
commands.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.12: The FireChief cognitive model running six cycles 
 
Figure 4.12 shows the firing of 6 rules. In step 1 the model must choose between waiting for 
the truck that has been recently moved and using the other truck. In this step the utility values 
of productions 1-A and 1-B are compared and the one with the highest utility value is fired. In 
this example rule 1-A is fired so the model waits for the truck to arrive at its destination. After 
the model decides to wait it searches for a visual-location that satisfies the specific set of 
constraints specified by rule 2-A and the result of this search determines step 3. During this 
wait the model enters a loop between rules 3-A and 1-A: the model decides to wait, senses the 
environment and finds that the truck has not finished its movement, each time this occurs a 
negative feedback is received, this feedback reduces the utility of production 1-A. therefore, if 
the movement takes long enough, rule 1-B would eventually win the competition over rule 1-
A. Eventually the truck arrives at its destination and therefore the rule 3-B is fired, the arrival 
of the truck triggers a positive reward that increases the utility of production 1-A. In this 
example although the utility of production 1-A is reduced production 1-B is never fired. The 
model’s attention is shifted to the current location of the truck which is now ready to execute 
a CF command. The visual buffer is now loaded with a chunk representing the content of the 
Rule 1 - A : wait for 
the  truck to move 
Rule 1 - B : switch to 
the  other truck Step 1: determine unit use 
Rule 2 - A : get visual -
location Step 2: search visual element 
Rule 3 - B : truck 
has  finished movement  
Step 3: check if the truck has  
arrived/move attention 
Rule 3 - A : truck has not  
finished its movement 
Step 4: check status of truck Rule 4 - A : move 
mouse  pointer to truck 
Rule 4 - C : distraction  
detected 
Step 5: issue a Control Fire Rule 5 - A : execute 
a  Control Fire 
(successful) 
Rule 5 - B : execute a Control  
Fire (unsuccessful) 
Step 6: detect alarm Rule 6 - A
:  
detect alarm 
Rule 4 - B : fire detected 
Rule 6 - B : ignore alarm 
Rule 5 - C :   detect fire 
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cell, that is, the model knows the type of terrain and that there is truck there. In step 4 it is 
important to verify that the chunk in the visual buffer is not un-requested (see the explanation 
of rule 4-C in table 4.2, subsection d). If the visual element encoded in the visual buffer is a 
product of an explicit shift of attention, as in the case of this example, then a mouse 
movement is initiated towards the attended cell (provided the cell is not on fire; otherwise 
rule 4-B would fire). In step 5, after the mouse movement is completed, the CF command is 
initiated by pressing a key. In the normal flow of events the CF command would start after the 
click of the key is completed and after two seconds the CF command would be completed. In 
the example here there is a different outcome: just after rule 5-A fires the target cell catches 
fire preventing the execution of a CF command. The result is that when the click of the key 
occurs after around 350 milliseconds, instead of starting a CF command the simulation 
generates an alarm. Because the CF command was not successfully executed a negative 
reward is given. This negative reward affects the utility of all the productions that fired after 
the last reward (1A, 2A, 3B, 4A, and 5B) where some of these productions are key (section 
4.2.3). At this point the model can detect the alarm and, making use of the contents of the 
imaginal buffer, can select a course of action. In this example there is competition of 
productions in steps 1, 5 and 6 (these are decision points). In step 1 the only source of 
knowledge for the model in making a decision is the previous experience of the model in the 
same situation. The recorded utility of the winning rule is modified according to the feedback. 
In this example production 1-A receives negative feedback for waiting and a positive feedback 
when the truck arrives. Step 3 and step 4 are driven by perceptual actions that are querying 
the state of the simulation. Step 5 is mainly driven by the simulation (rules 5A and 5B) which 
controls the execution of commands, but a rule that checks whether the cell caught fire just 
before executing the command (rule 5C) may be fired and therefore the CF command is not 
attempted. In step 6 the model compares utility values to decide whether to attend to the 
alarm or not. As explained in section 4.4.4 not all alarms are processed by the model. 
Sometimes the tone is detected after the firing of many productions has changed the state of 
the imaginal buffer so that by the time the alarm is detected the model is unable to identify 
the source of the alarm.  
 
There are external factors that increase the complexity of pattern matching. For example rules 
5-A and 5-B are activated by the same patterns in the ACT-R buffers but also take into account 
the presence of fire in the cell which is not queried by inspecting the buffers but by inspecting 
the simulation’s state. In both rules the model issues a key-press but the resulting behaviour is 
different: in rule 5-A a CF command is issued while in 5-B an alarm is emitted. This kind of 
situation occurs frequently during the running of the model due to the dynamic nature of the 
FireChief task. If the model is successful in stopping the fire it can wait until the trial ends (the 
trial lasts 260 seconds) and will receive a number representing its final performance; if this 
number is high the utility of using the Barrier strategy (the only strategic rule that is affected is 
the one that selected the Barrier strategy, see section 4.2.3.2) is increased, increasing the 
chance of selecting the Barrier strategy in the next trial.  
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4.5 Summary 
A considerable amount of LISP code is required for displaying and controlling the FireChief 
task, and for allowing the interaction between ACT-R and FireChief (this was the most difficult 
part of the model to implement from a technical point of view). As predicted by St. Amant, 
Freed, & Ritter (2005) the FireChief model re-uses similar sets of rules in many places. A logical 
structure to the rules was enforced throughout the development of the model. Rules are 
grouped by functionality and scope (see figure 4.7) making it possible to reuse parts of its code 
in tasks that present similar characteristics. To keep track of the large set of productions, 
around 900, is a major difficulty. Some coding standards were followed, the naming of 
productions rules being the most important. These names are unambiguous and large enough 
to group (according to functionality) and discriminate rules.  
 
Among other topics this chapter described the design considerations embedded into the 
model (section 4.2), the micro strategies implemented in the model (section 4.3) and provides 
detailed examples of the rules used by the model (sections 4.2.4 and 4.4.2). The model 
continuously interleaves cognitive with perceptual-motor operations, selects different 
strategies and implement them according to the reward structure of the task. In making a 
decision about how to use a unit (the most important resource) the model can either follow a 
plan (follow a less perception-intensive approach) or seek more information from the 
environment. In the second case the model needs to determine how much information will be 
gathered before making a decision. As the model interacts with the FireChief task it learns to 
make these kinds of decision based on the rewards it receives from the environment. The 
FireChief model is able to deal with a complex, dynamic task by following a coherent set of 
principles that can be extended to other domains (this is discussed in chapter 7). By providing a 
loose strategy definition the model is able to implement by itself complex patterns of 
behaviour which in turn are able to successfully stop the fire while replicating many aspects of 
the data. The following chapter presents the results obtained by running the model and 
evaluates how well it captures the interactions observed in the participant data. 
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5 Results 
The ultimate objective of this research endeavour is to increase our understanding of strategy 
use in dynamic tasks: how strategies develop and are selected, improved and changed. 
Chapter 4 described how the cognitive model works; the objective of this chapter is to show 
how well the model was able to replicate the empirical data. A particularly relevant section of 
this chapter describes how the procedural knowledge embedded into the model, governed by 
a set of utility values, was tuned to the task by the continuous interaction of the model with 
the simulation and, among other things, how the different training programmes mediate this 
process. As was mentioned in the previous chapter, knowledge about how to execute actions 
is provided to the cognitive model, but the exact emergence of strategies is a product of the 
interaction between the problem solver and the environment. This chapter presents the 
comparison between the data obtained by running the model and data obtained from 
participants (presented in chapter 3). The intention of comparing these two sets of data is to 
demonstrate that the model was able to capture various aspects of participant behaviour. This 
chapter also presents insights regarding the research questions posed in chapter 2.  
 
This chapter starts by describing how data was generated and how the model’s quality of fit 
(QOF) with the data was determined. In the following section results are presented using the 
criteria introduced in chapter 3 (section 3.4). This section starts with a description of strategy 
use in the different experimental conditions and continues with a discussion about command 
executions, timings (latencies) and adaptivity issues. In section 5.3 results are examined in 
relation to the topics of interest: strategy use, the existence of cognitive inflexibility, how 
actions are selected, and how the model copes with the cognitive demands of a complex 
dynamic microworld. The last section presents a view of a good performer based on what was 
learnt with the model.  
5.1  Generating model data  
The model generated the same kind of data as participants whilst providing a detailed trace of 
the operations being executed inside its various modules. By combining the information 
provided by the different ACT-R modules with the knowledge obtained during the analysis of 
the FireChief task, explanations related to the use of strategies were constructed.  
 
 
 Participants Model 
CTW 8 10 
CTE 9 9 
VTW 6 8 
VTE 9 10 
 
Table 5.1: Number of participants and model-runs in the different experimental groups 
Table 5.1 shows the number of participants and model runs for each experimental group. Each 
model run is carried out using the same set of rules and ACT-R parameters values; the 
136 
 
variability obtained is a product of particular paths of actions followed during each run that 
reflect different rewards from the environment and the runtime stochastic component of ACT-
R. A full model run lasts 6,240 seconds (24 sessions of 260 seconds). 
5.2  Assessing the QOF 
A common way of determining the QOF of a model is by using performance and latency 
comparisons (Lebiere et al., 2001). Kiefer & Urbas (2006) used the average number of patterns 
completed per minute and the average reaction time in ms. per pattern. Veksler, Gray, & 
Schoelles (2007) using the Table Decision task (section 2.2.3.4) considered three measures of 
performance: the average trial duration, the number of mouse clicks in the different cells and 
the inter-cell click interval (the time spent between cell clicks). In the model of Lee & Taatgen 
(2002) the model was compared at three levels: score per trial, time per unit task, and 
individual keystrokes. The CMU-ASP model (Taatgen, 2005) was evaluated by considering the 
number of aircraft successfully classified in each scenario, and the average time per scenario to 
perform each one of the three subtasks (select an aircraft, classify an aircraft and enter the 
classification). In the model of Peebles & Bothell (2004) of the RT task, the mean number of 
responses and the mean response time were used for comparing the quality of fit. Jones, Ritter 
& Wood (2000) identified nine measures of behaviour in the Tower task (section 6.1.3.1). They 
argue that using a variety of measures provides a more detailed match. Two of these measures 
are the time taken to complete the tower and the number of constructions made in 
completing it. Jones et al. (2000) used aggregated data for determining the QOF: they 
compared the aggregated data from 10 runs of the model with the performance of 5 
participants. All the metrics are obtained by trial and can be averaged over training 
programme, participant, or test condition. To show the QOF modellers are accustomed to 
presenting a graph comparing the data from participants and the model and showing that the 
tendency is captured (Taatgen, 2005); this practice is used throughout the chapter. 
 
In the following sections correlation data is provided to demonstrate the QOF; nevertheless, 
given that microworlds do not allow full experimental control (section 2.3.5), there are several 
section where the existence of meaningful interactions for both participants and the model are 
demonstrated instead by using ANOVA tests.  
5.2.1 General performance 
The first paragraph in section 2.3.1.5 describes how performance in measured in FireChief.  
5.2.1.1 Training phase 
Considering performance in the training phase the value the QOF is good (r2=.907, 
RMSD=.0773). To assess the impact of practice, data extracted from the model for CT 
performance for the first four trials was compared with performance for the last four trials. A 
one-tailed one-way within-subjects ANOVA was performed to determine whether there was a 
significant learning effect, the data are approximately normally distributed and the 
discrepancies are not too wide in the data generated by the different groups of trials. Results 
show that, as in the case with the human data (see section 3.4.4), there is a significant effect of 
learning (F(1,38)=4.41, p<.05). Figure 5.1 shows the average performance for participants and 
the model. The model offers an explicit explanation of how this improvement in performance 
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is achieved, by means of better strategy selection based on the feedback provided at the end 
of the trial, sensitivity to wind strength, and a better implementation of strategies as a 
consequence of tuning the utility of productions to the CT trial. Figure 5.2 shows the data for 
the VT; as in the case of the human data, there is a significant interaction between task 
complexity and performance in the data generated by the model in the VT programme (F(1, 
34) = 4668.1, p<.001).  
 
 
Figure 5.1: Performance comparison by trials in the CT 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Performance comparison by trials in the VT 
 
5.2.1.2 Testing phase 
Table 5.2 shows the performance comparison for the test phase. Performance differences in 
the VTW condition are a result of the model’s lack of ability to execute the Stop strategy with 
the same success as participants. The model also shows lower performance than participants 
in the CTE condition. In general terms the model has a preference for the Barrier strategy 
when the wind changes direction while participants choose both Barrier and Stop strategies. 
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Both participants and the model learn to use the Barrier strategy when appliance efficiency is 
reduced. Learning effects during the test phase were not studied as the topic of interest was 
cognitive inflexibility which is further discussed in sections 5.2.2.3 and 6.1.2.4. As this research 
is primarily concerned with strategy use and its implications for performance in dynamic 
situations strategy use and its relation with performance is discussed in the following sections, 
including how strategies change within trials.  
 
Testing Phase 
  Participants Model 
CTW 78.81 79.44 
CTE 78.70 74.03 
VTW 83.61 78.28 
VTE 76.13 70.58 
 
Table 5.2: Comparison during testing phase 
5.2.2 Strategy use: performance and frequency 
Table 5.3 shows the comparison of human study data with the model data for performance 
(top) and frequency (bottom) of the four strategies at the aggregate level. Because the 
modelled data present high variability, metric averages are used for establishing the QOF; 
other researchers have used a similar approach (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998).  
 
PERFORMANCE 
       Training CT VT 
      Data Model Data Model 
    Barrier 81.225 *80.865 75.625 *75.69 
    NonBarrier 73.445 *71.54 58.115 83.22 
    Stop 92.995 70.48 94.345 *83.68 
    Follow 63.6 *65.845 57.96 84.665 
    
   
(a) 
     
         
Test CTW CTE VTW VTE 
  Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model 
Barrier 79.21 *78.24 86.53 *76.64 81.67 *79.43 80.95 *71.71 
NonBarrier 63.56 71.28 72.74 64.63 74.21 *70.57 60.41 *65.2 
Stop 81.89 *81.15 0 0 89.78 *83.27 48.95 *59.76 
Follow 73.29 78.53 46.4 67.45 66.09 75.01 65.67 0 
 
  
  (b) 
     
         
         
         
FREQUENCY         
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Training CT VT 
      Data Model Data Model 
    Barrier 0.655 *0.55 0.29 *0.3 
    NonBarrier 0.175 *0.2 0.18 *0.195 
    Stop 0.065 0.16 0.42 *0.425 
    Follow 0.11 *0.095 0.11 *0.085 
    
   
(c) 
     
         
Test CTW CTE VTW VTE 
  Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model 
Barrier 0.59 *0.69 0.77 *0.86 0.34 0.52 0.72 *0.71 
NonBarrier 0.15 0.06 0.16 *0.13 0.11 *0.13 0.16 *0.16 
Stop 0.15 0.1 0 0 0.48 0.25 0.04 0.13 
Follow 0.11 *0.15 0.07 0.01 0.07 *0.11 0.07 0 
   
(d) 
     
Table 5.3: Performance in the training (a) and test (b) phases and frequency in the training (c) and test (d) phases 
considering strategy use. An asterisk represents good correlation. 
5.2.2.1 Constant Training condition  
Considering participant data for the training phase, a two-tailed one-way within-subjects 
ANOVA revealed that there is a significant interaction between strategy use and performance 
in the CT (F(3, 260)=52.75, p<.001) and in the VT (F(3,218)=84.48, p<.001). In the same way, 
considering the data generated with the model, there is a significant interaction between 
strategy use and performance in the CT (F(3,300)=24.23, p<.001) and in the VT  (F(3,284)=3.31, 
p<.05). This result means that strategy use has a significant impact on performance during the 
training phase and that this interaction is captured by the model. This is particularly relevant as 
this study is mainly interested in strategy use. If performance of the few trials were the Stop 
strategy was successfully implemented in the CT condition is not taken into account, the QOF 
of the model for the training phase is good (r2=.975, RMSD=1.88). Participants have a 
preference for using the Barrier strategy as this strategy usually generates good performance 
and the model successfully captures this tendency both in frequency and performance level. 
The NonBarrier strategy occupies second place considering frequency and again the model 
captures this tendency. Albeit not used frequently, the Follow strategy is the worst strategy for 
both the model and participants. Finally, the Stop strategy is seldom used in this condition and 
participants implement this strategy more successfully as two of them were able to implement 
the Stop strategy in such a fashion that the fire was stopped without using CF commands in 
various CT trials. These two participants were not deemed as outliers because they adapted 
their strategies during the testing phase. It is worth mentioning that the model is able to 
replicate this behaviour by exerting a high amount of control over the way actions are 
executed but, left to itself, the model does not have enough time to learn an adequate 
sequence of actions because its early attempts at using the Stop strategy will lead to poor 
performance and hence to rejection of the strategy. In other words, the tenacity to hang on to 
a preferred strategy (such as Stop) even under adverse conditions (the CT programme) is not 
captured by the model.  
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5.2.2.2 Variable Training condition 
Considering the VT programme the amount of times the Follow strategy is used is very low: 
11% for participants and 8.5 % for the model (see table 5.3 (c)). Participants achieve better 
performance than the model as some participants selected the Follow strategy in very easy 
trials. The model is not able to capture the low performance obtained by participants when 
executing the NonBarrier strategy. Considering the most structured strategies, Stop and 
Barrier, the correlation between the model and the data is good (r2=.987, RMSD=5.37). The 
high performance obtained by the model using the NonBarrier strategy can be explained by 
differences in the complexity of trials: if the model chooses to execute the NonBarrier strategy 
in a very easy trial (such as trials 2, 6, 8 or 12) it will obtain good performance. The fit of the 
model to how the other strategies are executed is quite good: the RMSD for the Barrier 
strategy is .18. Table 5.3 also shows the frequency of strategy execution. Note that during the 
CT the Stop strategy is executed a few times whilst the Barrier strategy is the most popular; for 
this reason the overall fit of the model remains high regardless if its lack of ability to perform 
the Stop strategy as well as participants. Considering all strategies the RMSD is high: 16.06. If 
we obtain the RMSD for the most structured strategies Stop and Barrier the result is 5.3 and if 
we get the RMSD for the Barrier strategy the result is 0.315. This result shows that the model is 
accurate when executing structured strategies under the VT programme training conditions.  
 
At this point is possible to identify a couple of strategy interactions involving the most 
structured strategies that will be relevant during the testing phase. (1) The Barrier strategy 
does not yield the same level of performance as in the CT programme: it is reduced by 7% on 
average for both participants and the model; and (2) the Stop strategy is implemented with 
high success and both the model and participants use it more frequently than in the CT 
condition: 42% and 42.5% respectively. The second interaction can occur because, in contrast 
with the CT condition, the VT condition allows the successful implementation of the Stop 
strategy in several trials.  
5.2.2.3 Testing phase condition 
Considering the human data in the testing phase, a two-tailed one-way within-subjects ANOVA 
revealed that there is a significant interaction between strategy use and performance in the 
CTW group (F(3,42)=3.812, p<.05), in the CTE group (F(2,67)=21.796, p<.001), in the VTW 
group (F(3,40)=12.361, p<.001), and in the VTE group (F(3,65)=11.002, p<.001). This means 
that the strategy selection has a significant impact on performance also during the testing 
phase. Considering the data generated with the model, there is no significant interaction 
between strategy use and performance in the CTW group (F(3,76)=1.835, p=.148), but the CTE 
group shows a significant difference (F(1,70)=3.425, p<.05) between the use of the Barrier 
strategy and the other strategies. There is a significant difference in the VTW group 
(F(3,60)=4.500, p<.05), and in the VTE group (F(2,77)=9.234, p<.001). The fit of the model for 
the testing phase is good (r2=.926, RMSD=8.1). As the topic of interest during the testing phase 
is cognitive inflexibility specific comments related to this phenomenon are discussed in the 
following subsections.  
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5.2.2.3.1 Condition CTW 
It is noticeable that both the model and participants have a preference for using the Barrier 
strategy at the moment in which the wind changes direction. Nevertheless the most 
interesting effect is how the use of the CF command is disrupted as a consequence of wind 
direction changes. The model is able to capture how performance decreases between trials 16 
and 17 for strategies that use CF commands (R2= 0.796). Although it is harder to implement the 
Barrier and NonBarrier strategies both participants and the model keep using them. This is 
considered evidence of cognitive inflexibility as the Stop strategy is more suitable for dealing 
with a change in wind direction. To create a barrier it is compulsory to know the direction in 
which the fire is going to develop, and this information is not known when wind changes 
direction so often.   
5.2.2.3.2 Condition CTE 
The most interesting interaction related to cognitive inflexibility in this experimental condition 
is how participants that learnt how to use the Barrier strategy during the training phase are 
not affected by this environmental change. A one-tailed one-way within-subjects ANOVA was 
performed to determine whether there was a significant performance difference in using the 
Barrier strategy between the 16th and 17th trial and the result is that for both participants and 
the model there is no significant difference (participants F(1,7)=0.45, p=.45; and for model 
(F(1,7)=1.3 p=.33). Using a strategy different from Barrier results in poor performance due to 
the fact that DW commands prove less effective in this experimental condition. The data in 
table 5.3 (d) shows that Only-DW strategies are almost abandoned by the CTE group during 
testing. This phenomenon can be explained by two mechanisms. (1) Participants in the CT 
group are well trained in the creation of barriers during training so presumably they will try to 
create a barrier when the 17th trial starts (unbeknownst to them that the efficiency of their 
appliances has been reduced). As far as these participants are concerned, the creation of the 
barrier may stop the development of the fire and, when they notice that DW commands are 
less effective, only then would they try to use DW commands in a different fashion; but the 
fire would in any case be halted by the barrier. In this particular circumstance being inflexible 
in strategy use obtains good results. (2) When participants try to execute a DW command over 
a strong fire, they will receive an alarm and the DW won’t be completed; eventually 
participants must start issuing CF commands in order to stop the fire. 
5.2.2.3.3 Condition VTW 
The most important interaction related to cognitive inflexibility is that, when wind changes 
direction, both participants and the model that underwent the VT should execute the Stop 
strategy more frequently than their counterparts in the CTW condition. By comparing 
conditions CTW and VTW it is possible to see that the frequency of use of the Stop strategy is 
higher in the VTW condition for both participants and the model (see table 5.3-d). A one-tailed 
one-way between-subjects ANOVA was carried out to test whether using the Stop strategy in 
the 17th trial by VTW participants results in significant better performance that using Barrier in 
the same trial by CTW participants. The results shows that both for participants (F(1,15)=14.62 
p<.05) and the model (F(1,15)=8.35 p<.05) better performance is obtained by implementing 
the Stop strategy when wind changes direction. The result is that the VTW group performs 
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better than the CTW group and therefore there is a proven advantage of being flexible when 
wind changes direction.  
5.2.2.3.4 Condition VTE 
Both participants and the model have a significant preference for the Stop strategy during the 
training phase but are able to switch to the more successful Barrier strategy when a change in 
the environment takes place (remember that Only-DW strategies do not work in this 
condition). What is relevant to the cognitive inflexibility phenomenon is to determine whether 
participants in the CTE group show better performance using the Barrier strategy than the 
ones in the VTE group. A one-tailed one-way between-subjects ANOVA was carried out to test 
whether performance using the Barrier strategy is better for participants in the CTE group 
during the first four trials of the test phase in comparison to participants in the VTE group. The 
first four trials were selected as performance becomes stable for the VTE group after the fifth 
test trial. Results show that performance using the Barrier strategy is better in the CTE 
compared to the VTE both for participants (F(1,7) = 6.96 p>.05) and the model (F(1,7)=10.4, 
p>.05). The model provides an explanation of this phenomenon in terms of strategy 
consolidation (see section 6.1.2.2).  
5.2.2.4 Within-trial strategy change  
 
  Participants Model 
Group Training Testing Overall Training Testing Overall 
CTW 6.00 4.88 10.88 4.90 1.90 6.80 
CTE 6.33 2.44 8.78 5.22 1.56 6.78 
VTW 11.67 3.00 14.67 7.25 2.63 9.88 
VTE 11.44 3.78 15.22 7.40 1.90 9.30 
Table 5.4: frequency of within-trial strategy change 
 
Within-trial strategy change refers to the number of times a strategy is changed during the two 
phases of the experiment. Table 5.4 shows the average number of times participants and the 
model change strategy during the training and testing phases (r2=.93 RMSD=1.43). Overall, in 
the training phase participants change strategies 6.2 times in the CT programme while the 
model changes strategies 5.1 times. In the VT programme participants change strategies 11.55 
while the model changes strategies 7.3 times (The RMSD for the training phase is 1.56 and the 
RMSD for the test phase is .99). There is a significant difference in the frequency of strategy 
change both for participants (F(1,30) = 35.692, p<.001) and the model (F(1,35)=19.354, 
p<.001). Nevertheless participants change strategy with more frequency than the model, 
particularly in the VT programme. Both participants and the model change strategy more often 
in the CTW condition in comparison with the CTE condition. Nevertheless the model changes 
strategy with higher frequency in the VTW condition. This last result is also an indication that 
the model is having problems dealing with changes in wind direction.  
5.2.3 A closer look at strategy use: command use 
Strategy execution depends upon how commands are issued. As previously mentioned the lack 
of full experimental control makes it impossible to deliver the same experimental conditions 
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for all participants/model runs. For this reason, rather than providing an analysis based on 
command frequency, results focused on functional interactions between command use, 
strategy execution and task performance are given instead. The objective of this section is to 
demonstrate how the model is able to capture participants’ behaviour at the level of command 
use. This section is relevant as there are aspects of the data that are masked when strategy use 
is considered only. For instance, a one-tailed one-way between-subjects ANOVA was carried 
out to test whether there is a significant performance difference between the CTE and VTE 
groups when implementing the Barrier strategy during training. The result was that there is no 
significant difference between conditions for participants (F(1,102)=1.067, p=.304) and the 
model (F(1,117)=.386, p=.536). Nevertheless, by analysing the utility of productions, it can be 
observed that the CT and the VT conditions generate a different set of utility values in 
productions by the end of the training, and these different sets represent different ways of 
implementing the Barrier strategy (section 5.1.2.3). This is the kind of insight provided in this 
section.  
 
The model is able to replicate the pattern of command use frequency in the CT programme 
(r2=.98 RMSD=5.04) and in the VT programme (r2=.94 RMSD=8.02). The most notable 
difference in the pattern of command use during training is that the execution of the Stop 
strategy for the VT involves a lower number of DW commands in comparison to the CT for 
both participants and the model, a phenomenon related to the second interaction described in 
section 5.2.2.2. During the test phase, for the CTW test condition, the model uses fewer 
commands than participants (as participants perform more repetitions of commands) but it 
captures the tendency of the data (r2=.975 RMSD=5.67). The tendency of the data is also 
captured in the VTW group (r2=.982 RMSD=6.3). Participants in the CTE group during the test 
phase use more commands than the model (r2=.982 RMSD=9.09). This can be an indication of 
the difficulty associated with dealing with a reduction in the efficiency of appliances. Because 
DW commands are executed mainly by copters, the ‘chaos’ generated by this change in the 
environment is associated more with the use of copters than with trucks. Finally the model 
also captures the pattern of command use for group VTE (r2=.949 RMSD=12.49). The most 
relevant finding provided by the use of transition matrices is that the pattern of command 
transitions for the Barrier strategy is the same in the CT and VT programmes for both 
participants and the model. This means that the consolidation of the Barrier strategy is mainly 
related to the spatial distribution of commands rather than to the transition between 
commands (see section 5.1.2.3). Now that the QOF of the model in relation to overall 
command use frequency has been summarized it is time to explore the most relevant findings.   
5.2.3.1 Latency of the Control Fire command: Barrier vs. NonBarrier  
Table 5.5 shows the latencies related to CF command use (only successful CF are considered) 
for participants and the model, distinguishing between the Barrier strategy “BA” and the 
NonBarrier strategy “NBA”. Overall the model is able to replicate the tendency observed in the 
empirical data (CT condition r2= .997 RMSD=.61, VT condition r2=.837 RMSD=1.1, CTW group 
r2=.919 RMSD=1.7, VTW group r2=.952 RMSD=.59, CTE group r2=.895 RMSD=.63 and VTE group 
r2=.898 RMSD=.65).  
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  CT VT CTW 
Type Data Model Data Model Data Model 
BA/barr 7.7 4.0 8.4 4.5 6.6 4.0 
NBA/barr 8.4 4.7 9.5 4.1 6.6 5.0 
BA/-barr 11.4 6.7 13.5 6.6 12.3 6.3 
NBA/-barr 12.2 7.1 12.0 7.5 12.0 7.0 
       
  VTW CTE VTE 
Type Data Model Data Model Data Model 
BA/barr 7.8 3.9 7.1 3.9 7.6 4.2 
NBA/barr 6.8 3.8 7.4 5.4 8.6 3.8 
BA/-barr 9.7 6.5 9.4 5.9 10.9 6.4 
NBA/-barr 11.4 6.9 10.4 6.8 10.7 7.4 
Table 5.5: Mean duration of CF commands (BA = Barrier, NBA = NonBarrier, the second term in type indicates if 
the CF belongs to a barrier or not, so BA/barr refers to CF issued under the Barrier strategy which are part of the 
barrier). 
 
Considering all trials, both model and human study (section 3.4.5.2), there is a significant 
difference in latency between the execution of a CF belonging to a barrier than in a CF that 
does not belong to a barrier (F(1,737)=200.373, p<.001). In the CT condition, for both the 
human study and the model, a CF command take the least time when it belongs to a barrier 
and is executed under the Barrier strategy and takes the longest time when it does not belong 
to a barrier and is executed under the NonBarrier strategy. The model is able to capture this 
tendency, but falls short regarding absolute times, that is, the model is always faster than 
participants. The human data in the VT condition shows a similar pattern. During the test 
phase the latency of CF commands issued by participants that do not belong to a barrier are 
longer than those that do belong to a barrier in all conditions, and the same was observed in 
the model. As mentioned before a key factor is that the mouse pointer has to be moved longer 
distances for CF commands that do not belong to a barrier, but latency differences are also a 
result of the different cognitive and perceptual actions involved in adding a segment to a 
barrier in comparison to placing an isolated CF, particularly the fact that the model tends to 
keep its attention on the unit that is going to execute the CF commands when a barrier is being 
constructed.  
5.2.3.2 Latency of the Drop Water command: copters vs. trucks 
Only completed DW commands are used for comparing command duration. In table 5.6 the 
Only-DW strategies Stop and Follow are considered. Overall the model is able to replicate the 
tendency observed in the empirical data (CT condition r2=.179 RMSD=.77, VT condition r2=.892 
RMSD=.73, CTW group r2=.96 RMSD=.58, VTW group r2=.883 RMSD=.1.8, CTE group r2=.999 
RMSD=.95, the model never executed the follow strategy in the VTE condition so no QOF of 
data was obtained). Note that the highest RMSD was obtained for the VTE test condition 
mainly due to the fact that the model never executed the Follow strategy during the test phase 
whilst participants executed this strategy 5 times. There is a significant difference between a 
DW command issued by a copter and a DW command issued by a truck, regardless of the 
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strategy used. In general terms it takes less time for participants and the model to start a DW 
command if a copter is used. These differences in time are related to different ways in which 
units are used. Because copters are able to extinguish fires of higher intensity it is a good 
practice to use them to drop water over stronger fires.  
 
CT Participant Model  VTW Participant Model 
 Stop Follow Stop Follow   Stop Follow Stop Follow 
Truck 6.75 7.5 7.89 8.29  Truck 8 9.3 7.66 7.66 
Copter 5.03125 6.63158 5.76 5.76  Copter 5.7 6.7 6.10 5.94 
           
VT Participant Model  CTE Participant Model 
 Stop Follow Stop Follow   Stop Follow Stop Follow 
Truck 9.17442 10.24 8.46 8.46  Truck 0 7.2 0.00 11.67 
Copter 7.77907 7.16 6.59 6.96  Copter 0 4.8 0.00 7.44 
           
CTW Participant Model  VTE Participant Model 
 Stop Follow Stop Follow   Stop Follow Stop Follow 
Truck 9 9 7.37 7.30  Truck 4 8.6 8.48 0.00 
Copter 5.6 6 6.14 5.77  Copter 5.7 6 7.17 0.00 
Table 5.6: Mean duration of DW commands 
 
Because the location of stronger fires is contingent upon the direction in which the wind is 
blowing these fires tend to create clusters. In this way copters used when executing either the 
Stop or Follow strategies are usually close to each other: they operate in the area currently 
occupied by the fire-front. On the other hand, trucks attacking the fire have a bigger operation 
area, which can explain why it takes longer to initiate DW commands with this kind of unit. The 
fact that the model was able to replicate the latencies observed in human data suggests that 
strategies are well captured by the model. The model is also able to capture the increment in 
the time required to execute a DW command between the VT and CT conditions observed in 
the human data. This increment is caused by the hardest VT trials, where fast fire development 
tends to cause a wider dispersion of units. As observed in the empirical data, the model shows 
a significant difference between using trucks and copters to execute DW commands: DW 
commands issued by copters take less time than DW commands issued by trucks 
(F(1,888)=27.02 p<.001). This result demonstrates that both participants and the model are 
using copters and trucks a similar fashion. The CTE and VTE conditions are not discussed 
because the majority of DW commands are cancelled due to the reduction in the efficiency of 
appliances and there is therefore insufficient data for comparison.  
 
Table 5.7 shows the utility of productions related to attacking the fire after training is 
completed. Section 4.2.3 describes how the utility of productions can be used to understand 
the model’s behaviour. Subsection 9 in section 4.3.1 describes the three modes of attacking 
the fire. In both training conditions the model has a low preference for attacking weak fires, 
but under the CT condition this aversion is higher: due to the high wind strength the model 
should attack weak fires only if the strong ones are under control; on the other hand easy trials 
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in the VT programme allow the model to attack weak fires without high risk. In both training 
conditions the model found that attacking strong fires is rewarded.  
 Trials 
Attack fire 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Attack Strong CT 0.67 0.85 0.21 1.15 1.24 -0.96 0.18 -0.17 -0.59 0.39 1.17 -1.72 0.81 0.83 1.07 0.94 
Attack Strong VT 1.11 1.15 0.34 0.78 1.37 1.18 0.67 -0.16 0.71 2.06 2.83 1.37 1.29 0.21 0.62 0.45 
Attack Strongest CT 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.23 0.23 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.44 0.46 0.49 -1.36 -1.36 -1.36 -1.36 -1.36 
Attack Strongest VT 0.25 0.27 0.28 0.37 0.37 0.40 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.76 0.70 0.61 0.60 
Attack Weak CT 0.00 0.33 0.37 -0.54 0.65 0.77 0.84 1.08 0.07 -0.18 -2.27 -2.27 -1.38 -1.43 -2.46 -2.29 
Attack Weak VT -0.52 -0.52 -0.60 -0.60 -0.60 0.02 0.50 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 -0.37 -0.37 -0.04 -0.09 
Table 5.7: Utility values associated with attacking fire 
 
The most interesting difference related to the use of the DW command comes from attacking 
the strongest fires: under the VT condition this behaviour is considered useful while in the CT 
condition there is an aversion to this way of attacking the fire. This is a consequence of the lack 
of use of the Stop strategy in the CT condition (because the strongest fires exceed the capacity 
of the fire-fighting units) and the good feedback that the model receives when using the Stop 
strategy in the VT condition (due to the existence of easy trials). This is also an indication of the 
lack of practice of the Stop strategy by the model in the CT condition. 
5.2.3.3 Use of the Move command: strategy consolidation 
A closer analysis of the use of the Move command reveals an interesting interaction related to 
strategy consolidation. A one-tailed one-way between-subjects ANOVA was performed to 
determine whether there are more short movements (of length equal to one cell, see section 
3.4.5.4) when executing the Barrier strategy in the CT in comparison to the VT. The result show 
that this is the case both for participants (F(1,30)=14.88 p<.001) and the model (F(1,30)= 13.05 
p<.001). When participants and the model consolidate the Barrier strategy they are able to 
create a barrier efficiently; this means that participants tend to issue CF commands in close 
proximity to each other, and the shortest distance between two cells is the length of one cell. 
Section 3.4.4 shows how better performance during the Test phase is obtained when the 
Barrier strategy is consolidated and section 6.1.2.3 explores the consolidation of the Barrier 
strategy in detail.  
5.2.3.4 Move and Control Fire interaction 
 
  Participant Model 
CF in Barrier 13.12 15.17 
CF not in Barrier 16.57 16.24 
First CF Barrier cell 20.86 22.01 
Table 5.8: Comparison of types of moves 
 
Table 5.11 shows the average time required for executing a Move command before issuing a 
CF command (based on whether a CF belongs to a barrier, does not belong to a barrier, or 
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starts a barrier) following the Barrier strategy. The model captures the tendency discussed in 
section 3.4.5.2: CF commands issued in cells outside the barrier take more time that CF 
commands issued for a barrier. The second important tendency observed in the data is that 
the time required to execute the very first movement before issuing a CF for a barrier requires 
more time than the other types of movements (participants, F(415,2)= 28.03, p<0.001; model, 
F(562,2)= 109.08, p<-001). Chapter 4 (section 4.2.4.2) describes the different processes that 
are executed before issuing the first CF of a barrier.  
5.2.4 Evidence of adaptivity 
Several adaptive behaviours identified during the data analysis phase are replicated by the 
model.  
5.2.4.1 Strategy adaptivity 
In the CT condition both participants and the model use the Barrier strategy increasingly more 
frequently until trial 16. Figure 5.3 shows the proportion of times the Barrier strategy is used in 
the CT condition. Note that both for participants and the model the Barrier strategy is used 
with more frequency as more trials are completed and that there is a drop in the use of the 
Barrier strategy after Trial 16 (the beginning of the test phase). This phenomenon is expected 
due to the change in conditions that renders the Barrier strategy inappropriate for the test 
trials (section 3.1.3.2). The rest of this section discusses strategy adaptivity during the training 
phase; the impact of strategy selection during the training phase is discussed in the cognitive 
inflexibility section (6.1.2.4). Table 5.9 shows the average utility values of the rule set 
associated with strategy choice (Section 4.2.3.2 explains how the utility of these rules is 
modified). A utility value is high or low depending on the utility values of its competing 
productions. The CT run leads the model to adopt a clear preference for the Barrier strategy. 
Table 5.10 shows the selection of strategies and the resulting performance for the 
corresponding model runs. This table only shows the strategy selected at the start of each trial, 
remember that the model is able to switch strategies within trials. The choice of strategies in 
5.10 is based on the utilities shown in table 5.9. Note that the utility of selecting the Barrier 
strategy drops to 1.17 in trial number eight (cell with asterisk in table 5.9). This drop occurs 
due to the low performance reported in table 5.14 (cell with asterisk in table 5.10); the 
seventh trial yielded a result of 69.8 (a poor result compared with previous trials) which 
lowered the perceived utility of the Barrier strategy from the model’s perspective.  
 
148 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Use of Barrier strategy in the CT condition considering all trials 
 
The model run for the VT condition changes strategies more frequently than the model run for 
the CT condition. Table 5.10 shows that the first strategy selected by the model in the VT 
condition run is Stop which yielded very low performance (cell with double asterisk in table 
5.10). As can be seen at the end of the first trial the utility associated with the use of the Stop 
strategy is –12.38 (cell with double asterisk in table 5.9). In the next three trials the strategy 
used was Barrier which is abandoned after obtaining low performance in trial 4 (as indicated 
by the unchanging values over trials 4 to 6 in table 5.9). The NonBarrier strategy is selected 
next and yields very high performance due to the low complexity of the trial. The NonBarrier 
strategy drops its utility in the seventh trial due to the low performance obtained but it is 
selected again in the following trial where it obtains a high performance. In trial 9 the Barrier 
strategy is selected again but the result is not good enough so in the next trial the Stop 
strategy is selected and remains in use until trial 13 (the hardest VT trial scenario).  
 
 Trials 
Select Strategy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Select Barrier CT 2.00 2.52 9.56 7.51 9.51 10.00 4.18 *1.17 8.70 0.52 7.42 10.00 10.00 7.90 10.00 6.04 
Select Barrier VT 2.00 8.38 10.00 4.31 4.31 4.31 6.31 6.31 7.65 7.65 9.65 9.65 10.00 10.00 -1.52 -1.52 
Select Follow CT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Select Follow VT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Select NonBarrier CT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 
Select NonBarrier VT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 10.00 3.02 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
10.0
0 
Select Stop CT -4.27 -4.27 -4.27 -4.27 -4.27 -4.27 -4.27 -4.27 -4.27 -4.27 -4.27 -4.27 -4.27 -4.27 -4.27 -4.27 
Select Stop VT 
**-
12.38 -9.38 -6.38 -6.38 -3.38 -0.38 -0.38 2.62 2.62 9.67 9.10 10.00 -3.63 -0.63 -0.63 -0.63 
Table 5.9: Utility values associated with strategy use 
 
The VT condition elicits a different pattern of behaviour. What impacts strategy selection the 
most are the significant variations in complexity existing in the VT programme. Some trials are 
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very easy and generate good feedback regardless of strategy selection. This could be 
misleading both to participants and the model. In the case of the model it receives positive 
feedback for an arbitrary choice of strategy that serves to increase the utility of a strategy that 
might not be a good choice for harder trials. Some trials are so hard that only structured 
strategies such as Barrier and Stop can produce good results, but if these strategies are not 
selected the model cannot exercise them. By having these extreme changes in complexity 
between trials it is possible for the model to develop a preference for less effective strategies, 
such as in the case of the NonBarrier strategy which is used in trials 5 to 8 after obtaining 98.24 
in a very easy trial.  
 
This section described how the Barrier strategy becomes the preferred one during the training 
phase. This phenomenon produced cognitive inflexibility during the test phase, which can also 
be traced to the utility of productions; this is discussed in sections 6.1.2.3 and 6.1.2.4. 
 
  CT VT 
Trial Perf. Strategy Perf. Strategy 
1 73.56 STOP **49.23 STOP 
2 76.15 BARRIER 99.06 BARRIER 
3 93.18 BARRIER 100 BARRIER 
4 78.03 BARRIER 71.29 BARRIER 
5 71.8 NONBARRIER 100 NONBARRIER 
6 95.53 BARRIER 98.24 NONBARRIER 
7 *69.8 BARRIER 57.38 NONBARRIER 
8 70.98 BARRIER 100 NONBARRIER 
9 94.48 BARRIER 81.16 BARRIER 
10 60.87 BARRIER 96.16 STOP 
11 92.6 BARRIER 87.31 STOP 
12 94.95 BARRIER 93.3 STOP 
13 90.72 BARRIER 47.37 STOP 
14 78.14 BARRIER 100 BARRIER 
15 91.3 BARRIER 46.28 BARRIER 
16 73.56 BARRIER 92.08 NONBARRIER 
Table 5.10: Strategy use for two runs of the model 
 
5.2.4.2 Refilling the tank and performance 
At first appearance it might seem as if the way to achieve best performance might be to refill 
the tank as soon as it becomes empty, however, data from both the model and human 
participants shows that both the model and participants that refill units as soon as the tank is 
depleted (the adaptive participants) are not better performers. A one-tailed one-way 
between-subjects ANOVA revealed that there is not a significant difference in performance for 
either participants (F(1,21)=.01, p=.921) or the model (F(1,21)=1.6, p=.22). The model keeps 
track of the number of DW commands that have been issued, but the rule that sends a unit to 
the dam to refill its tank must win a competition with other rules. What is observed is that the 
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rule that can send a unit to refill as soon as its tank is depleted is not favoured over the rest, so 
there is no priority in executing this action. Participants do not seem to prioritize this task 
either. It was observed that the model prioritizes actions such as sending copters to locations 
in which fires can be attacked or perceptual actions that sense the state of the fire. This result 
suggests that it is cognitively cheaper to wait for an “empty tank” alarm and send the unit to a 
nearby dam (the vast majority of trials have several dams) than to keep checking the level of 
water. 
5.2.4.3 Waiting behaviour  
Imagine that you are executing a Move command using a truck. You just completed the drag-
and-drop mouse command so the truck is disabled by FireChief and starts its movement 
towards the target cell. What will you do next? You can wait until the truck arrives at the 
target cell, switch attention to another unit, check the status of the fire, check the strength of 
the wind, and so on. When the model finds itself in a similar situation it must also decide what 
single action to execute next from the several options available. An adaptive behaviour 
observed both in participants and in the model is the emergence of an interaction between the 
length of the movement of units and waiting behaviour. This phenomenon was not detected 
during the analysis of participant data, a hint towards this discovery occurred during the 
movement length analysis for the model. To be more precise: if the movement’s length is 
shorter than 2 cells, the model tends to wait for the unit to arrive; otherwise it selects another 
option, such as moving its attention to another unit. This interaction effect is mediated by the 
type of command issued after the movement: the model favours waiting when executing CF 
commands, but not DW commands. Figure 5.4 show the proportion of times that waiting 
behaviour is observed considering the MoveCF and MoveDW sequences for participants 
and the model. The figure shows that waiting behaviour is favoured when CF commands are 
involved in the sequence. There is a significant difference in waiting behaviour between Move-
CF and Move-DW sequences in participants (F(1,46)=184.210, p<.001) and the model 
(F(1,46)=88.734, p<.001). Section 5.2.1 shows that as trials are completed both participants 
and the model execute the Barrier strategy with greater success and section 6.1.2.3 shows 
how the utility of key productions changes accordingly. The RMSD is 0.078 considering 
between participants and the model considering the MoveCF interaction.  
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Figure 5.4: Proportion of time (Y-axis) that participants and the model wait for a unit to finish its movement by 
trial (X-axis) (M->CF is the sequence of a Move and a Control Fire command, similar case with M->DW)  
 
Waiting behaviour can be traced to the key productions’ utilities shown in figure 5.5. These 
utilities are extracted from a single model run during the training phase. Waiting for copters to 
complete a movement is punished in both training programmes. What this model run learned 
to do is to make short movements with trucks and wait for them until they are ready to 
execute a CF command. Although this involves wasting some time waiting, this behaviour 
increases the probability of completing a CF command successfully.  
 
Figure 5.5: Utility values of productions (Y-axis) associated with waiting behaviour (1 model run) per training trial 
(X-axis) 
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Waiting behaviour is evidence of adaptation to task characteristics. There are no specific rules 
that prefer waiting over other behaviours: waiting behaviour emerges as a consequence of the 
reward scheme used in the model. The important fact is that the model is able to pick up this 
adaptation while controlled by the single-command reward scheme. This result reinforces the 
idea that focusing on single commands in dynamic tasks represents a valid approach. This 
behaviour emerges in the model due to the negative rewards received when a CF command 
cannot be executed, mainly because the fire reaches the location where it was planned to 
issue it before the command can be executed. The model learns that it is preferable to waste a 
certain amount of time waiting for the unit to arrive and to issue a CF command as soon as it 
finishes its movement. 
5.2.4.4 Achieving good performance 
The objective of this section is to provide a description of a good performer from the 
perspective of the cognitive model. Two factors allow the construction of this description: (1) 
the fact that this study is competence oriented and hence the model tries to reproduce the 
behaviour of participants engaged in the task and (2) the way in which the model is designed 
where micro strategies compete freely and therefore there is no preference for a path of 
action at the outset. As the model interacts with the FireChief task those patterns of behaviour 
that contribute to the successful execution of commands stand out by continuously receiving 
positive feedback. Section 5.3.1 discusses these patterns of behaviour.  
 
Number Rule group Best Worst Difference 
1 No switch trucks -3.13 -2.86 -0.27 
2 Switch trucks 1.92 1.26 0.66 
3 Change unit -0.49 1.29 -1.77 
4 No switch copters -2.33 -2.12 -0.20 
5 Switch copters -3.05 -3.05 0.00 
6 Wait copters -0.07 -2.65 2.58 
7 Wait trucks 2.09 0.48 1.62 
8 Barrier top-down sc 3.58 1.89 1.69 
9 Barrier top-down ln 3.26 2.77 0.49 
10 Barrier bottom-up 1.37 -1.75 3.12 
11 Attack low -0.55 -0.31 -0.24 
12 Attack high 1.26 0.81 0.45 
13 Attack key -0.26 -0.43 0.17 
14 Select Strategy Barrier 9.34 0.94 8.41 
15 Select Strategy NBarrier 1.95 -0.91 2.86 
16 Select Strategy Stop -3.25 -5.44 2.19 
17 Select Strategy Follow 0.00 -4.35 4.35 
 
Table 5.11: Comparison of utility values of key productions between the best and the worst performers 
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This analysis of strategy adaptivity and attainment of good performance focuses on the 
dynamic aspects of the process in which productions are tuned. Section 4.2.3 explains the 
methodology followed in conducting this analysis and the reasons for conducting it. With the 
aim of gaining insight into what differentiates best and worst performers, two profiles were 
created based on utility values for each group (model runs of the CT scenario are used in this 
comparison). To obtain these profiles the utility of relevant productions for each group is 
queried at the end of the training phase and averaged. The comparison is focused only on the 
rules relating to the creation of a barrier: the way trucks are used, how they are moved, and 
how the barrier is created. Utility data from the top and bottom quartiles were compared. 
Table 5.11 shows the quantitative data related to the upper and lower quartile model runs. 
This comparison shows that the most striking difference between good and bad performers is 
that good performers successfully combine top-down (sc = semicircle, ln = line) and bottom-up 
processes to create a barrier, while the worst performers apply only top-down processes 
successfully, failing to combine them well with bottom-up processes so that cells selected for 
the fire-break prove less effective.  
 
Top performers also have a preference for waiting for trucks to Move (they link two 
commands with the same truck more often) and have a strong preference for using the Barrier 
strategy. Model-runs in the lowest quartile do not have a preference for waiting for trucks and 
have a preference for Barrier but not as marked as top model-runs. This example illustrates 
how cognitive modelling can be used to determine which microstrategy is the most successful 
by means of utility comparisons. 
5.3  Summary of QOF 
In relation to performance the model captures well the overall performance levels (section 
5.2.1), the learning effect produced by the CT (section 5.2.1) and the effects that the different 
environmental changes generate over performance (section 5.2.1.2). Section 5.2.2.1 
demonstrates that performance in the CT group is linked to strategy use and that the model 
captures this interaction. The model also captures significant interactions related to command 
use: the faster execution of CF commands when barriers are being created (section 5.2.3.1) 
and of DW commands when copters are used (section 5.2.3.2). The interaction between 
performance and strategy use is also captured in the VT condition but mainly for the 
structured strategies Stop and Barrier, presumably due to differences in the complexity of 
trials (section 5.2.2.2).  An analysis of strategies during the Test phase revealed four 
interactions related to the phenomenon of cognitive inflexibility that are well captured by the 
model: 
1. The use of the CF command is disrupted as a consequence of wind direction changes in 
the CTW condition (section 5.2.2.3.1). 
2. The execution of the Barrier strategy is not affected in the CTE condition (section 
5.2.2.3.2).  
3. The Stop strategy is used more frequently and with more success by 
participants/model in the VTW condition than in the CTW condition (section 5.2.2.3.3).  
4. Performance using the Barrier strategy is worst for participants/model in the VTE 
group (section 5.2.2.3.4).  
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The interpretation of these four interactions, together with the patterns observed during the 
training phase, is that both participants and model consolidate the Barrier strategy during the 
CT programme. When the wind changes direction the participants/model stick to the use of CF 
commands even when performance is disrupted (a sign of cognitive inflexibility).  When the 
efficiency of appliances is reduced the consolidated strategy Barrier keeps producing good 
performance. For participants/model in the VT there is more opportunity to practice the Stop 
strategy. When wind changes direction the Stop strategy is used more frequently as it 
represents a better choice (as demonstrated in section 5.2.2.3.3). When the efficiency of 
appliances is reduced participants/model in the VTE group use the Barrier strategy, 
nevertheless the level of performance is lower than for those that had the opportunity of 
consolidating this strategy. As mentioned, the model is able to capture well all these 
interactions. The total number of commands per trial is captured well by the model, which is 
an indication that the latency of individual actions is similar for both participants and the 
model.  
 
It is important to stress that the model is more accurate for predicting behaviour associated 
with the execution of the Barrier strategy. When barriers are being constructed attention is 
focused on the units that are creating the barrier and collaboration emerges: the model tends 
to execute short movements (section 5.2.3.3), wait for the units to arrive at its destination 
(section 5.2.3.4)  and use the location of previously executed CF commands as a reference to 
determine the location of the new CF. This is different to the patterns observed when isolated 
CF commands are executed: attention is switched to other units when the unit is moving, the 
unit remains idle before the CF is executed and longer mouse movements are required to 
execute commands. All these patterns emerge as a result of the competition of procedural 
rules as described in section 4.1. 
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6. Discussion and conclusions 
The object of this study, CPS in dynamic domains, is an interesting and challenging one. As the 
approach to the study of CPS using microworlds was adopted, it was necessary to understand 
these tasks. From all the characteristics microworlds have their complexity and dynamic 
component were deemed as the most relevant. Given than in microworlds the stimulus is no 
longer under the full control of the experimenter and therefore to duplicate the same set-up 
for every participant is not possible, it was decided to follow the suggestion of Brehmer & 
Dörner (1993) of focusing the study on strategies and tactics. It was also decided to create a 
detailed cognitive model of CPS behaviour in order to understand more about strategy use in 
complex dynamic situations and several studies involved with cognitive models were reviewed, 
this research revealed that there are very few cognitive models of highly dynamic tasks. There 
are several aspects related to the use of strategies in microworlds, particularly dynamic ones, 
which require further investigation, such as what is the nature of these strategies, how are 
they affected by task manipulation and how does the problem solver make decisions when 
coping with the complexity and dynamics of such tasks. FireChief, a dynamic complex task, was 
selected to conduct the study and the dataset of the Cañas et al. (2005) study was chosen due 
to its richness and emphasis on strategy use. Because computerized scenarios tend to produce 
a lot of behavioural data a tool (PAT) was created to facilitate a brand new analysis of the data. 
Using this tool it was possible to identify different patterns of behaviours which are the 
components of the various microstrategies modelled in a later stage. The core of this model is 
its ability to adapt as a response of the feedback it continuously receives from the 
environment. It was shown how this model was able to replicate several aspects of the 
empirical data. The aim of this chapter is to go over what has been learned from the FireChief 
model specifically and, as several aspects of CPS were involved in the creation of the model, to 
relate these findings to similar results gathered from the literature in order to discuss how this 
work has advanced our understanding of CPS.  
6.1. General Discussion  
Chapter 1 introduced specific research questions related CPS. These questions are answered in 
the light of what was discovered during the course of this research.  
6.1.1.  What characterizes strategies in complex dynamic tasks? 
A complex dynamic problem involves achieving several goals that are not clearly defined by 
allocating limited resources to select and execute a variety of actions which can only be 
implemented under certain constraints and may produce side effects. On top of these features 
the problem must be solved under time pressure. Section 2.3.2.1 conceptualizes complexity in 
terms of the number of elements present in the system plus the number of possible actions 
available to the problem solver. This conception of complexity is shared by several studies 
using a variety of microworlds (section 3.1). In some microworlds such as FireChief complexity 
and dynamics are heavily interwoven. Section 2.3.1.5-C explains why complexity and dynamics 
in FireChief is mainly related to wind conditions. Complexity increases as commands must be 
issued at a fast pace to fight stronger fires. These strong fires destroy cells quickly and 
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propagate to adjacent cells increasing the number of cells on fire quite quickly. A consequence 
of this increment in the number of cells on fire is that the problem solver needs to choose a 
single action from a broader range of them. CPS situations in dynamic domains can be tackled 
by implementing the right strategies. The characteristics of these strategies are discussed in 
sections 6.1.1.1 to 6.1.1.4. 
6.1.1.1. Focus attention on important aspects of the problem 
Several researchers observed that performance in CPS situations decreases as more variables 
are involved in the task (Hussy & Graznow, 1987; Ackerman, 1992; Schunn & Reder, 2001; 
Joslyn & Hunt, 1998). The first characteristic of a successful strategy for complex dynamic 
situations is that it be constructed on the basis of an adequate representation of the problem 
that abstracts the most relevant aspects of the problem. Of the myriad aspects of a FireChief 
display, the FireChief model focuses its attention primarily on the fire-fighting units and the 
fire. The most important piece of information related to fire-fighting units is their status, that 
is, whether they are available or not for executing commands. Overall the model has about 
twice the number of rules for perceiving the location and intensity of the fire than for 
perceiving the location and status of the fire-fighting units, and in general terms more time is 
spent examining the location of the fire. The location of fire-fighting units is also relevant when 
considering their proximity to the fire. Problem representation is directly linked with the use of 
WM (see section 2.3.6.3). The FireChief model holds in WM a chunk that represents its current 
intention (see section 4.2.3.1) and keeps track of the individual intentions of each unit related 
to the execution of commands. Keeping the status of units in WM is important otherwise the 
model must execute a series of perceptual and cognitive actions every time it switches 
attention to a previously unattended unit in order to determine its status. Other models use a 
similar approach, for example, in the Table Decision task model (Veksler et al., 2007) the 
imaginal buffer was used for storing the highest value seen so far.  
 
Because a problem’s representation is centred on the status of individual units, strategies are 
used basically for making two decisions: whether to issue a DW or a CF command, and where 
to Move a unit to issue the selected command. Although the focus of perceptual actions is the 
fire, the results of these perceptions do not become part of the mental representation of the 
world, but are used to select between firing a variety of different cognitive actions. The model 
is able to deal with different fire-fighting scenarios by means of continuous perceptual actions 
and a fire-fighting-unit-centred representation of the world. Using this representation 
FireChief tasks can be reduced to selecting a general intention and assigning individual 
commands to each unit. The EnCoRe model (Niessen et al., 1999, see section 2.3.6.1) follows a 
similar approach and focuses its attention on the aircraft’s vertical position.  
6.1.1.2. Use perceptual actions intensively  
As mentioned in previous chapters, the rich environment provided by CPS tasks such as 
microworlds can be used as an External Memory (EM) and it has been observed that the 
problem solver calculates the cost of accessing this EM and then decides either to use EM or 
internal memory (Fu & Gray, 2001; Gray et al., 2005; Veksler, Gray & Schoelles, 2007). The 
second characteristic of successful strategies is their ability to continuously search for 
elements and make attention shifts to harvest information from the environment. The 
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FireChief display is demanding for the ACT-R visual module and, because the environment is 
continuously changing, it is necessary to act fast. Perceptual and motor mechanisms interact 
with cognitive mechanisms to determine performance. The model needs to distinguish 
landscape elements, including fire intensity. There are two available model operations for 
identifying FireChief elements: by physical attribute and by location. The first kind of operation 
is based either on an item’s colour (it works for all FireChief elements) or the alphanumeric 
labels of the cells (used to check fire intensity). The second kind of test is based on an item’s 
(relative/absolute) location. The FireChief model uses a similar approach to the Argus Prime 
model (Schoelles & Gray, 2000; section 2.5.2) to find elements based on location: manipulating 
the scan area for the search. The model needs to make good use of the visual buffer and apply 
attentional shifts wisely as they provide up-to-date information about the state of the 
simulation. The model needs to perceive changes in the environment, encode these changes 
(in the imaginal buffer) and use this information to execute commands or to gather more 
information. The time required for processing visual elements depends upon the time it takes 
to switch attention and harvest visual features. The FireChief model also uses a mechanism 
embedded in ACT-R for detecting unusual developments of fire (subsection 15 in section 
4.3.1). 
 
The model confirms the observation of Gonzalez et al. (2004) that performance in FireChief is 
associated primarily with the ability to store and process visual or spatial information. The 
ability to process visual information was discussed in the previous paragraph; spatial ability, 
understood as the ability to process the location of elements in making decisions, is realized in 
ACT-R by a combination of perceptual and cognitive actions. Spatial stimuli can be encoded by 
making comparisons between the coordinates of visual elements and can be remembered 
using the imaginal buffer. The built-in mechanism to locate the nearest element to the current 
focus of attention is particularly useful for this end. The model also makes use of the aural 
module to deal with alarms. Effective response to alarms is important for good performance in 
FireChief. Frequently the model’s attention is focused on a unit while another is threatened by 
the fire, and the only way of noticing this is by processing aural stimuli. 
6.1.1.3. Rely on fluid motor actions 
Psychomotor ability is a determinant of good performance in a dynamic task, as observed by 
Rehling et al. (2004). In dynamic tasks any benefit derived from a decision decreases with the 
amount of time it takes to be executed. Even though an adequate action for a specific situation 
is chosen, the problem solver must issue a considerable amount of commands and so the 
execution of this action is quite dependent on manual actions. The third characteristic of 
successful strategies is its reliance on fluid motor actions. The importance of motor actions is 
discussed in section 4.2.4, in particular section 4.2.4.1 showed how important the duration of 
manual actions is for the execution of a Move command. Veksler, Gray, & Schoelles (2007) 
came to a similar conclusion: in the table cell task 80% of the time between cell clicks was 
comprised by the motor component. St. Amant, Freed, & Ritter (2005) also found that the 
motor actions dominated success in a telephone dialling task.  
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6.1.1.4. Promote adaptiveness 
The problem solver must also cope with the dynamic nature of the task. In order to achieve 
this it is necessary to adapt behaviour to the changing environment. Among others, Bettman 
(1979) stresses the importance of being receptive to the environment. In addition Schunn & 
Reder (1998) found that individuals experience different success base rates for each strategy 
and learn to prefer different strategies. When implementing a strategy by executing 
commands the FireChief model is primarily driven by the current state of the fire. This 
information is obtained by perceiving the environment. The model obtains the best 
performance when there is a combination of the top-down and bottom-up modes of 
controlling behaviour, suggesting that this approach is beneficial when dealing with dynamic 
tasks. To adapt to the changing environment the problem solver should be able to monitor its 
actions and evaluate them. This topic is further discussed in section 6.1.3.  
6.1.2.  How strategy use is affected by task manipulations? 
Section 2.2.3.4 explained how task manipulations such as graphical cues, the content of 
instructions, the cost of accessing information, and primarily the configuration of trials affect 
strategy use by placing constraints on how actions are executed. What is particularly relevant 
in this respect is to understand precisely how these manipulations affect strategy use. 
According to Veksler, Gray, & Schoelles (2007) microstrategies evolve throughout the 
execution of the task. Also Bettman (1979) argues that strategies develop in an ad hoc fashion 
during the course of the problem solving process and the means of generating these strategies 
is by being receptive to the environment. This would appear to be borne out by the way the 
model tunes production utility values to the different experimental conditions. This research 
further explored a data set provided by the Cañas et al. (2005) study. The model provides an 
explanation of how the different training programmes of the Cañas et al. study facilitate or 
hinder the ability of participants to cope with changes in the environment introduced during 
the testing phase. This section describes the findings obtained through this study in relation to 
how task manipulations affect strategy use, which in turn affect task performance. Subsection 
6.1.2.1 starts by recapitulating the most relevant aspects of the strategies found during the 
new analysis. Section 6.1.2.2 describes how task manipulations affect strategy consolidation 
and its relevance to task performance. Section 6.1.2.3 describes how strategy consolidation 
affects the way barriers are created and prepares the discussion presented in section 6.1.2.4 
about cognitive inflexibility. Section 6.1.2.5 closes this discussion and links the previous topics 
by relating strategy use to performance.  
6.1.2.1. Strategies 
Several studies using complex tasks were able to identify strategies used by participants 
(Charman & Howes, 2002; Veksler, Gray & Schoelles, 2007; Fu & Gray ,2006; Schunn & Reder, 
1998, among others). It has also been observed that appropriate strategy selection is key for 
successful performance in complex tasks (Lee et al, 1995; Byrne & Kirlik, 2005). In order to 
select an adequate strategy it is necessary to abstract the most relevant aspects of the task 
(section 6.1.1.1) and, in the context of dynamic tasks, this research suggests that it is 
particularly important to consider the variable that drives the dynamic component of the task 
the most. In the context of FireChief wind conditions represent the most important source of 
information for strategy selection. 
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The research presented here uncovered a new set of FireChief strategies and helped in the 
understanding of how they are selected and how their execution is modified as experience is 
gained. These strategies are non-compensatory (see section 2.2.3.5) as they do not consider all 
available information before making a decision, a condition that should be expected in this 
kind of task. In addition, all four strategies are also strong problem solving methods in the 
sense that they make use of domain-specific knowledge (e.g. how to execute FireChief 
commands and how trucks and copters operate). Differences in strategy adaptation are a 
consequence of training programmes, the feedback received after executing actions and trial 
performance. The model is run with the same parametric values every time and there are no 
differences in knowledge because all strategies are available to the model at all times. Strategy 
use is driven by environmental cues and rewards received from the environment in a rather 
short temporal window. This study also provides a detailed description of how microstrategies 
are executed by a combination of cognitive, perceptual and motor operations.  
6.1.2.2. Strategy Consolidation 
The context of CPS shapes the decision making behaviour of the problem solver, this context is 
a product of the manipulations made to the task. When the task is manipulated in such a way 
that the problem solver interacts with the same situation over and over there is a particular 
learning effect. Section 2.2.3.1 describes how skill acquisition is a process that starts in the 
cognitive stage and ends in the automatic stage. This research explores how this learning 
process occurs within a highly dynamic scenario.  
 
An approach that interrogates the ACT-R sub-symbolic level (introduced in section 4.2.3) is 
used to understand more about strategy consolidation as learning in ACT-R is closely related to 
the tuning of its subsymbolic processes (Anderson et. al, 2004). These utility values of 
productions are tuned throughout the trials in a unique fashion, under constraints imposed by 
the properties of the FireChief task, the procedural knowledge represented by rules and 
rewards from the environment. In ACT-R terms, not knowing what to expect from your actions 
is equated with balanced utility values in the competing rules for a particular decision; when 
strategy consolidation occurs, the model ‘knows’ what to expect from its actions. According to 
the theory, sufficient practice allows for a change between cognitive stages (Ackerman 1988; 
Taatgen, 2005). At the level of the cognitive model, a strategy is consolidated when the 
competition between rules at the different decision points is avoided due to the dominance of 
a given rule (or set of rules).  
 
More evidence of the consolidation of strategies in the CT condition is the significant increase 
in performance between the first and last 4 trials (see section 5.2.1). This is an indication of the 
opportunity the CT trials offer participants to improve performance. This performance 
improvement can be a consequence of better strategy selection or implementation. The model 
supports the view that this performance increment is attributable to differences in strategy 
which are a product of how productions are being rewarded. Lee, Anderson & Matessa (1995) 
explain performance improvement in an ATC task based on strategy change also: as practice 
increases participants reduce the number of keystrokes required for completing the task. 
Similarly, Charman and Howes (2002) observe that practice in the task increases efficiency in 
the use of commands. In the CT condition, the model executes the most successful strategy 
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with more frequency and with more efficiency as trials pass by. In the CT condition several 
model runs follow a strategy selection pattern in which the model tries one or two different 
strategies before executing the Barrier strategy. When the Barrier strategy is executed, 
acceptable performance is obtained which in turn promotes the selection of the Barrier 
strategy again, allowing a considerable amount of practice in the creation of a barrier and so 
forth.  
 
Another phenomenon observed in this research is that consolidation of strategies can be 
deterred by manipulating the task in such a way that participants do not face the same CPS 
situation in each trial. From the cognitive modelling perspective this means giving no 
opportunity for a particular rule or rule-set to become dominant due to changing 
environmental conditions that make the outcome of actions less stable. The two training 
programmes in the Cañas et al. (2005) study have different patterns of complexity variation 
where the hardest trials lead to more strategy exploration. For this reason the VT programme 
promotes a fairer competition between strategies because more options are explored in 
comparison to the CT condition where it is hard to obtain good performance other than for the 
Barrier strategy, thus favouring the choice of this strategy over others. In the VT condition 
there are more complexity fluctuations, more changes, and a less predictable reward pattern. 
 
When the training phase is over what distinguishes participants from the two training groups is 
the different utility values acquired for the same set of rules. These different utility values 
represent not only strategy preferences but also a preference for how to implement those 
strategies. In this sense the knowledge that the model acquires through its interaction with the 
FireChief simulation is stored as a set of utility values. These different utility values generate 
different responses to the changes in the environment that are introduced during the testing 
phase. The problem solver has to resolve the tension between exploration and exploitation 
throughout the problem solving activity (Nellen & Lovett, 2004). Using the terminology of 
Nellen & Lovett, in the VT condition the model cannot establish sufficient trust in an option in 
order to exploit it.  
6.1.2.3. The Barrier case 
The previous section explained how strategy consolidation may occur if certain conditions are 
present, this section describes in detail strategy consolidation related to the creation of a 
barrier of CF commands and prepares the discussion of cognitive inflexibility in the following 
section. The most structured strategy is Barrier and this also presents a richer set of elements 
for cognitive modelling because the three FireChief commands are frequently used. The 
question of whether it is a good option to deploy a barrier depends on many factors, the most 
important being wind conditions. If the wind strength is of 6 or higher creating a barrier is a 
good option. The analysis of production rule utilities provides an explanation of how the 
different training programmes give rise to different ways of creating the barrier: the particular 
method of creating a barrier depends on previous ways of constructing the barrier within 
several contexts and thus on the different weights accrued by production rules associated with 
the creation of the barrier. Contrastingly, if wind strength is too low (3 or less) it is more 
advisable to attack the fire with DW commands and barrier construction rules are not 
rewarded.  
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During CT participants tend to use and perfect the Barrier strategy. The participants and model 
respond to the CT programme by learning to create a barrier to stop the fire, and successful 
participants in the CT group are those that specialize in the creation of barriers. When a barrier 
is being created, the mouse pointer tends to be closer to the next target cell and, because a 
barrier is usually constructed by a sequence of CF commands, the distance of the various 
mouse pointer movements tends to be shorter in comparison to the NonBarrier strategy 
where CF commands are more dispersed. As a result, although the model burns extra cognitive 
resources in identifying the next cell of the barrier (compare subsection 5 in section 4.3.1 and 
subsection 4B in section 4.3.2), the longer times associated with moving the mouse pointer 
when the NonBarrier strategy is executed causes higher latencies. Table 5.5 showed that a CF 
belonging to a barrier takes longer to execute in the VT condition. The explanation offered by 
the cognitive model is that extra cognitive and perceptual steps are being made before issuing 
the CF command: the VT group pays more attention to the developing fire in comparison to 
participants in the CT group and therefore exhibits more reactive behaviour. Overall the VT 
predisposes responsive behaviour. 
 
 
Figure 6.1: production utility values of barrier creation (top-down) related rules 
 
Figure 6.1 shows how the utility of the set of productions related to the creation (in a top-
down fashion) of the barrier increases as trials are completed for the CT condition. The utility 
of these productions for the VT condition is also shown. The set of production rules available 
for use are exactly the same for both training programmes, (that is, a single model undergoes 
either of the training conditions). However, the pattern of utility change is different as can be 
seen in the graph. The continuous increase of production utility values for rules associated 
with the Barrier strategy means that their repeated choice (related to the execution of 
commands) is continuously rewarded, a phenomenon that only occurs in an environment that 
does not dramatically alter the effect of the actions being executed on repeated trials. In the 
VT condition, the same chain of actions that successfully executes a CF command in the CT 
condition may fail, for example, when wind strength is very high. The invariable characteristics 
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of the CT condition allows the discovery of the production rules that work best for the CT trial 
and once these rules are discovered they are selected over and over again. In the VT condition, 
the firing of the same rules may not receive the same feedback.  
 
According to Veksler, Gray & Schoelles (2007) time comparisons between commands provide 
insights into how strategies evolve. The model ends up preferring a top-down approach to the 
creation of the barrier in the CT condition. This switch from the competition between bottom-
up and the top-down approaches towards the dominance of the top-down approach shaves-
off time as a consequence of the reduction in perceptual actions. In dynamic tasks the problem 
solver needs to control how much information will be gathered before executing a command. 
Fu & Gray (2006) found that people decrease the number of information-seeking actions when 
their costs are increased. Although the Cañas et al. (2005) experimental design does not 
manipulate the cost of information-seeking actions there is a cost associated with performing 
visual searches. Similarly to the case of Fu & Gray (2006) where utility of information was 
manipulated, the utility of gathering information related to the location of fires is indirectly 
manipulated by the training programmes. In this sense the utility of gathering this information 
(fire location) is low when no change in wind strength is expected, which is the case of the CT.  
The model is able to reduce the amount of information that needs to be gathered in order to 
make a decision when environmental conditions are constant (such as in the CT condition) in 
comparison to a more variable situation (such as the VT condition) regardless of the amount of 
practice. In other words, the model is sensitive to the level of dynamics of the task and is able 
to adapt the amount of perceptual actions to environmental conditions. 
6.1.2.4. Cognitive inflexibility 
Schunn & Reder (2001) consider the possibility that once a strategy is consolidated it becomes 
less adaptive in response to success and failure feedback. Direct evidence for this was found: 
as a consequence of the CT condition, the model shapes the utility of its rules in such a way 
that it becomes insensitive to rewards at the micro-level for some time. For this reason larger 
changes at the global level are required for generating the required strategy change during the 
test phase. Strategy selection during the test phase depends on various factors: the type of 
training, strategy preference before the change, and type of environmental change. Particular 
strategies confer particular benefits in the different training and testing phases. Barrier is most 
effective in the CT condition, no strategy is preferred in the VT condition. Similarly, Stop is 
most effective in the Wind Change test condition, whereas Barrier is most effective in the 
Efficiency Reduction condition (see section 4.3.4). The model running under the CT is slower to 
change strategy when the wind changes direction. A feature of the data is that participants 
from the CTE group perform better using the Barrier strategy than participants in the VTE 
group (see table 5.3). Participants (and the model) in the CT condition can be cognitively 
inflexible to their advantage in the efficiency reduction condition. Remember that participants 
from the CTE group have more opportunity to practice the most successful strategy while the 
higher strategy variation of participants in the VTE group deters the tuning of the Barrier rules 
to the structure of the environment. In the testing phase a change in wind direction can be 
successfully addressed by any structured strategy while a change in the efficiency of appliances 
requires the use of the Barrier strategy. This can be concluded by observing that the model is 
able to obtain good performance in the WD condition by either executing the Barrier strategy 
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or the Stop strategy. In the WD condition, participants in the CT group (CTW) still use the 
Barrier strategy quite frequently, while participants in the VT group (VTW) use the Barrier 
strategy less frequently. The pattern of strategy use when efficiency is reduced is very similar 
between the CTE and VTE groups: Barrier is the most preferred strategy and both groups 
repeatedly use it. 
 
Cañas et al. (2005) found that the changes introduced in the environment during the test 
phase generated significant effects in performance, but also that these changes affected the 
participants differentially depending on the strategy that they were putting into practice. 
Cañas et al. hypothesized that strategies that rely on the execution of CF commands are more 
affected by changes in the direction of the wind, while strategies that rely on the execution of 
DW commands are more affected by changes in the efficiency of appliances.  
 
The detailed specification of strategies (Section 3.3) implemented in the model provides the 
fine grain level of detail necessary to understand precisely how these changes impacted 
performance. In the situation where the wind changes direction the model needs to fire a 
greater number of rules in order to identify and select the next cell in which to issue a CF 
command thus increasing the number of problem solving steps. What happens is that after a 
candidate cell is chosen there are rules that check the location of fires nearby. When wind 
changes direction these rules end up encouraging the model to choose a different cell based 
on the location of the fire. The result is that the model spends more time deciding how to 
create the barrier. We can use this detailed understanding of model behaviour to understand 
the differential impact of a change in wind direction for the model undergoing CTW compared 
to the model undergoing VTW (where the VT model has developed a preference for the Barrier 
strategy, so that it is directly comparable to the CT model). The model trained in the CT 
condition has a clear preference for the use of top-down approaches while the model trained 
in the VT condition has a preference for the bottom-up approach. This difference has an 
impact when the wind changes direction at second 60. In the VTW condition the model is 
continuously observing the fire in order to identify the next cell in which the CF will be issued, 
so when the change in the wind occurs, the model selects the next target cell based on more 
accurate information. On the other hand, a model that prefers the top-down approach to the 
creation of the barrier will place the next block of the cell without recourse to observing the 
fire. In this sense the automation of the strategy runs the risk of deterring the problem solver 
from extracting relevant information from the environment, and hence allows the emergence 
of cognitive inflexibility. We can compare this with the situation in which appliance efficiency is 
diminished and therefore attacking large fires with water is no longer feasible and therefore 
creating barriers using DW commands is no longer viable. In the EF condition there are several 
fires with intensity 3 or higher (outside the capacity of the DW command); if CF commands are 
not issued, performance will be inevitably low. Although the model may start using an Only-
DW strategy such as Stop it will receive multiple alarms (negative rewards) when trying to 
extinguish strong fires and the consequence will be that a new approach to solve the problem 
will be adopted. 
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6.1.2.5. Strategy use and performance 
To conceptualize strategy use as a product of previously learned utility paves the way to 
understanding more about performance differences. Section 5.2.2 discusses task performance 
both from participants and the model. The best and worst performers reflect a different 
pattern of utility values in the productions used for the creation of a fire barrier. The model 
reveals that problem solvers facing a task under time pressure will be more successful if they 
combine top-down and bottom-up processes to deal with the task. The best FireChief 
performers have a preference for waiting for trucks to complete a move then immediately 
issuing a command (that is, they link two commands with the same truck more often) and have 
a strong preference for using the Barrier strategy. Less strategy change is related to higher 
performance in the CT programme. To avoid wasting time is a good practice, the best 
performers do not waste a lot of time moving the mouse long distances. Lee et al. (1995) 
observe that the strategy use of participants contributes significantly to performance. In 
general terms the best performers are those that choose the best strategy frequently. 
Frequent use of a strategy enables its refinement through the learning of convenient 
behaviours such as waiting for trucks to complete a move if the length of the movement is 
short, the most appropriate form for a barrier, and the appropriate distance between a barrier 
and the fire.  
 
The initial strategy selection has an effect on performance. Consider a model starting the CT 
programme. If the model selects the Barrier strategy it is possible that its performance will be 
high enough to increase the probability of selecting the Barrier strategy a second time round 
(which may result in further good performance). On the other hand, if the model selects the 
Follow strategy it is probable that its performance will be low increasing the probability of 
selecting another strategy in the following trial. The important point is that the model is able 
to explore new strategic alternatives if it receives a low final feedback, that it tends to repeat a 
strategy selection that has proven successful in previous trials (taking into consideration the 
assessment of the situation) and that it tends to improve the implementation of a strategy the 
more it is practised. Payne et al. (1988) argue that a major problem is to understand and 
predict when a particular strategy will be used.  
6.1.3.  How do choices arise in complex and dynamic situations? 
Ultimately, models of human behaviour involving decision making look for explanations of how 
these decisions are made. Section 4.1 described two cognitive modelling paradigms: 
Competing Strategies and Perceptual and Motor Processes. Due to the necessity of 
implementing these paradigms in the context of a highly dynamic task this study enriched 
them. Following the Competing Strategies paradigm four strategies compete to solve every 
FireChief trial and the relative merits of the different strategies are managed by the utility 
learning mechanism. Following the Perceptual and Motor Processes paradigm the model 
heavily relies on perceptual actions in order to maintain an updated representation of the task 
environment. Nevertheless, there are some characteristics of the FireChief task, mainly related 
to its dynamic component, which posed specific modelling challenges and hence demanded a 
novel approach.  
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In the context of the cognitive model top-down control refers to the definition of strategies 
plus the sequences of productions that implement chains of behaviour. A strategy is specified 
at a fairly abstract level. In the case of the Barrier strategy the plan is to start using trucks to 
create a barrier and at the same time to use copters to extinguish some of the fires; after the 
barrier is completed all units start attacking the fire. On the other hand bottom-up control 
refers to the processing of feedback that tunes the utility value of each production plus the 
deliberate act of sensing the state of the world for gathering information.  
 
This research found that the way environmental feedback is processed is critical for controlling 
behaviour. The model continuously gathers information and re-shapes the execution of its 
strategies. Selecting actions based on utility comparisons facilitates a fluid and quick selection 
of actions which is instrumental for obtaining good performance, particularly in situations with 
high levels of dynamics and time pressure. This ability to adapt depends on how the utility 
value of productions are modified which in turn is based on the model’s design, where several 
rules compete in selecting the next action at almost every time step, and the rewarding 
scheme. 
 
Participants interacting with the FireChief task show a considerable diversity of behaviours. A 
modelling challenge was to allow this richness to appear in the model behaviour and this was 
found to be possible by a promoting the competition of microstrategies at the sub-strategic 
level. This characteristic of the model distinguishes it from models such as that, for example, 
presented by Taatgen (2005) where actions follow a pre-established plan. The cognitive model 
has knowledge of how to execute atomic actions that can be combined to issue commands, 
but the precise sequencing of these actions is largely left to the reward history of individual 
rules. The dynamic nature of the FireChief task has a considerable influence in this matter: the 
ever changing environment in FireChief favours the reaction to environmental cues over the 
creation and execution of detailed plans, at almost all times the model must choose a single 
action from a pool of various options (check the example in section 5.4.2). The task of 
achieving the model’s flexibility in a dynamic task such as FireChief represented a complex task 
mainly due to the potentially high degree of brittleness. It has been found that brittle models 
fall short in accounting for flexibility (Taatgen, 2005) and the dynamic nature of FireChief 
produces a large variety of situations in which the model needs to know what to do. The model 
has to handle all possible events triggered by FireChief whilst enabling the execution of 
commands. The occurrence of distracters made this task more complex. The model is able to 
recover from distracters by relying in its working memory (cf. Brumback et al., 2005) which is 
stored in the imaginal buffer. Section 6.1.3.1 discusses the core of the extension implemented 
to the Competing Strategies modelling paradigm to enable flexibility whilst enabling the 
completion of high-level goals.  
6.1.3.1. Rewarding the execution of commands 
When a command is successfully executed it has an impact in the environment. This research 
highlights the key role of the size and distribution across rules of rewards. As pointed out by 
Janssen, Gray & Schoelles (2008) the conceptualisation of reward used during the 
development of the model greatly influences its behaviour. In the FireChief model 
microstrategies are selected by applying rational analysis: those rules that contribute the most 
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towards the successful execution of commands are rewarded. By rewarding the successful 
execution of commands, the FireChief model emphasizes the relation of overt environmental 
changes (those produced by the execution of commands) and rewards. The model is not driven 
by the completion of large tasks or elaborated high-level goals (section 4.2.3.1), but rather the 
model shows that it is possible to gain control over complex dynamic situations by focusing on 
the execution of atomic actions whilst following a loose strategy definition. 
 
The reward scheme works along with the random component in ACT-R to achieve this 
flexibility. The use of the s parameter (noise) is important to show variability, as in the Peebles 
& Bothell (2004) model (section 2.5.2). As pointed out by Jones, Ritter & Wood (2000) 
increasing noise during the calculation of utilities reduces the influence of knowledge about 
which strategy is the most effective. In their model of the Tower task they increase the noise 
parameter systematically and found that a value of 6 (which is higher than the standard value 
of 3 reported is several studies) gave the best fit to data. With a noise level of 6 any model is 
likely to select incorrect strategies, this is similar to what happens during VT where the lack of 
opportunity for rehearsing a single successful strategy allows for a freer competition between 
strategies rather than the dominion of a single strategy observed in the CT condition.  
 
Rewards can be seen as an abstraction of the ability of an individual to process feedback from 
the environment. The objective of the Tower task (Jones, Ritter & Wood, 2000) is to build a 
pyramid using 21 wooden blocks (based on a target pyramid presented to participants at the 
beginning of the trial). If a rule helps to generate the construction the model believes to be 
correct, the rule’s strength is increased. A similar approach (that is, to reward certain actions) 
is followed by the FireChief model. An important difference between the Tower task and 
FireChief is the degree of time pressure. In FireChief decisions must be made at a fast pace 
because the environment is continuously changing, so there is not the same opportunity for 
evaluating options as in the case of the Tower task. The consequence is that, even when the 
right decisions are made, rewards are diminished if they are not executed in a timely manner. 
 
An interesting aspect of modelling a task that spans several minutes is how different time 
bands of behaviour are impacted. Considering Newell’s (Newell, 1990) time scales, the 
FireChief task covers both the rational and the cognitive bands. The model performs actions at 
the cognitive band level: deliberate acts (100 msec.), operations (1 sec), and unit tasks (10 sec). 
A unit task refers to the execution of single commands. The model also performs actions at the 
rational band: each FireChief trial lasts 4 minutes and each participant completes 24 trials (96 
minutes in total). Within this time it is necessary to integrate sets of unit tasks into blocks of 
behaviour, such as creating a barrier, both in order to complete a full trial and to complete 
entire training and test programmes. The cognitive model shows how decisions at the 
cognitive band level impact the rational band. Using command execution reward as an 
example, waiting behaviour in the continue barrier microstrategy impacts the execution of the 
Barrier strategy: waiting for trucks to travel short distances (cognitive band) increases the 
probability of issuing a successful CF command (cognitive band) which in turn increases the 
probability of implementing the Barrier strategy (rational band) and complete a full training 
programme (rational band).  
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6.2. Future lines  
This section describes five avenues of exploration that can be followed by reusing the artefacts 
already provided by this research or by making extensions to them.  
6.2.1.   Modelling poor performers 
Although it might be expected that a game-like simulation such as FireChief would maintain 
the interest of participants, it is possible to identify in the data set problem solvers who almost 
always present low performance, possibly signalling a lack of effort or interest. Although this 
research does not attempt to model personality factors, there are moments when there is no 
rational basis for making a choice and for which personal preferences may influence strategy 
selection: for example, strategy selection for the very first trial, prior to any performance 
feedback being received.  
6.2.2.   Running more experiments 
The model could be further tested by obtaining more empirical data using new FireChief 
scenarios and training programmes. To research how much training is required to become 
cognitively inflexible and to assess the capability of the model to replicate this phenomenon 
the amount of practice can be varied. The current FireChief model shows cognitive inflexibility 
after being trained 16 times with the same scenario. A training programme that starts with 12 
VT scenarios and finishes with 4 CT scenarios can be used to test (1) whether participants show 
signs of cognitive inflexibility or not after a shorter training period and (2) whether the model 
is able to capture this tendency. It may be the case that participants become inflexible after 
the last 4 trials but the model does not consolidate its strategies in such a short period. This 
research found that participants tend to use CF commands when wind strength is high and 
that, with enough practice, patterns that resemble a barrier of CFs emerge (and the model 
replicates this phenomenon). But, what would happen if the capability to execute CF 
commands is reduced? Similarly to the EF test condition CF command execution can be 
affected in such a way that Only-DW strategies (Stop and Follow) should be preferred even 
though wind strength is high. In this scenario the capability of DW commands to extinguish 
fires should be increased to allow good performance (otherwise participants will get low 
performance almost always). In this scenario it can be tested (1) whether participants and the 
model stop executing CF commands and (2) how long it takes for participants and the model to 
stop executing CF commands. At the same time it would be interesting to see the level of 
performance of the Stop strategy after the capability of appliances to extinguish fire increases.  
6.2.3.   Exploring different task manipulations 
Several researchers have found that subtle changes in the interface may represent significant 
cognitive changes for participants (section 2.2.3.4). For instance, this research found that 
participants, and the model, have a preference for using copters when dropping water on fires. 
This preference may be caused by (1) the fact that copters are faster that trucks, (2) that 
copters have slightly more power to extinguish fires or (3) that trucks can be destroyed by the 
fire. These features of the task can be manipulated to determine whether participants start 
using trucks with more frequency and to test if the model is able to replicate this behaviour. 
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6.2.4.   Incorporating different kinds of data 
Studies such as Schoelles & Gray (2000) include the use of eye tracking data, this information 
helped them to discover a particular strategy in which participants move the mouse pointer 
over an aircraft, switch their attention to a specific area of the visual display, click the mouse 
and finally notice a change in the visual display (as a result participants can be sure that the 
information displayed corresponds to the selected aircraft). Without eye tracking data the 
discovery of this strategy would have been impossible. The use of eye tracking data may 
contribute to understanding better how participants deploy their attention and hence the QOF 
of the model may be improved, including the latency of commands. It would be particularly 
interesting to know whether eye tracking data can contribute to improving the QOF of the 
subtask of executing a CF command (just after the unit has arrived at the target location). It 
would also be interesting to study how the appearance of spot fires and fire development 
captures attention and compare this new data with the current mechanisms used by the 
model.  
 
6.2.5.   Adding more learning mechanisms 
Section 4.2.3.2 explains why the production compilation mechanism was not used in FireChief. 
Nevertheless it would be interesting to explore this path. Also, although utility is able to 
capture many useful aspects of how choices are made, other constructs may enrich the quality 
of the model. For instance, Nellen & Lovett (2004) propose that considering the amount of 
information gain (understood by these authors as a measure of how much knowledge is gained 
as a consequence of selecting a particular action) is an important factor when making 
decisions. It would be useful to incorporate a measure of information gain into the model, 
mainly due to the fact that strategy exploration is important for guiding behaviour. By adding 
this element the model’s focus won’t just be the execution of single commands but also the 
discovery of new knowledge. 
6.3. Conclusions 
The contributions of this work towards our understanding of CPS are the methodological 
approach to the creation of the model, the design patterns embedded in the model (which are 
a reflection of the cognitive demands imposed by the nature of the task) and mainly an 
explanation of how skill, described in terms of strategy use, is acquired in complex scenarios. 
This study contributes to our understanding about strategy use in complex dynamic tasks: 
which strategies are used, how they are selected, and how strategy execution changes as 
experience is gained. A key finding is that good performance is linked to an effective 
combination of strategic control with attention to changing task demands, reflecting time and 
care taken in informing and effecting action. 
 
Several artefacts were produced by this effort including a dynamic task fully compatible with 
ACT-R, a tool for analysing both participant and model generated data, and a cognitive model 
whose features enable the replication of several aspects of the empirical data. In this research 
four strategies were identified, and their structure comprising microstrategies clearly 
described, in a way that allows modifications or improvements to be made in order to measure 
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their impact for the overall strategy. These strategies can be modified to test different 
approaches to fighting the fire, alternatively different sizes and locations of rewards can be 
implemented. The model can run under the same task configuration using the same 
knowledge (rules) and yet produce different results: variability is achieved by allowing 
competition between rules based on utility. 
6.3.1.   Understanding CPS behaviour from a cognitive modelling 
perspective 
This study provides a deeper understanding of the phenomena observed in the Cañas et al. 
(2005) study, including a computational realisation of the cognitive inflexibility phenomenon, 
the focal topic in the Cañas et al (2005) study. This understanding is a product of a deeper 
scrutiny and new analysis of the data plus the development of the cognitive model. The model 
describes how ACT-R actions are combined into microstrategies and how these microstrategies 
are combined to form strategies. Chapter 5 demonstrates that the model captures well the 
overall performance levels (section 5.2.1), the learning effect produced by the CT (section 
5.2.1) and the effects that the different environmental changes generate over performance 
(section 5.2.1.2). The interaction between performance and strategy use is also captured in the 
VT condition but mainly for the structured strategies Stop and Barrier, presumably due to 
differences in the complexity of trials (section 5.2.2.2).  
 
Strategy consolidation and cognitive inflexibility can be traced to the utility values of 
productions: the different training programmes produce a different profile of utility values. A 
particular implementation of a strategy depends on the fine tuning of ACT-R rules, as a 
consequence of environmental rewards, and thus is a product of both the specification of trials 
and the history of the interactions between problem solver and task. Cognitive inflexibility 
occurs in the CT condition because the learning mechanism shapes the utility of rules in such a 
way that the model becomes insensitive to negative rewards at the micro-level for a specific 
period of time during the test phase. These dominant rules tend to be those that belong to the 
Barrier strategy for the CT condition. In this sense the automation of the strategy runs the risk 
of deterring the problem solver from extracting relevant information from the environment, 
hence allowing the emergence of cognitive inflexibility. In the VT condition no single strategy 
dominates. Section 5.3 describes four interactions related to the phenomenon of cognitive 
inflexibility that are well captured by the model during the test phase. 
 
A detailed model of performance allows a better understanding of the role of mouse 
movements in understanding variability in command duration. In the case of FireChief the 
spatial distribution of commands determines the time required to move the mouse pointer 
between cells. At the same time the spatial distribution of commands is a consequence of the 
strategy that is implemented and the characteristics of the trial. The time required for moving 
the mouse pointer makes an important contribution to the total duration of commands. This 
phenomenon is not surprising; nevertheless, the detailed dimensions and characteristics of the 
impact of mouse movements on command execution was not clear based solely on the 
analysis of participant data; the model delivered key insights into this phenomenon. As a 
consequence of accurately modelling these components of command execution several 
patterns of command use observed in the human data are well captured by the model. 
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 Longer latencies associated with executing a CF command that is not part of a barrier. 
In this respect it is important to track down the moment at which the cognitive effort is 
made (see section 4.3.4). Cognitive effort for placing the new section of a barrier needs to 
be traced to the time before the movement is executed and not only the point at which the 
CF command is issued (section 5.2.3.4). Similarly the model captures a difference in 
latencies between executing a CF command when using the Barrier strategy and executing 
a CF command when using the NonBarrier strategy (section 5.2.3.1). In this respect the 
model highlights the weight placed on the time associated with mouse movements in the 
total time required to execute commands.  
 
 Preference for shorter movements while fighting the fire, particularly when strategies 
are consolidated (section 5.2.3.3).   
 
 Longer time associated with the execution of the first CF command of a fire-break 
barrier in comparison with the remaining CF commands (see section 5.2.3.1); sub-section 1 
in section 5.3.1 describes what the model does with this extra time.  
 
Other relevant interaction is that, in the VT programme, the model shows a preference for 
creating a fire-break barrier in a reactive way. Considering the high variability of the VT 
programme, bottom-up control is the best approach: the variability of wind strength makes it 
harder to apply top-down control. On the other hand, the model trained in the CT programme 
chooses to exert top-down control in creating the fire-break barrier. Again, this preference is 
not a product of symbolic reasoning, but an emergent property of the reward scheme. It was 
also observed that participants wait for a truck to finish moving in situations where there isn’t 
long to wait so that a CF command can be issued immediately upon arrival. This interaction is 
also mediated by the type of command issued after the movement: waiting behaviour is 
typically favoured prior to the execution of CF commands, but not DW commands. This 
behaviour arises from the trade-off between the advantages of waiting over getting on with 
fire-fighting elsewhere; there are no specific rules that prefer waiting over other behaviours: 
waiting behaviour emerges as a consequence of the reward scheme used in the model. This 
evidence not only supports the appropriateness of using the Competing Strategies paradigm to 
model CPS behaviour in dynamic tasks, but also of extending this paradigm with an additional 
layer as described below.  
6.3.2.   Extending the Competing Strategies cognitive modelling 
paradigm  
This research supports the view that, for dynamic tasks, the competition of strategies is not 
limited to strategy selection, but also to the execution of the strategy. The dynamic nature of 
these tasks forces a second layer of competition between alternative courses of action at a 
lower functional level (i.e. microstrategies). These processes represent two different kinds of 
decisions in complex dynamic tasks that should be addressed differently when creating models 
of human performance. After a strategy is selected the implementation of it requires several 
quick, non-deliberative decisions within similar setups. This is the recurrent choice problem 
that the model faces throughout a trial. This finding enriches the Competing Strategies 
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cognitive modelling paradigm (section 4.1) by incorporating an additional layer of within-
strategy execution competition. This layer is comprised by several architectural features. 
 
The considerable dynamic component of the computer simulations such as microworlds and 
the large amount of visual elements available in their interfaces pointed towards the 
exploitation of the Reinforcement Learning mechanism embedded in ACT-R over a declarative 
approach. The consequence is that cognitive models of complex dynamic tasks become 
primarily stimulus-driven where retrievals from declarative memory are infrequently required. 
In such scenarios the model can make use of the task environment as an external memory. 
This research suggests that, in line with Fu & Anderson (2008), the high cognitive load of 
FireChief hampers explicit memory encoding but not the Reinforcement Learning mechanism.  
It can be argued that the CT programme enables the creation of declarative rules to govern 
behaviour, but this would mean a different set of rules for the different models. Nevertheless 
the existence of such rules can also explain cognitive inflexibility as their top-down influence 
would generate insensitivity to feedback. More research is needed in this respect. In the end 
the model’s behaviour is driven by external environmental cues but mediated by internal cues 
represented as production utility values.  
 
Fu & Anderson (2006) stress the importance of identifying the critical choices responsible for 
the delayed reinforcement, in this context one of the greatest challenges was to find the right 
level of abstraction for updating the utility of productions. Fu & Anderson (2008) consider that 
dynamic tasks increase the complexity of the credit-assignment problem. Reinforcement 
Learning is driven by the gradual accumulation of experiences through trial-and-error feedback 
to inform the correctness of future choices.  
 
Rewarding productions for their effectiveness in successfully completing commands has 
proven to be a good criterion (section 4.2.3.1). This scheme enables the differentiation and 
tuning of key rules by providing the right level of granularity. This reward scheme presents 
emergent properties in the model’s behaviour and performance that mirror behaviours 
observed in the human data. These behaviours are not pre-programmed by means of 
productions rules but result from the way rules compete and are rewarded. The model of the 
Blocks World Task described in Janssen & Gray (2012) shows adaptation to its accuracy goal by 
keeping the number of placed blocks low. Similarly the FireChief model adapted to its goal by 
striving for the successful execution of commands that ensures the continuous use of available 
resources. These results shed some light onto how people deal with complex, dynamic tasks. If 
a particular way of implementing a microstrategy is continuously rewarded, it becomes the 
preferred way of executing it, regardless of the possibility that another action might be more 
adequate. This observation can be extended to other dynamic tasks where the time for 
planning is severely reduced due to time pressure. For instance, instead of explicitly selecting 
which microstrategy to execute for each subtask, the Argus Prime model (section 2.5.2) may 
reward the execution of single commands, such as clicking on an aircraft, and allow a free 
competition of all microstrategies. 
 
Results also suggest that a form of local optimization (the execution of single commands) 
result in global optimization (stopping the fire) under certain constraints: selecting the 
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appropriate strategy and exerting a weak amount of control over strategy execution. The weak 
control structure of the strategy definition is similar to the one described in Taatgen (2005) 
about an Air Traffic Control task. But rewards, ultimately, only change the utility of 
productions: it is also necessary to provide a suitable design to allow the emergence of 
adaptive behaviour. The enforcement of production competition embedded in the basic 
workflow (figure 4.1) ensures that the rules responsible for the decisions are properly credited 
and, as a consequence, small fluctuations in production utility caused by the reward scheme 
add up to define a pattern of behaviour at a higher level (e.g. the emergence of cognitive 
inflexibility in the CT).  
 
Solving problems is a pervasive aspect of everyone’s life and a subset of these problems are 
infused with a dynamic component. The results of this research pinpoint a set of best practices 
that successful strategies for complex dynamic tasks should have: identify a set of relevant 
elements of the task and focus attention on them, perceive the status of these elements 
continuously, execute motor commands promptly, allow flexibility when executing the 
strategy and look for the execution of those actions with the highest impact on the 
environment. As a corollary this research supports the idea that, from the multitude of 
cognitive demands that the problem solver must meet in order to solve complex dynamic 
tasks, the primary one is the ability to process feedback from the environment. Finally, based 
on the insights generated by a cognitive modelling approach, this research also proposes that, 
while dealing with a complex dynamic task under time pressure, the problem solver is focused 
on completing clearly defined subtasks (such as executing single commands).  
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